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ABSTRACT

Don Luigi Sturzo (18?1-1959) has been acknowledged by historians of Italian politics as an effective social reformer, an
astute politician, and a great statesman. This active phase ot
sturzo's career has been well documented and his name assured a
permanent and honored place in the long history of his native
country. But the fundamental character and depth of the social
theory that also marks the achievement that was his life has not
been adequately explored. It is the thesia of this work that the
scope or Sturzo's theory embraced nothing less than an integral,
concrete and coherent view or, being ~uman. The purpose of this _
study is to serve as an i~trochiction ·fbr such an understanding
ot Sturzo•s theory.
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Al though this is an ih~erpi,-eta~i ve an.d construe ti ve exposition rather than simply a hlstoric~l<Qr· ··bextual analysis of
Sturzo's thought, the inner logic of this study remains that or
Sturzo's own thought. The movement of this logic is rooted in
and follows the realization or the ontological structure of the
person in his living, and thereby historical, reality. Since
this realization is, in its essence, the concretization of sociality--the associative dimension of man's becoming--the activity
through which the person achieves his being is at one with the
inward formation of society. The individual person and society
are constituted together in a synthesizing relational process
of differentiation-in-synthesis in which the closer and more
intense the relationship, the deeper and more extensive is the
distinct reality or each. The definitive and original irresolvable principle of sociality is rationality, the specifying
principle of the person; and it is the projection of consciousness through the inner dynamism of rationality for expression
and completion through the mutuality of thought and action that
constitutes the concretization ot sociality. An analysis of
this process from the perspective of both the person and society
is the starting point.

$.

'two other essential features ot this process provide the
focus or attention:. its concrete expression in social forms and
the regularities of its movement, which Sturzo expresses in the
form of "sociological laws." While the social process is pluralistic in its structure, polarity is the dominating feature or
it in its concrete process. Both characteristics have their
ontological basis in the sole substantive and efficient principle
animating the process, the individual person.
Just as it is history, as the constitutive activity of man,
that manifests the inner laws of man's associative nature--laws
which reveal that man in and of himself cannot effect a totalizing
and conclusive pacification of the tendencies that give rise to
the laws--so is it history and history alone that reveals the
presence of a personal, transcendent. unifying principle within
the historical process. Therefore, not only is Sturzo•s theory
of history the foundation of all his thought, but it is also the
culminating point of his thought wherein he works out and brings
together the implications of his integral social theory in all
of its aspects. He bases his integral social theory on an openended historicism that is able to account for both transcendent
and immanent factors within the historical process, to preserve
their intrinsic unity within a single process. and yet uphold
the substantive reality of each. This study therefore concludes
with an exposition of the main features of his theory ot history.
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INTRODUCTION
In view of certain trends and categories of contemporary
thought the relative obscurity or the theory of Don Luigi Sturzo
is puzzling.

In view of the grave socio-political problems

pressing in upon mankind from every side today this obscurity
is inexplicable. 1

For it is not exaggeration to say that it

is precisely the shadow cast over mankind by these problens

that measures the stature of Don Luigi Sturzo as a socio-political reformer and theoretician.

As one commentator on Sturzo's

thought has accurately expressed it:
Don Luigi Sturzo was a man of his times: This is the
key to his mind and spirit. His most outstanding
characteristic was that historical identity which is
the sole basis of greatness. He was of his times,
1 Numerous reasons have been advanced for the neglect of

Sturzo's thought. They are sometimes contradictory. For example,
as a thinker who is Catholic, Sturzo has had the misfortune to
be interpreted as a Catholic thinker. As a result, on the one
side there are those who view his thought as simply a statement
of'"Catholic Nee-Thomistic social :philosophy." One critic of
Sturzo'a thought dismissed it as an instrument of influence of
Catholicism, in this instance "based on a Catholic Platonism."
Cf. Paul. Honigsheim's review of Inner Laws of Societt' in Am. J.
of Soc., 57 (1945), 160-61. On the other side some end to find
nis thought and its expression not "Catholic" enough. One critic
finds a strain in his thought "which links him, not to Christian
and Catholic traditions, but to the revolutionary thought of
post-Reformation times." Cf. werner Stark's review of Timasheff's
The Sociology of Lui~i Sturzo in Thought, 38 (Summer, 1963), 318~0.
See also Franz ueller's review of Inner Laws of Society in
Am. Oath. Soc. Rev., 6 (1954), 109-11. Rone of the reasons,
whether taken singly or together, provide an adequate account
of the lack of attention given to Sturzo's thought. For exanple,
even those, such as Nicholas Timasheff, who find Sturzo's theory
"both original and profound" point to methodological and terminological difficulties of an extremely complex theory. But,
obviously, these difficulties are not peculiar to Sturzo's theory
alone.
1

2

moreover, not only because he faithfully reflected
their perplexities and problems, but also, because,
to a significant degree, he mastered them.2
The problems that were to forge his thoughts and eventually
shape his career were those of post-Risorgimento Italy.3

His

vigorous and effective response to these problems gradually and
laboriously extended itself from social and economic reform on
the municipal and provincial level to the organization of a
national political party, the Italian Popular Party, with which
his name is so closely associated.

The eminent historian

Federico Chabod has described the birth of this party as "the
most noteworthy event in twentieth century Italian history,
especially in relation to the preceding century." 4 This event
occurred on the morning of January 18, 1919 when Don Luigi
Sturzo made his historic and dramatic appeal "to all men f'ree
and brave" to support the Italian Popular Party.

It is here,

in the person of Sturzo, that we find the locus of the inspiration, spirit, and thought behind the Popular Party.

Just as it

marked a new phenomenon in the history of Italy, so too, did
Don Luigi Sturzo.

He bas been acknowledged by historians ot

2 A. Robert Caponigri, "Introduction" to Sturzo's Church
and State (Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. vi.
3For an illuminating account of these problems and Sturzo'a
response to them, see A. Robert Caponigri's article, "The Ethical and Sociological Bases or Italian Politics: Sturzo and Croce,"
in Ethics, 59 (Oct., 1948), 35-48. The same author presents a
tine biographical sketch of Sturzo's development in Review of
Politics, 14 (April, 1952), 147-65. For Sturzo's own brief
account, see "My Political Vocation,n in Commonweal, 34 (Sept.
26, 1941), 537-40.
4

Federico Chabod, L'Italia contemporanea (1918-1248)
(Torino: Giulio EinaudiJ, p. 43.

Italian politics as "un uomo nuovo," a new man.5
Due to a renewed interest in the Popular Party in recent
years this active phase of Sturzo's career has been well documented and his name assured a permanent and honored place in the

long history of his native country.

But it is not oerely his

image, though it looms large, as refracted through Italian history that marks the achievement that was his life.

It is true

that Sturzo•s thought was formed and his theory articulated in

actively coping with the problems of post-Risorgimento Italy.
It was from within the context of this active and reflective
engagement that his thought matured and his vision expanded.
As they did, Sturzo came to see that the problems of Italy were
not peculiar to her alone.

In fact, he came to see these prob-

lems as reflecting an undertow of trends and currents that ran
counter to the very values and ideas upon which Western civilization had been built.

His sense of history told him that the

solution to these problems was not to push the clock back, nor
was it

t~e

theories.

formulation and enactment of novel, counteracting
Rather, it lay in reenforcing and injecting new life

into the basic values of Western civilization by integrating
them with the positive values emergent in modern culture.

And

Sturzo saw the convergence of both old and new in the single
value, basic and transcendent to all others, of the free and
autonomous individual person.
Very early in his career, in fact many yenrs before the
5carlo Morandi, Ipartit! ~·;tict neila storiQ d'Italia.
(Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1 5 , P• 91.

4

founding of the Popular Party, Sturzo diagnosed the ills afflicting Italy, and all· of modern society, as not mere surface phenomena of particular social structures, but as lethal fissures
in the social order reaching down to that which is at the basis
of all social forms, the individual person.

The social order violated in its very essence: here
is the problem in synthesis •••• It is not the case or
individual violations or or simply false applications
to concrete cases, but of social violations founded
on the false and erroneous conception of the nature
of man.6
It is this determination of the fundaoental character and depth

ot the problems confronting modern society that defined the
level of Sturzo's vision and from that level only can one adequately understand and evaluate the theory his vision engendered.

It is the thesis of this work that the scope of Stur-

zo' s vision embraced nothing less than an integral, concrete and
coherent view of being human.
Sturzo•s active and reflective concern with the problem of
"being human" is the unifying theme of his diversified writings.
It is a concern that focuses on this problem not as it presents
itself in abstract form, but in the concreteness and particularity which is the reality of history.
the individual person.

It is, then, a concern for

With this leitmotiv in mind one is able

to move through his writings without the disorientation and
discontinuity which may otherwise follow as a result of the
diversity of form and the varying levels of theorizing they
express.
6 Luigi Sturzo, L'organizzazione di classe e le unioni protessionali (1901), in S!ntesi sociaii, Vol. I, Seconda Serie
de11 1 0pera Omnia (2nd ed., rev.; Bo!ogna: N. Zanichelli, 1961),
p. 169.

5
sturzo saw it as no historical accident that the twentieth
century has witnessed the rise of personalist oriented theories.

Just

as

the nineteenth century gave emphasis to individual

liberty because it had been denied in the name of authority, so
it is the reassertion of

t~e

primacy and autonomy of the indi-

vidual person that the twentieth century calls for since "this
is denied in the name of the State and

o:f

the collective entity--

race, nation, or class--that each State strives to express in
a most tangible manner."7

Consequently, Sturzo•s own socio-

political activity and theory revolve around the individual
person.

It is here that he finds the effective counterpoint,

both practically and theoretically, to the modern state, in its
tendency towards a social, political, economic and even ethical
monism and to the attendant movement of society towards a reductive secularism.

In the first instance, as the practical coun-

terpoint, it is the autonomous person that was the basis and
vitality of the Popular Party; and in the second instance it is
the person that stands at the core of his socio-political
theory.

Sturzo himself states, "We must take a new road, lead-

ing to the revaluation of the human person, above and beyond
individualism, which considers persons as so many numbers, nnd
statism, in which they are swallowed up in the whole."8
The primary aim of this study is to present an interpretative and constructive exposition of Sturzo's "revaluation of
?sturzo, "The Crisis of Democracy," in Politics and Moral(London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 19~S), pp. 56=?.
8

llli··

p.

56.

6
the human person."

A few preliminary observations are in order

for the proper understanding of this endeavor.

The form and

content has been imposed by what I consider to be the initial
and most urgent task if Sturzo's theory is to merit the attention it deserves: to plumb as deeply as possible toward the
center of his theory to lay bare that fundamental orientation
of his thought and the potent ideas intrinsic to it which
together give to that theory an enduring historical life of its
own.

'Whatever criteria one may use to determine the historical

significance of a theory on man surely first and foremost must
be that quality which follows from effectively engaging the
dominant human problems of a given era in such a way as to
reflect the consciousness of that era and yet at the same time
to transcend it by touching in some fundamental way essential
features of human reality.

In this way it never loses its

initial vital quality of immediacy whereby it remains not only
a line of thought which merits intrinsic consideration in its
own right, but also a fund of ideas for further creative theorizing.

The purpose of this study is to serve as an introduc-

tion for such an understanding of Sturzo.
It is by reason of, and

to

emphasize, what I consider to

be this dual dimension of value in Sturzo's theory that I have
undertaken an interpretative and constructive exposition rather
than simply a historical or textual analysis of his thought.
This does not mean that the interpretation presented here is
not based on a close and thorough textual analysis of Sturzo's
writings.

What it does indicate is that in my textual analysis

?
I have focused as much on the implications and ranifications of
sturzo's ideas as

thei~

explicit formulation.

Many of the ideas

rendered explicit here are either a complementing or a reinforcing of what are fragmentary indications of ideas and dirsctions
of thought in Sturzo's writings.

A prime example of this is my

treatment of Sturzo's theory of history because. although he
intended to, Sturzo never had the op]ortunity to work into an
explicit theory of history the historicism that underlies all
of his thought.

The operative criteria throughout my work has

been not only the spirit or cognitive orientation of Sturzo's
thought, but also, and especially, its intrinsic logical structure.

:fheretore, the inner logic of this study remains that of

1

Sturzo's own thought.
The movement of this logic is rooted in and follows the
realization of the ontologica.l structure of the person in his
living, and thereby processive, reality.

Since this realiza-

tion is, in its essence, the concretization of sociality--the
associ~tive

dimension of man's nature--the activity through

which the person achieves his being is at one with the inward
form<ltion of society.

An analysis of this process is the sub-

ject matter of the first chapter.

Two other essential features

of this process provide the focus of attention in the next two
chapters: its concrete expression in social forms and the

regularities of its movement.

Since it is in and through

history that the inner reality of man realizes and manifests
itself, it is in his theory of history that Sturzo grounds his
theory and brings it to completion.

This study therefore

8
concludes with an exposition of the main features of his theory

of history.
one further point that is basic both to my interpretation
o! sturzo'a theory and to an appreciation of its encompassing
contemporaneity must be clarified: Why did Sturzo express his
revaluation of the person in sociological terms?

Through his

sense of history Struzo knew that if this revaluation was to
have meaning, validity and power for the present, it must be
formulated in response to and in terms of the present.

Thus,

by reason of the radical socio-political and secularized char-

acter of the problematic of contemporary man Sturzo approached
and expressed his revaluation in terms of a social theory that
is itself radical and fundamental.
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within the text.

References to the articles of ;)turzo and to

the works of other authors are cited in footnotes.

The more

readily available English translations of Sturzo's writings
have been used wherever posaible, but they have been checked
against the latest approved Italian editions.
tions from Italian editions are my own.

The transla-

CHAPrER I
P"ERSON AND SOCIETY: A SOCIO-PERSONALISM
When Don Luigi Sturzo returned to his beloved native Italy
after world war II, in recognition for what his career, and he
himself as a person, represented to the Italian people, the
National Council of Christian Democrats honored him with these
words: "You symbolize a deeply moral conception

or

political

and social life in the service of man and for the protection
. d'1gn1•ty •••• ul
of h 1s

For no less an authority than the emi-

nent French thinker, Maurice Vaussard, these words synthesize
the essential characteristics of Sturzo's career. 2 Sturzo
initiated and carried out his social and political activity always "in the service of man and for the protection of his
dignity."
Just as the individual person stands at the center of his
social and political activity, so does the person stand at the
heart of Sturzo's social theory.

In fact, his theory both be-

gins and culminates in the concrete person.

Yet, this does not

mean that Sturzo•s theory undercuts the reality of society.
With the term "society" we arrive at the second of the two terms
1 These words were spoken by Adone Zoli in the name of the

National Council of Christian Democrats, September 20, 1946.
See Maurice Vauesard, Il pensiero ~olitico e sociale di Luigi
Sturzo (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1966), P• 15.
2 Ibid.
11

12

around which all social thought revolves--the individual and
society.

Just as the problem of the one and the many has domi-

nated all Western speculation into the nature of reality, so
has the social dimension of this problem dominated all investi-

gation into the structure of social reality.
The human community is indeed a mysterious reality,
exhibiting a wholeness that far transcends a pure and
simple atomism, a real unity which is yet a multiplicity and which obliges us to rethink the very notion
of the individual and the way in which he is related
to society. The fact remains, and cannot be cancelled
out through a desire for a simplistic solution, that
while society is real gua society, it is still a communion of individuals considered in their individualsocial being.3
In grappling with this problem an array of conflicting and
irreducible theories have marked social and political theory
from its inception.

Within the welter of these theories the

limiting alternatives have been either to assign an ontological
priority to one or the other of the two members, and thereby
ultimately reducing the opposing member, whose reality, if it

is upheld, is secondary, mediate, and consequential, into the
ontological primacy of the other or else to view the two terms
synthetically as constituting two interdependent aspects of the
reality.

The attempt here is not to simplistically categorize

or "pigeon-hole" specific theories that have enriched the tradition of social thought, but merely to provide the limiting positions within this tradition.
Among these positions, Sturzo•s theory at first sight
appears to fall within those which view the reality of the
3Robert C. Pollock, "L'uomo nella societa e nella storia,"
in Del metodo sociologieo (Bergamo: Atlas, 1950). p. 196.
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individual and society as indivisible. 4

It is true that Sturzo

18 absolutely explicit in his opposition to any theory that
views the individual and society as two distinct entities. In
the concrete, to use Sturzo's favorite expression. the person
and society are two integrating components of the "concrete
real."

It is only through conceptual analysis that we can

treat them as distinct.

To project the results of this con-

ceptual analysis as a reflection of reality is to be guilty of
what Sturzo aptly terms "abstractionism."

~is

fallacy consists

"of presenting as concrete what is a mental abstraction of their
own." (T.L. 9)5

In this instance it means that in analyzing

the factors of an ongoing and unified process, we then proceed
to hold that the factors were antecedently separated.
But to categorize Sturzo's theory within the theoretical
framework of other relational or synthetic social theories is
to run the risk of overlooking not so much the distinguishing
features of Sturzo•s theory but, more importantly, its radical
originality and difference·.

The terminology and mode

ot expres-

sion may appear similar but the entire cognitive orientation
4 Nioholas Timashetf interprets Sturzo's theory in this way.
See his book. The Sociolo6i of Luigi Sturzo (Baltimore: Helicon
Press, 1962), pp. 66-71.
or an exceiient critique of Timasheft' a basic interpretation of Sturzo, see Victor Gioscia's
"Discussion of Timashef't's Paper." American Catholic Sociological Review, 22 (Spring, 1961). 34-3S.

5It is worthy of note that abstractionism which Sturzo
considers to be the basic fallacy of social theory includes
what John Dewey has called "the philosophic fallacy." that is.
"the conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence." See Dewey's F?merienoe and Nature (New York: Dover.
1958) • PP• 261 and 68.
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could well be different.

An equivalent example in the history

ot philosophy would be a comparative analysis of the metaphysics of Aristotle with that of St. Thomas Aquinas without taking
into account or perceiving the fundamentally different cognitive
orientation of the two thinkers.

The result would be to inter-

pret the two systems in terms of the external modes of expression alone apart from the animating spirit that invests the
terminology of each thinker with its specific meaning.

It comes

down to the difference between comparing two systems which
can be distinguished, but both within the essentialist tradition,
or comparing two systems which are not only distinguishable,
but reflecting two irreducible orientations towards reality-the essentialist and the existentialist.
Sturzo's terminology may correspond to that or relational
or synthetic theories, but the difference in the underlying
meaning spans a cognitive distance as

~reat

as that between an

essentialist and an existentialist metaphysical system.

Two

brief examples will serve to clarity this and prevent the attempt
to reduce Sturzo's theory to that of other similarly articulated theories.

A central notion to Sturzo•s theory and to

any synthesizing social theory is that of relation.
relations are real.

For both,

But whereas for synthetic theories the

relational aspects of social reality flow out of already constituted natures, £or Sturzo, the very ontological structures ot
both the person and society are constituted by relations.

In real life all that exists is the social concretion-concrete relations. (I.e. 144)
The whole world is an immense system of syntheses and

15
and relations. Every being is a synthesis, and all
beings are relational. Because of this the world is
organic. It is organic because every synthesis making
up the world takes and gives; it takes by resolving
the kindred activities ra.d.iating from other syntheses
into itself; it gives radiating round itself a part
of its activity.6
sturzo points up this distinction himself.

He quotes a defini-

tion of society from Robert Mc!ver's Society: Its Structure and
Changes:
throu~h

''Society is the system of social relationships in and
which we live."

Sturzo•s view of. this definition is

that it "is acceptable to a phenomenologiat, but it is only an
observation of a fact without any explanation which could be
philosophical, and therefore should be avoided." (M. 31-2)

The

significant term in Sturzo' s comment is the word ''phenomenolo-

gist."

Sturzo uses the term "phenomenology" to indicate simp1y

a direct analysis of facts as they manifest themselves in immediate perception.

Such an analysis would never reveal the

internality and constitutive reality of relations.

Therefore,

such a definition as Mciver•s is only descriptive.
Another essential difference between Sturzo's theory and
other theories relates to the temporal dimension of social reality, the function of time.

In metaphysical terms the difference

is between viewing social reality in terms of being or in terms
of process.

Sturzo's theory considers the person and society

not so much something that is, no matter how closely interdependent their realities are, as something in continual becoming.
Social reality, grounded on the interaction of persons within
and with the social framework, is viewed neither in terms of
6 sturzo, "Theory of Knowledge in Neo-Synthetiam," Dublin
Review, 18? (Oct., 1930), 290.

16

substance nor of being, but as process.

It is only the procea-

sual perspective "which carries us to the heart of reality ......
uThe social structure of mankind is one with its concretization,
and this is processive in time, that is historical." (I.L. xixii)

As will become clear in the unfolding of Sturzo's theory,

this processual view follows from a recognition of temporality

as an internal, necessary, and constitutive dimension of social
reality.

The originality of Sturzo's theory has been character-

ized as:
••• a new vision of major size, distinctly sociological. Its primary characteristic is the notion of
process, which embraces a radical temporalisn, more
sophisticated by far than the nineteenth century temporalisms of Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, or of Sturzo's
own contemporary, Bergson. It is a new conception
of time as the basis of social life which contains
the seed of a sociological relativity, the social
equival~nt of Einstein's magnificent general relativity.'/

Sturzo's social theory begins with the problem of the inward formation of society.

The terms "inward" and "formation"

carry a significant denotation for the correct pre-analytic
perspective on

Sturzo's theory.

The word "inward" signifies

that the emphasis of Sturzo•s theory is on discovering the
inner structure and laws of social reality.

His concern in

investigating the data of various social phenomena is to lay
bare the inner reality that manifests itself through these
phenomena.

The approach toward the study of society in terms

of its formation indicates Sturzo's historical methodology.
It is important to preface an analysis of the components involved
in this formation, the person and society, with a reiteration
?Gioscia, "Discussion of Timasheff' s Paper," p. 37.

~

l?
of this methodology. . To view these terms abstractly and analytically is to view t.hem not only as separable, but separate;
however, when they are viewed in the concrete dialectic of the
historical process, they reveal themselves as reciprocal conditions of each other's reality.

Analysis is a necessary metho-

dological procedure for separating out in order to understand
the synthesizing elements of the social process, but it cannot
be over-emphasized that all analysis meansabstraction so that
"reality is very different from what it appears in analysis."

(I.L. 252)

Thus, the results of analysis, as not only a step

removed from reality but also "frozen" in the distorting immobility of concepts, elucidate only insofar as they presuppose,
are grounded in, are constantly referred back to, and prepare
for the dialectical synthesis out of which they were abstracted.
The synthetic processual view of social reality presents
methodological difficulties which are never satisfactorily
solved because they arise from the conceptual mode of our knowledge.

But what can be done is to so recognize

th~se

difficul-

ties as to not allow the limitations of the conceptual formulation to become more than that--precisely limitations of the
theory and not of the contours of the reality under investigation.

In regard to our specific area of concern here, the per-

son and society, we are forced to distinguish between them, in
order to understand something of them, because all reality becomes intelligible only through differentiation.

Yet, the

reality of each is not only determined by, but constituted in,
relation to the other.
In the consideration of the individual person, we distin-
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guish between his individual and social life.

This leads us to

char 8 cterize these two aspects of the one personal life with
terms which are classically set in opposition to each other
because they have been viewed abstractly and analytically, and
not concretely and synthetically.

The life of the individual

person is one, not two, unifying the entire range of personal
activity, whether individual or social.
We often speak of the individual and the social as though
or inner and outer, but in reality the inner, too, is
social. Or they are taken as the subjective and objective, but nothing is objective that is not subjective
also. Or at other times they serve to distinguish the
idea from its realization, but every realization contains the idea and is the fruit of individual activity.
The analytical forms of speech are always incomplete;
they elucidate only insofar as they presuppose or prepare the synthesis. (T.L. 42-3)
'l'hus, it is from the matrix of the socio-historical process that
Sturzo unweaves the pattern of social reality.
In the structural formation of society the individual person is the active and efficient principle.

Society is "the

multiple, simultaneous, continuative projection of individuals
in their activity." (I.L. xvii) 8 This follows from the tact
that the person is at once individual and social.
He is so individual as not to partake of any life but
his own, as to be an incommunicable personality. He
is so social that he could not exist or develop any
faculties not even live his life outside the social
forms •••• It is evident that in the concrete we find
neither individuals apart from society, nor society
apart from individuals. In the concrete, there are
only individuals in society. The associative principle in the individual is an inner principle. while it
completes his individual reality. There does not exist
an extra-individual and, hence, extra-human associative
8 cr. also T.L. 186; "The Philosophic Background of Christian Democracy,'' Review of Politics, 9 (Jan., 194?), 9-10.
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principle, self-subsistent and as such informing
social life. (I.L. xiv)
It may appear tnat Sturzo is simply stressing the social nature

o! man which clearly places the historical and ideal origins of
his thought in the tradition of classical humanism.

In a sense

this is true because assuredly it is within this tradition that

the social diroensior.

of man's nature is highlighted.

For an

integral facet of this tradition is its emphasis that only
within society does man achieve the depth and extension of his
being.

But in the historical development of the philosophical

study of man, this insight has not borne the fruit it should
have, mainly because only lip-service has been paid to it.
This is manifest in the attempt to fix the nature of man apart
from the social process.

There is also a deeper reason.

within

the tradition of classical humanism, when they speak of man's
nature as essentially social, it is precisely that--a nature
which has a social dimension; that is, man's sociality, the
associative aspect of the individual, is viewed as flowing out

of an already constituted structure-- 11 already 11 indicating not
a temporal or empirical priority, but both a logical and ontological priority.

To say that the individual does not have a

temporal or empirical priority to society means that the individual never actually develops outside of the social relations
and forms that are generated and crystallized by his sociality,

or if he ever did, it would be in an anomalous condition such
as that of the "feral man," projected by anthropologists and
social psychologists.
prior to society.

But in the logical order, the person is

The concept of the individual is a logical

presupposition of the concept of society.

Sturzo agrees with

both of these points, but not with attributing an ontological
priority to man's nature apart from the realizing of its sociality.

That the classical tradition of humanism opts for the

grounding of man's sociality in an ontologically prior structure is indicated by such classical notions as "the state of
nature, 11 "the isolated man," or "the man on an island."

Here

is the precise point where Bturzo goes beyond classical humanism.
First of all, it is important to note that Sturzo deals
with the concrete, existing individual man, not with man or
humanity in the abstract.

But he goes beyond this.

He looks

on man not primarily as an individual, but above all as a person.
As individuals, all men are equal by reason of their common
humanity, but it is only as persons that the depth of their
reality is fathomed in its vital and qualitative uniqueness.
Considering men as individuals results in the tendency to either
reduce man to the level of nature, or at least to view him in
the sa:ne terms as other natural organisms, but with his own
specifying properties.

The consequence ist and has been, to

either fall into naturalistic dilemnas, which are often only
pseudo-dilemnas, or to undercut the uniqueness of man which
manifests itself only in the personal dimension.

Ultimately,

it can have no other result than the alienation of man from
himself since it is only in the personal field that he comes to
realize, and recognize, the spiritual dimensions of his own
subjectivity.

It is precisely on the basis of these insights

that :3turzo rejects in social theory such comparisons as that
between animal groupings and human society. (cf. M. 32-3;
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I .L. 10-ll)

In regard to Sturzo's focus on the personal dimension of

man, th ere is a terminological difficulty that has to be claritied.

sturzo uses the terms, "the personal," "the person,"

"personality," and "human personality" interchangeably.

The

term that most .frequently appears in his writings is "human
personality."

But in technical use today these words have come

to assume quite different meanings.

The difficulty revolves

around the fact that both of the terms "personal" and "personality" relate to the person and would seem to denote those qualities or set of characteristics by which a person is a person
and distinguished from all beings which are not persons.

But

the term "personality" has generally taken on a more specific
meaning to denote the sum total of attitudes, traits, or behavioral patterns which distinguishes one person from another.9
Sturzo uses the term "personality" in its wider denotation.
The crux of the problem we are considering concerns the
metaphysical implications of Sturzo's theory.

It is a question

ot whether his theory just fits within the tradition of classical humanism or whether his relational processual view extends
to the ontological level.
does.

He states that

be impossible.

0

There is textual evidence that it

without a society any human activity would

Society is always operating from the moment

that there are individuals.

It may lack a stable and purposeful

organization; ••• but from the fact that there are individuals who

9John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber &
Faber, 1959), p. 25.
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seek to achieve something new through their own activities,
sociality in the conc·rete exists." (I.L. 12)

0

Society is not

an entity or an organism outside and above the individual, nor
is the individual a reality outside and above society." (I.L.
xivfO Although Sturzo is careful to maintain the reality of
both the individual person and society, he views the reality of
each not in terms of being, which would make of them two distinct entities, but in terms of a relational process out of
which the distinct reality of each evolves only as relational
to the other.

They are two factors or elements of a single

synthesizing process.

Man is at once individual and social: he

is essentially individual and necessarily social.

Man "is so

individual as not to partake of any life but his own, as to be
an incommunicable personality.

He is so social that he could

not exist nor develop any faculties nor even live his life outside the social forms." (I.L. xiv; 206)
What we are trying to determine is the ontological relationship between these facets of the person.

Sturzo gives "to

the associative instinct its full value as an ever-developing
exigency and social impulse, and by this very fact we resolve
the individual into society." (I.L. xvi) 11 It should be noted
that Sturzo says "resolve," not dissolve the individual into
10For some other pertinent passages exemplifying Sturzo•s
relational processive view of the person, see: I.L. xix, 13-15,
162, 210, 301, 30?; T.L. 45; I.C. 44-45, 49-50; N.&I. 132;
"History and Philosophy," Thought, 21 (March, 1946), 56.
11
sturzo unfortunately uses the term "instinct" for the
natural and primordial tendencies and aptitudes of the person.

,.....----~-
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12 is the resosociety. But the basic sociological resolution
lution of society irito the individual person. ',-/hat Sturzo is
indicating in this reciprocal resolution of individual into

society and society into the individual is the continuous cycle

or

the syntheses involved in human becoming, "a cycle that runs

from the person to the collectivity and from the collectivity
to the person, a cycle of inward thought finding outward expression, of practical activity conceived and actuated." (I.L. 300)
The social process is so co-natural to us that society is sim-

ply the externalization of our own inner reality joined in a
dynamic synthesis.

Thus, as Robert Pollock states in his acute

analysis of Sturzo•s thought, "society is not an accidental
attribute of man. but rather a necessary aspect of his individual essence,u so that "the personal life and the life of society are not two separate lives, but the one individual-social
life. 111 3
For Sturzo, then, the very ontological structure of the
person is constituted in and through his sociality.

Sociality

is an ontological structure because it is the act by which the
person achieves his own being.

That is to say, the activity by

which sociality is concretized in social forms is the activity
by which the personal is established together with the "concrete
real," or in other words, its actual world.

The nature of man,

that is, the personal, is not in any way pre-existent to the

12sturzo's theory of sociological resolution will be discussed later. For now it is sufficient to note that he takes the
term from the physico-mathematical sciences. It indicates the
reduction to the primary elements that do not permit any further
resolution. Cf. I.L. 8.
13Pollock., "L'uomo nella societ} e nella storia, '' p. 194.
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actual process of the concretization of

sociality.

Social

life is not "as a voluntary choice posterior to individual
existence, but necessary and co-existent with it from the time
of the first appearance of human life on the earth." (I.e. 143)
It is entirely immanent to that concrete process itself.

By

this I oean that the person is not an entity distinct from the
process itself, but the process itself is actually internal to
and constitutive of the person.

Prior to and apart from the

concretizing process of sociality the person !!, not.

its being only in actualizingthis process.

It attains

Th.is means that in

the dimension of being the person is open-ended because it is
always

becomin~--"always"

because the plentitude of its being

in its depth and extension opens onto the infinite contours of
reality, and "becoming" because these two dimensions of its
existential concreteness, its depth and extension, are each constituted by the other in a reciprocal process, which together
form the concretization of sociality, "without which the human
individual is inconceivable.'' (I.L. 5)
Since the person is characterized by the quality of openendedness, so also is the process whereby he is generated.
Therefore, by reason of this self-generative dynamism within the
process, the process never achievesa closed or completed facticity, but rather is always tendential.

This process through

which the existence of the person is established is the one and
the same process whereby society, or more specifically, the
social forms are established.

"Sociality cannot remain a matter

of merely individual relations, but tends of itself to some form
--it may be elementary--of organization, that is, to the estab-

~
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lishillent of a hierarchy of forces." (I.e. 48)

It is only in

generating these concrete forms of society that the person is
generated.

And it is these concrete social forms themselves

that reveal the emerging of the inward structure of the person.
"Society with its variety and its perennial process, is nothing
but the manifestation, ever in becoming, of an inner reality."

(I.L· xiii)

Thus, society is not something that is exterior

to the person in the sense that it is to be set off from the
interior dimension of the person.

For as we are now indicating,

this interior dimension is itself social in a concretely constitutive mode of the person.

The person's mode of being is social

because his ontological structure is social.

Thus, within the

totality--a totality not of facticity but tendential--of human
reality society, too, is interior to the person.

Its external-

1ty consists only in the extent to which the inner reality of
the person has been achieved.

The entire span of human civili-

zation gives awe-inspiring evidence of degrees to which the
field of the personal has developed within the self-generative
emergence of the person.
All that crystallizes outwardly as language, traditions,
institutions, laws, all that incorporates itself with
places--towns, streets, labors, monuments, records,
temples, and churches--or with forms of costume of
intercourse, of living all that is expressed by works
of thought and art, and that which develops with time,
namely history--all are the personal activity of man ••••
(T.L. 186)

All of the achievements of the human spirit within the person
are not "outside of'' or exterior to ·that spirit, but are the

expression of that spirit seeking to obtain the fullness of
its being.
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!rhe transitive aspect of human activity tends to obscure
the fact that spiritual activity is not transitive.

But within

the framework of Sturzo's thought, personal activity in its
~ost

intimate character as personal is centered in the spiritual

dimensions of that activity.

In personal activity, then, and

to the degree that it is personal, nothing other than the person
himself is discovered and defined, since it is the human spirit
generating its own presence to itself in which its reality as
spirit consists.

This does not mean that all activity in which

the person engages is necessarily generative of his own being,
any more than in classical thought did anyone hold that all the

activity of man, just by the mere fact of having been performed
by a man, was thereby human activity.

The delimitation of such

activity in either case has to be set.

The activity under con-

sideration here is limite1 to that activity in which the person
gives form to his own being.

And the active and creative prin-

ciple of that activity is the human spirit, which as immanent
to the process is itself embodied in the external crystallizations of the process.

This process within which the person

emerges is clearly not a physical or mechanical process that
characterizes the physical order, but rather it is a creatively
--in the richest meaning of that word--sel!-generative process
in which the person comes to be.
Out of the dialectical synthesis

or

this concrete process,

it is necessary to disengage the elements involved through the
process of abstraction and conceptualization, not only in order
to better understand the process itself but also to form the
logical concepts necessary for a viable social theory.

Yet,

2?

here such a procedure not only carries its usual inbuilt limitations and risks of distortions, but is extremely difficult.
EVeryone recognizes the legitimacy and necessity of studying
man according to the formality or one or the facets of his being

tor theoretical and scientific purposes, whether it be the biologist or doctor viewing him as a biological organism, or the
psychologist studying only the psychological aspects of his
being, or the anatomist analyzing his physiological structure.
Here it may be thought that we are considering another distinguishable aspect of man, his social dimension.

But within the

context of Sturzo's theory, not only is this dimension necessary
and intrinsic to man, but constitutive of him in his totality
as a

person.

Thus, it not only influences and includes ·the

other formalities of his being, but is their underlying ontological structure.
While Sturzo is at pains to preserve the reality of both
the person and society, yet the reality of the person embraces
within itself the reality of society in a reciprocal relationship of dependence.

That is why he holds that sociology, the

study of society, is really nothing other than social anthropology. (I.L. xvii)

Tbis is also why he demands that man must not

be viewed "as an abstract formula in a world of abstractions,
but as a truly living being whose consciousness develops only
with his experience, and insofar as he lives his life in the
social and historical complexity of his existence. 1114
tion to this, the person is a synthesizing reality,

l4ill£, •• p. 1?5.

In addi-

e~bracing
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within itself "spirit and sense, individual life and social
life, culture and religion, earthly interests and supernatural
life." (P. & M. 5?)

The person not only is a synthesizing

reality in itself, but as the locus of intelligibility within
the world, is also the grounding principle for the reality of

the world.
Natural history is distinguished from human history
for objective and didactic reasons; not certainly for
the reality of the human concrete, because the nature
and history of the complex we call nature are perceived
and appraised only insofar as they are per~eived and
realized by man. Everything that does not enter into
that human sphere is for us as if non-existent; the
day that it enters into that sphere, either through
observation or possession and transformation, it becomes history, our history.15
Although we still have to go into some detail to clarify
the human process, we have already indicated that for Sturzo the
person has no existence apart from the concretizing process of
sociality and, as immanent to this process, he is both the subject and term of the process.

The very nature of this process

as process and as constitutive of the person, reveals the historicity of human reality.

Just as the social order is not

extrinsic and alien to man, so the historical process is not so
much that in which man assimilates an external and alien world
of nature, as rather that through and by which he defines his
own being.
This history is not extraneous to our life, but like
land transformed from stumps into flowering gardens
and fertile fields, it is our life. our history is
the search into the bowel's of the earth for materials
that are transformable and transformed by the hand of

15Sturzo, "Historicist Sociology," Cross Currents, 9 (Fall,

1959), 334.
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man; it is the study of the stars, towards which today
we reach out as towRrds zones to be explored, by drawing near to them. This life, inaofar as it is realized
and remenbered, is history, and insofar as it is fixed
in our culture, in our institutions, in our industries
and activities, it is the life of society.16
What has been established thus far: has important methodological implications both for and beyond an understanding of
sturzo's own theory.

From a methodological point of view it

means that in order to grasp Sturzo's concept of the person,
since it is the ultimate object of his theory, the entire system has to be presented; and yet, at the same time, the concept
of the person is at the basis of the theory.

In order to arrive

at an understanding of that reality out of which the theory
arises and in which it terminates we have to give an exposition
of the entire system.

The difficulties arising from the neces-

sity of having to present piecemeal and successively what can
only be understood in its totality and simultaneously are inherent in both the formulation and exposition of any encompassing
theory.

But these difficulties are infinitely increased with

a theory that has a processual, relational and synthesizing
perspective.

Thus. a philosophical understanding of man demands

a socio-historical understanding of man, "because the individual
man is of such a nature that he cannot be known without his historical development, his present activity, his possible future.
His life unfolds in time; man is not a fossil in a museum. nor
a slab in a pavement. 111 7

This methodological procedure in the

16 Ibid.

l?sturzo,

"History and Philosophy," p.

56.
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study of man is a clear demarcation between 3turzo•s view of

aan' 8 "social nature" and that o! classical humani3t1.

Classi-

cal hwnanism holds that man is social by nature and yet attempts
to determine the ideality of this nature independently of the

social structures which arise out of the determinations of this

nature.

For Sturzo this can only lead to a misunderstanding of

both man and society since the structure of each determines the

structure of the other within a dialectical historical process
that generates both together.
The light this sheds on Sturzo's own methodology is noteworthy.

Although the concrete individual person stands at the

center of ::sturzo' s theory of society, he does not begin his
theory by presenting a theory of human nature and then deducing
the structures, laws and finalism of society from it.

To do so

would indicate that the structure of human nature is ontologically antecedent to both society and tistory.

This is clearly

contrary to Sturzo's position since the person is both the subject and term of the social and historical process.

Hence,

Sturzo's historical method is not imposed on his subject matter,
but rather follows from the socio-historical ontological structure of "the reality of the hu!llan concrete."

He does derive

-

his theory from an analysis of human nature, but not in an a

Rriori and apodictic way as independent of the socio-historical
process within which it appears and wtich in fact is its concretization.

He rather focuses on human nature as it manifests

itself in process.
Thus far we have only adumbrated a positive concept of the
person in his sociality.

we

have seen that the person and
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society are not distinct entities, irreducible and set in opposition to one anothe·r, but rather two synthesizing realities

established by a dialectic of a reciprocal dynamic process.
'through this perspective the person is discerned in his selfcreating activity as the existential agent of society.

Prior

to a more thorough analysis of this concept of sociality we are
confronted with the fundamental problem of whether this dynamic
processual view of the person does not ultimately presuppose a
personal reality which is already differentiated.

we have al-

ready indicated that for Sturzo the person is not pre-existent
to this process which is constitutive of his very being.

Yet,

as to the question whether this process does not presuppose an
already differentiated reality, Sturzo answered that it does

"to us who admit the separate creation of each human soul."
(T.L. 45)

At first sight this seems to either conflict with

our interpretation of Sturzo's theory or else Sturzo himself
is inconsistent.

Thia is an essential problem and demands a

careful analysis, because Sturzo•s statement seems to make the
person ontologically prior to the process.

We could say that man as a natural being is a presupposition of the process.
reasons.

But this is unsatisfactory for three

First of all, this would be looking at man in terms

of being and not in terms of process.

Secondly, this would

constitute man as an entity distinct from society, which Sturzo
clearly rejects.

As a logical abstraction it is possible to

consider the individual as distinct from society in order to
try to determine its constitutive and fundamental elements.
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Jut what aspect of the concrete individual is there that is not

touched by and thereby affected by the socio-historical process .1a

Thirdly, t•· is would be reducing man to the level of

other natural entities which is the alienation

or

man from him-

self•
It is important to remember that we are dealing with the
field of the personal, that is, with man as person.

The two

dimensions of the person involved here are his individuality
and his sociality, which is the associative aspect of the individual person and which coneretizes itself in social forms.
These two aspects of the person, it is true, have their primordial origin in a physio-spiritual unity.

vidual and social.

"Man is at once indi-

His individual potentiality and his social

potentiality have a single root in his sensitive-rational
nature." (I.L. xiv)

"Individual'' in this instance refers to

not just the de facto differentiation of man, but more strictly

to "personal individuality," since Sturzo relates the term to
man as "an incommunicable personality."

The term "potentiality"

in this case should not be confused with the traditional notion
of potentiality.

Whereas potentiality is traditionally set in

opposition to, but ordered-toactso that pure act excludes potentiality, it here carries the activistic signification of a dynamic and creative principle that generates and supports both the
18The theological doctrines of the Fall of man through
Original Sin and his redemption through the historical events
Of the Incarnation, Death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ
indicate the extent to which the. soul of man is touched by
the socio-historical process.
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person and social forms together in its own creative process.
fbus, this physio-spiritual unity, or in other words, man's
"sensitive-rational nature" is presupposed by the process. but

only as the active immanent principle of the process.

It is a

''personal reality already differentiated'' in the active signification of potentiality.
The de facto differentiation of the unique personal reality is established at the moment of inception of the physiospiritual unity within the socio-historical process which
grounds the creative process of the personal individuality of
just this person who is determined by, and in turn determines,
other personal and social realities within the socio-historical
process.

This physic-spiritual unity is determined by the socio-

historical process even prior to its conception to the extent
that it reflects the socio-historical determination of its
geneological heritage.
Sturzo also provides another set of concepts which may
serve to further clarify the relation of the person's "sensitiverational nature 11 to the relational-processual development of
the person.

Sturzo uses these concepts in elaborating the nature

of society, but since society is simply the crystallization of
the social dimension of the person, they can equally as well
apply to the person.

He states that what he means by society

in the concrete is simply society in its own dimensions: the
structural and the temporal dimension.
have a structure, would not be able to
did not move, if it did not develop its

34
be able to exist." 19
the person.

These words are also applicable to

The structure of the person consists in his sensi-

tive-rational nature, without which he would not become.
temporal dimension is the becoming itself.

The

But it is Sturzo's

understanding of the word "structure" that reveals the radicalness of Sturzo's process view.

Structure generally implies the

notion of fixity, stability, immobility; not for Sturzo.
ture itself is "mobile, it is a process."

Struc-

But later in the

passage he distinguishes between structure and process when he
speaks of the "study of society as structure and process, that
is to say, in its synthesis of existence and history." (H.S.
20

333)

These passages, I believe, can be explained in this way.
Structure indicates those aspects of the person, and thereby
society, that persist in the constitution

or

the person.

But

these perr.ianent elements--per:nanent only in the sense that they
are always present as necessary components of the person, not
in the sense that they are unchanging or not subject to process
--are themselves process.

As Vico puts it, "The nature of' things

is nothing but their coming into being at certain times and in
certain fashions." 21 As an example we can take the ability to
think as one of the structural aspects of the person.

This

1 9sturzo, ''Historicist Sociology, 11 p. ;33.
20 Ibid.

-

21 Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista.Vice,
trans. from the third edition, !744, by '.rliomas aoddard Be~gin
and Max Harold Fisch. Ithaca: Cornell u. Press, 1948, par. 14?.

~
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ability is a peroanent characteristic of the person, a presupposition for becoming .a person, and yet the ability itself, as
principle of thinking, is not ontologically prior to or distinct from the process of' thinking, but is ontologically constituted only in the process of thinking.

This ability is the

initial actualization of an inner exigency for (still further)
concrete realization.

we can go beyond thinking to the very

core of the person, his consciousness.

Although we will later

more fully elaborate this central notion in Sturzo's system,
nevertheless, within the context of the present discussion,
sturzo's processive view applies to consciousness as it does
to the ability to think.
in process.

Consciousness attains actuality only

It is only in the process of "inter-individual

relationships and the outward, common activity of men," that
"the consciousness of each has found the possibility of becoming
actual, of evolving and perfecting itself." (I.L. 301)

This is

why Sturzo relates structure and process in a "synthesis of

existence and history. 11

Existence in this context in no way

connotes the passive overtones of "being there," signifying a
toothold in reality. but rather evokes the dynamic and causitive signification of its etymological roots.
With its conception, the sensitive-rational nature of man
"stands forth" as an intrinsic need to further actualize itself; that is, it exists as the principle of its becoming.
Structure is the "rational, volitive, and active power" of man
to "stand forth 11 and it is real, i.e., exists, only as ''stand-

ing .forth."

Man exists, or creates himself not all at once, but

through time, processually.

Therefore, man's existence and
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history are one.

That is why Sturzo speaks of the "synthesis

of existence and his·tory."

Man's coming to be, i.e. his

"standing forth" as an independent interdependent reality--independent in that he is an autonomous be-ing, interdependent in
that this autonomous be-ing is gained only through mutual relations with other persona and other realities--is nothing else

than history, and history is nothing else than man's coming to
be.

Since the limits of this nature, or str'Uoture, oa.nnot be

fixed, neither can its existence, that is, its actualizing

process.

Thus, the person is an open-ended being because it is

a being that exists or becomes.
In traditional

ter~inology,

it may seem as though we have

identified essence and existence.

In actual fact we have not.

Essence corresponds to the ideality of man, that is, man as a
"simultaneous and perfect whole. 1122

The physio-spiritual nature

of man as concretized in the concrete individual embraces this
within itself as a potentiality which is actualized through and
with its act of existing.

But the actualization, its act of

existing, never achieves the complete realization of this potentiality.

"Neither the individual taken in himself, nor society

as the outcome of its individuals can be said to possess themselves wholly, and, hence, to be able to rest on the realization

of the moment as final and definitive." (I.L. 13)

Thus there

is a basic distinction to be :r:J.ade within the concrete individual:
22 Sturzo, "Maurice Blondel's La Pensee;
~
the Philosophy of
'L'elan spiritual,'" Hibbert Journa!, 34 (April, 1936), 347.
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the nature as realized is nothing other than its existence, but
between this nature·as realized and the nature in the fullness
of its potentiality as a dynamic and creative principle, there
is a distinction that can only be adequately described as
"real."

The reality of this distinction expresses itself within

man as an inward exigency for further realization.
Up to now we have sketched some of the broad contours of

the relationship between the individual and society.

We have

discovered that for Sturzo this relationship is so basic to
both as to be ontologically constitutive for each.

When Robert

Pollock compared the relationship between the individual and
society to that between the body and soul within the concrete
existing individual--an inextricably intertwined relationship
of reciprocal and intimate compenetration--he was not giving

expression to an exaggerated metaphor, but to an analogical
reality. 23
The individual human being becomes a person only through

relationship with another person.

His very existence consists

not in ;nere "being-for-another,'' but in the complex mutuality

of "being-for-each-other."

As we plumb the depths of the self-

consciousness we 1iscover, as Hegel has expressed it, not the

n1n but the 11 \./e, 11 the ego that is "We" and the "We" that is
ego. 24 The problem confronting Sturzo was not only to discover
the nature of this union, but to determine how this union can

er.

23 Pollock ... L'uomo nella societA e nella storia," p. 200;
I.L. 32.

~4 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenolo~~ of Mind (New York: Harper & Row, Toochbook ed., 1967), p. ?.
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be adequately symbolized in reflection.
In his attempt. to articulate the nature of this union,
sturzo first explained it in terms of the relational nature of

man.

Then with the publication of Essai de sociologie in 1935,

hiB emphasis shifted from relations to the individual-social
consciousness of the person.
are chosen

~ith

The words "his emphasis shifted"

care because in his later stress on conscious-

ness Sturzo in no

way rrdropped" his relational perspective.

Timasheff incorrectly interprets Sturzo in this fashion.

In

discussing Sturzo's earlier relational view, Timasheff states
that ''unfortunately Sturzo dropped this line of investigation
altogether and did not coordinate it with the newly acquired
insight that consciousness was the key to the problem (of what
is the nature of the unity of society and the individual). 02 5
It would have been contradictory for

:~turzo

to do so because

consciousness itself is essentially relational, in its origin,

its development and fulfillment. (cf. I.L. 175, 301, 306)

The

relational view was not dropped, in fact it can hardly be said

to be in the background.

A number of' significant topics are

explic.it.ly handled relationally.

The value of one's own person-

ality id deepened through the widening o.f the circle of personal
relationships.

Knowledge only arises out of an interpersonal

relational context.

The relational nature of the person finds

expression in social groups.

Mutual relationships "have value

as a society insofar as they resolve themselves into the formation of personalities spiritually and morally richer and more
2 5T1masheff, The Sociology of Luigi Sturzo, p. 72.
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complete than they would have been had such relationships not
been experienced." (I.L. 303; cf. 20, 207, 255)

In sddition to these topics that Sturzo explicitly handles
relationally in Inner Laws of Societz, the entire thrust of the
work is rooted in a relational perspective not only of tbe person and society, but of all of reality.

This relational per-

spective on reali t;y was :uost explicitly ex-pressed some ti ve
years e1J.rlier by Sturzo in his analysis of Mario Sturzo' s theory

of Neo-Synthetism.

Although be is presenting Mario's own theory,

the entire tone of the article :nakes it clear that Sturzo' s own
position concurs with that of Mario.

The processive relational

character of reality provides the ontological foundation of
Mario's theory of Neo-Synthetism.

"The whole world is an im-

mense system o.f syntheses an.·1 relations. Every being is a synthesis, and all beings are relational. 1126 Reality. then, pre-

sents itself as a kind of Hegelian °altogetherness of everything."

If all of reality is relational in character, then the

relationship between indi vidua.ls cannot a.lone be the specifying

element of human society as distinct from animal groupings.
Sturzo saw early in the development of his sociological theory,
that the specifying element in human society is its rationality.
As he focused his attention more and more on the place and function of rationality within the complexity of society and its
movements, Sturzo came to see that the determining factor of
society is collective consciousness.

The insight into the

26 sturzo, "Theory of Knowledge in Neo-Synthetisc," Dublin
R_eview, 18? (Oct., 1930), 290.
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formation and function of collective consciousness became, in
sturzo' s own words, ·••the theory on which I built thP- whole social edifice," "the key of my sociological theory." 2 ?

It is in his second work published during his exile, in
1 929, The International Community and the Ri5ht of War, that
sturzo stresses tte relational character of man in explainir:g
the person-society unity.

The entire life of man is a life of

social concretion, that is, concrete relations.

Man exists

socially by reason of the .tact he is relational.

Human society

is the expression of this human relativity--the interrelationalco-exiatence of men.

Therefore, society in general, apart from

any particular form of societ;y, follows from the relational
nature of man as "a necessary natural datum."

"Every human

society is nothing else than s relationship between individuals
in some \vay grouped together.

11

(I.e. 23; of. 36. 45, 144)

Every

person develops as a radiating nucleus of relationships, acting
and reacting with other nucleated networks, "so that there comes
to be

g

continual multiplication of each in others and of

others in each." (I.e. 45)

Each nucleated network o.f relation-

ships radiates a two-fold motion that is at one and the same

time ce11tripetal and centrif'ug:il.

Tbis reciprocating, rela-

tional activity arises from the two-fold

di~ensionality

person, his ''individuality" and "sociality."

of the

Both of these

dimensions are dynamic tendencies, each of which is reciprocally
established through the '1ynamism of the other and both together
2 7 Sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," Thou5ht,
22 (March, 1947), 123; cf. M. l?.
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have as their end-in-view the achievement, expansion and perfection of the person.
The reciprocal relationship between these two factors constitutes what Sturzo views as the intrinsic law of the genesis
and development of both the individual person and society: "The
more individuals increase in conscious personality, the fuller
the development of their associative qualities and forces; the
fuller the development of such associative forces, the more the
individuals develop and deepen the elements of their personality." (I.C. 45; cf. 49-50)

The depth and autonomy of the person

is acquired in proportion to the extent that the person extends
himself in relation to others.

In the development of the asso-

ciative aspects of the person, they become externalized in the
form of particular societies.

"Thus by continual action and

reaction society comes to be individualized in types, institutions, moral bodies, and the individual to be socialized in the
institutions circumscribing his life." (I.e. 45)

As the dimen-

sion of sociality becomes externalized in organized society,
the feedback from the process itself as well as from the society
formed thereby deepens the individuating elements of the person.
This reciprocating, intrinsic law of "individuality-sociality"
"is always in force and functions according to the stage of
development attained by the individual and social factors." (I.e.
50)

This relational perspective of Sturzo as presented in

~

International Community and the Right of War contains within
itself several fundamental ideas that led Sturzo to see that
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the primary datum in the concretization of sociality which effectuates the unity between the person and society is individualsocial consciousness.

First, he saw that society evolves in

conjunction with the development of the individual consciousness.

Secondly, he saw that the relational existence of man is

primarily rational and communicative, and not merely physical
90

that the specifying element in human society is its ration-

ality.

Thirdly, he saw that the whole social process is not a

dialectic of blind, extra-human forces, such as physical or
historical conditioning, without outcome, but is rational and
tinalistic.

And it is precisely in focusing his attention on

these factors in an attempt to coordinate and determine their
role within the matrix of the entire socio-historical process
that led 3turzo to recognize that collective consciousness was
the key to the problem of the nature of the union between the
individual person and society. (M. 17-19; of. I.C. 55, 36, 4950) The term "collective consciousness" 28 is a comprehensive
formula to indicate the consciousness of each of us which is
reflected in the consciousness of others in the mutual process

or

determining and realizing a common end. (M. 19)
The unity between the individual person and society is

established in the process called by Sturzo the concretization
of sociality.

Sturzo also calls this process "the concretization

28 In addition to the term "collective" consciousness, Sturzo
also uses the terms "individual-social,n "inter-individual,"
"group," "national," "social," or "historical" consciousness-all referring to the same reality, but stressing different aspects of it .,according to the various shades of language."
Ct. I.L. 4; M. 19, 91.
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society."

The .first phrase refers to an analysis of the

process in terms of.the individual person, the second looks at
it from the viewpoint of society.

Sociality is the ability of

the person to generate and support social forms. (I.C. 48)
The specific, definitive and original principle of sociality is

consciousness. (M. 97)

Within the development of conscious

activity, there are two interdependent processes that constitute consciousness and thereby both the person and society: the

processes of projection and internalization.

Sturzo does not

actually use the term "internalization," but rather uses the
terminology of the ''deepening of consciousness,'' or the "deepening of personality."

The social dimension of this

0

deepening

of consciousness 11 is the synthesizing of society into the individual person.

I have used the generally accepted term

11

inter-

nalization 11 to encompass every aspect of what Sturzo calls the
"deepening of consciousness."

These two processes correspond

to the dimensions of extension and depth of the person that we
referred to previously in this chapter in discussing the person
as open-ended.

For the person confronts infinity whether he

turns toward the bottomless vortex of his own be-ing or the
limitless reaches of reality.

Internalization is the process

ot receiving and assimilating socio-historical facts and values.
or any aspect of reality that constitutes the human and natural
world, in such a way that they become part and parcel of his
own becoming as realities which he has made his own. (I.L. 300301)

Internalization as a process of receiving and assimilation
conveys the connotation of being a passive process on the part
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ot the person, while the projection of consciousness denotes a
dynamic activity. ·In actual fact both reveal the person as an
active and dynamic center.

This is indicated in regard to in-

ternalization by the fact that no social value or pattern of
social conduct, for example, can simply and completely be imposed froo without by any form of coercion.

The most that can

be produced by !actors of coercion, whether they are legal or
illegal, is external conformity, unless these factors are not
imposed but arise from within the spirit animating the social
life.

And mere conformity is recognized as not being able to

sustain social life since it neither is an expression of the
animating forces of social life in the individual person nor
does it reinforce these forces.

To internalize a social value,

then, is not a passive receptivity or undergoing of exerted
influences, but is to actively assimilate it whereby it in turn
becomes an active and effective principle of activity.

For

example, a person becomes ''just 11 and is recognized as such by
others only when he acts justly, not by reason of any factors
external to him, but by an inward movement of his own personality.
Correlative to internalization is the projection of consciousness.

It is precisely in this projection of consciousness

that i3turzo locates the concrete sociality of the individual
person. (I.L. 5)

This projection

or

consciousness not only

gives rise to the structural formation of society which becomes
individuated into specific social forms, but it is also a biophysical, psychological, Bthical, and socio-historical datum
"without which the human individual is inconceivable." (I.L. 5)
This concept of projection recurs repeatedly throughout Sturzo's
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writings and it is in terms of this notion that he most frequently
explains the formation and nature of society.

But in most pas-

sages other than the above one where he locates the principle

of the concretization in consciousness, Sturzo relates the

notion of projection not to consciousness, but to the entire
person, and especially the person in his activities.

Hera are

some representative passages:
The whole of society is the projection of individuals
in their relationships and inter-activity. (T.L. 4)
But there is no activity, not even thought, which does
not project us into society; which is not effectively
social. (T.L. 178)
Society is nothing but the projection of single activities in the interweaving of all activities. (T.L. 186)
Society is essentially the coexistence of individuals
and the projection of human personality. (I.L. 299)
The social instinct, that projection of the ego into
an environment necessary for action •••• (I.L. 311)
Society is only the simultaneous and progressive projection of the activity of man's personality concretized
in the multiplicity of individuals who, either nec~~
sarily or voluntarily, cooperate among themselves.~
The significance of these passages lies not only in what
they reveal about Sturzo's

underst~nding

of the unity between

society and the individual person in terms of his key concept
of projection, but more importantly they give a clue to his
understanding of consciousness and its relation to both the
person in his activity and to human activity itself.

Since

the eophasis in these passages is on activity, they may seem
to diminish the importance of consciousness within Sturzo'a

29sturzo, "The Philosophic Background of Christian Democracy, u pp. 9-10.
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system.

Actually, the contrary is true.

To determine this

requires a careful analysis of what Sturzo understands by consciousness.

As mentioned above, these passages give some indi-

cation of this.

Closely centered around the one process of pro-

jection we find consciousness, the person and activity.

Our

task is to determine their precise relationship; and in doing
60 ,

we should be able to arrive at a clearer understanding of

all three.
we have seen that c ::;1:sciousness is the principle of sociality and that the projection

or

consciousness is the concreti-

zation of sociality within each individual person.
as

This process

simultaneous and continuous among a number of persons brings

about the realization, or fornation, of a particular society.
Yet, Sturzo also views society as the projection of the entire
person and of the activities of the person.

This does not mean

that Sturzo identifies the person with consciousness; but he
does hold that the individual is a person through consciousness.
(I.L. 300-301)

Although Sturzo limits the notion of conscious-

ness to the human level, and for this reason denies that any
animal grouping is a society, (cf. M. 21-22) he does not set up
a dichotomy between consciousness and the rest of reality.

Rather, he subscribes to Blondel's theory of "Cosmic Thought"
and its evolution through the levels of reality to reach its
apex in conscious thought.

He thus extends the roots of con-

sciousness back into the whole of reality.

There is "a process

of thought intrinsic to reality, leading to the flowering of
conscious thought as active intelligence, for which unconscious
creation is the preparation, the conditioning environment and

4?
means of development." (T.L. l?4)30
Consciousness involves much more for Sturzo than a simple
"psychic awareness."

Nor is it limited to thought.

In fact.

it is a single synthetic process that embraces within itself
the cognitive and volitional. the theoretical and practical
dimensions of human activity.

I use the term "dimensions" to

indicate the indivisible unity of these aspects ot human activity.

This does not mean to imply that these are not able to

be distinguished theoretically.

But it does mean that they are

not separable within the synthesis of conscious activity.

In

trying to grapple with the reality of consciousness, we encounter
a mysterious vortical process of synthesis which surpasses
everything that it unites.

Some of the phrases Sturzo uses to

describe consciousness are: "the intelligence and will united
together in an operative synthesis directed to action"; "the
synthetic function of the internal faculties of man"; "knowledge
of that which one desires to obtain and the relative determina-

tion to obtain it, foI"'iliing the synthesis which precedes the
personal human act." (C. & P. 13; l?; 22-23; 9; ct. also M. 96)

As will become clear in determining the nature of the inward
synthesis of consciousness, the term "precedes" must not be
understood in a temporal sense, but within the order of existential causality.

The inward synthesis of consciousness sus-

tains the human act and in sustaining it is itself constituted
as such.

The dynamism of consciousness, then, extends beyond

303ee also, "!1aurice Blondel 1 s La Pens~e: the Philosophy

of 'L'elan spiritual,'" pp. 344-45;

T.L. 96,

294; I.L. xxi.

synthesizing of the cognitive and volitional dimensions of
the person to the re.alization of their object through action.
We find here, then, within a synthesizing process the unity

or

thought, "which is the rationality of action,'' action, "which
is the realization of thought," and consciousness, "taken as
the presence of rationality and activity to themselves." (I.L.
x:xix)

.Each of these calls for fuller elaboration in order to

better understand the unity they achieve within Sturzo•s theory,
although this very unity renders an analysis of each separately
extremely difficult.
In accord with his entire methodological procedure, Sturzo
approaches knowledge as it functions within the concrete dialectic of the human process.

To do otherwise, that is, to approach

it as an abstract problem of an analytic situation is contradicted by the human experiential process.

0

which is not separa-

tive or analytic, but unitive and synthetic."3l

It is in rela-

tion to the totality of human experience that Sturzo makes an
analysis of knowledge.

"In the concrete, there is never any

knowledge of reality which does not, at the same time, imply the
coexistence of other beings which, taken together with the
knowing subject, can be considered as a totality." (S.P. 2?; cf.
T.L. 214)

Encompassing every particular act

or

knowledge there

is an implicit cognitive situation that includes within it an
indefinite totality which embraces both the knower and object
and at the same time transcends them.

Sturzo goes on to make

a careful analysis of this totality and its relation to knowledge.
31 sturzo, "Theory of Knowledge in Neo-Synthetism,n p. 280.

~uffices
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for our immediate purposes, now, to merely call

attention to the totality within which knowledge functions,
because in view of this totality we are Qrima facie confronted
with the incompleteness of any particular act of knowledge and
thereby at the same time its processual character through its
inherent dynamism toward further completion.
Within this processual prospective, Sturzo always keeps
in the forefront of his theory the proposition stressed so much
by st. Thomas Aquinas--but how much more it needs to be constantly reiteratedt--that it is the entire man who knows and
not his faculties.

And man always acts within a unitive and

synthetic process.

It is out of and within this synthetic

process that knowledge arises and functions.

"The basis of

cognition, indeed, is an experience simultaneously sensitive
and classificatory, affective and volitional, theoretical and
practical. 11 3 2 But as rooted within and part of a synthetic
process, the knowledge process itself must be synthetic.

Thus,

for example, in the classical distinction between the sensitive
and intellectual process,

th~re

are not two processes with each

taking place by means of a separate faculty, which are juxtaposed and co-ordinated by the knower, but rather there is the
synthesis of two tendencies or powers in a single synthetic
process.
This synthetic proce,ss embraces within itself not only the
cognitive powers o.f man, but al so the will.

The will syntheti-

cally enters into the cognitive functions just as the cognitive

32

~-' p. 288.
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powers synthetically enter into the function of willing.

There

is never a purely intellectual act unassociated with an act of
the will, or vice versa.
Even the coldest and most arid speculation is in
itself an act of will, containing affective values
whether direct or indirect. we call it an intellective
act because it is mainly theoretical, just as we call
a primarily practical act an act of the will.33
Thus, there is no such phenomenon as pure speculation apart from
practical overtones, just as there is no practical activity
that is completely devoid. of theory.

One or the other prevails

in a single synthetic process according to the direction given
to his activity by the individual person.

This synthesis of

the internal powers of man has its ontological basis in the
seamless integrity of the

liff~

of the human spirit in which

body and soul are joined through a mysterious synthetic union.

lt is the entire human person that is the single multi-dimensional principle cf activity by means of various capacities
which are operative, not as juxtaposed or concomitant, but as
inwardly synthetic within consciousness.

As multidimensional

its powers are distinguishable theoretically, but not in tact.
They achieve reality only in the monolithic integrity of the
life of human person.34

It follows from this synthetic view of knowledge in which

the cognitive faculties are united together with the w:11 in

the operative synthesis of consciousness that knowledge is not,
for Sturzo, a purely representational activity in which the

-

33Ibid., P• 28?; S.P. 27.
4

-

3 Ibid., PP• 286 and 288.

~··

51'
person reproduces or a.ssimilates in himself tbe ideali ty of the
external world.

The knowing process comes to achieve its full

reality in fact only as joined to, and completed by, willing
and action.
Those who make of knowledge a purely representational
faculty, those who translate it into an existential
judgment, without cleaving heat or without repulsion,
abstract from reality, ignoring the finalistic character of knowledge, leaving out of count the movement
of sympathy towards truth, of recoil from error as
such, and the desire to seek that grain of truth that
every error contains. (T.L. 86; cf. I.L •. xxix; S.P. 33)
Knowledge, just as sociality, is an ontological structure
of the person because it, too, is an activity through which he
comes to realize his own being as a person which is constituted
as a radiating and receptive principle of presence.

For the

mode of being proper to the person as such is that of presence.
Presence is both manifested in and generated by the reciprocally interdependent activities of knowing and loving.

These

activities find their principle and term in the presence of the
person because presence is most intimately and constitutively
characterized by an ontological "openness" toward all of reality.
This openness consists in more than an active "facing outward 0
which, in opening out onto the rest or reality, at the same time
is filled by the radiating activity emitted by that reality.
In addition to this dimension of openness, presence is also
marked by another dimension that opens onto itself in an immediacy that transcends all mediation.

It is this that ontologi-

cally constitutes the person as such in its spirituality and
subjectivity.
Both knowledge and love arise out of, generate and terminate
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in thiS openness of presence because on the ontological level
they are equivalents.
personal reality.

All three encompass the totality of

Within the operative process of human acti-

vity knowledge and love are mutually dependent activities •
.Each is the principle and condition of the other because each
provides the openness of being that makes the other possible.
In a sentence that is pregnant with meaning, Sturzo states that

"loves makes reality an experience." (T.L. 99)

Reality becomes

an experience for us--it takes on meaning--as we open ourselves
up to it.

And it is love that gives us that receptivity and

transparency, as it were, of being whereby we are able to actively assimilate--actively in the sense of "reaching out" and
"making our own"--the reality that confronts us.

That movement

of being that allows for the understanding embrace of something

is precisely the stirring of love.

And in so moving love itself

is deepened and expanded.
The development of the altruistic tendencies, by moderating innate egoism, awakens that understanding sympathy
which is fundamental for a full knowledge or the world
in which we live •••• It is fundamental in any sane theory
of knowledge that we succeed in knowing only what we
love.35
"The deeper the knowledge, the stronger the love; the keener the
love, the
86)
and

~ore

intimate and close-cleaving the knowledge.rt (T.L.

Only to the exterit that one "opens up" through knowledge
love is he able to love and know.

Each, and both together,

provide for an ontological metamorphasis--as radical as that in
the biological transformation from caterpillar to butterfly--

35 sturzo, ''Some Notes on the Problem of Education," p. 110.

53
whereby the individual is able to "step outside 11 of the indurated and closed larva of egoism, and in so "stepping out" to
achieve his personal being.

For egoism, as a constricting

movement turned exclusively inward, is, from an ontological
viewpoint, pure negation because it is the alienation of the
person from himself. (I.L. 306)
Since the mode of being of the person is that of presence,
knowledge, love and life are convertible terms on the personal
level.

"Knowledge is experience, it is life, it is love.

We

may invert the terms: love is knowledge and it is lite; life is
knowledge and love." (T.L. 87)

Thus, knowledge, for Sturzo, in

its full significance, is not mere awareness nor a representational activity.

Any type of "spectator" theory of knowledge

is completely alien to the entire orientation and spirit of
his thought.

Knowledge is a generative and creative process

of the person, and together with him, his world,

Knowledge is

not a passive mirroring of the world, nor is it an adjustment,
passive or even active, to the world.

Rather, as ineffably

joined with the will in the inward synthesis of consciousness,
it is the active and creative manipulation of reality which man
transforms, and in transforming discovers both himself and his
world. (I.L. xix, 220)36
The historical source for Sturzo's view of the active and
creative character of knowledge is the theory of Giambattista
Vico, "who best saw the intimate relationship between doing and
knowing; who threw into relief the value of thought as lived in

36 cr. also "Historicist Sociology," p. 334.

events." (T.L. 222)

Vico's doctrine on the unity of thought

and action is epitomized in his famous dictum that man only
knows what he makes. 3?

Thia dictum is rooted and takes its

tundamental meaning from Vico's entire theory of man.

But for

our purposes here it is sufficient to note that aspect of it
that is operative within Sturzo's own theory in terms of our
present discussion on knowledge.

This aspect is, for Sturzo,

Vico's theory that
••• man does not acquire knowledge through 'simple and
clear ideas• ••• but by becoming himself in a manner the
cause of the fact into which the true is convertible •
••• Man really knows what he makes (which is history)
because he makes it. Man knows nature through what
he is able to make or recreate of nature by his experience and activity. (C. & S. 354; cf. T.L. 8?)

The difference between this type of theory of knowledge
and any kind of "spectator" theory is equivalent to the distance
between simply observing the moon. or actually going to the
moon and bringing it in its totality within the human sphere.
In the first instance, the moon is "known" only'!f'rom afar" and
in an external and superficial manner as an object "out there."

But man's knowledge in the full sense of the word only occurs
in the second instance in which he "makes" the moon "his own"
and masters it by his activity.

To speak of' knowledge ''in the

full sense of the word" is to indicate that Vico•s, and Sturzo's, theory does not mean there is not knowledge in the first
instance.

This relates to a distinction Vioo makes in his theory

between "coscienza" and "scienza."38

The distinction involved

37vico, De Italorum Sapientia (Bari: Laterza e Pigli,
1914), pp. 134-35; fhe New Science, pars. 364-66.
38 Vico, De Italorum Sapientia, P• 138.
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here is that between a mere awareness of something and a genuine understanding of it.

It is the distinction between ''look-

ing at'' the moon and "understanding" it.

In this latter instance,

the moon is not simply, nor even primarily, an object "out
there" to be looked at, observed and studied; it is rather "an

element of human conquest and creativity," as Vico would put it,
or "a conditioning of the creative energy of man 11 as Sturzo
would view it. (C. & s. 354)

Genuine understanding calls for

direct participation and total involvement on the part

or

the

knower.
It must be noted that the term "makes'' as it is used in
Vico's dictum, and as correctly interpreted by Sturzo, is not
used in the same sense as a machine "making'' a product as something completely distinct from the movement of the machine and
with the product totally other than the machine.

The term has

reference to an activity such as tha.t o.f an artist in which the
tinished work of art contains within itself and thereby expresses the creative activity that effectuated it.

Thus, the rela-

tionship between the artist and his work of art is not one of
alienation and complete otherness, but rather one of discovery
and recognition precisely because it is the expression of his
own spirit as the immanent principle of it.
sense in which man "makes 0 history.

It is used in the

The full significance of

this will be brought out in the exposition of Sturzo's theory
of history.
Although Sturzo's perspective on the participatory and
creative nature of knowledge has its direct historical source

~i~o's

,

theory, the historical roots or this view

far back as the Hebrews of Biblical times.39

extend~s

In his epistle to

the Philippians St. Paul says of Christ, "I want to know him
in the power of resurrection and to share his sufferings and
even his death, in the hope of attaining resurrection from the
dead. 1140

The Hebrew idea of "to know" is not the reception

or

intellectual information but to accept vital participation;
the Hebrew "knows" his wife and a baby, not an idea, results.

To know Christ, then, is, for St. Paul, to accept vital participation in Him and to experience in oneself the power of the
transformation.

According to the Hebraic mentality truth is

something which is lived.

As Sturzo says, it is a matter of

experience and not only of pure speculation.

Man knows God

"insofar as he can succeed in experiencing the Godhead in himself."

Knowledge, "insofar as it is real and full knowledge,

is undoubtedly love.

To know God is equivalent to establish-

ing a relationship with Him •••• " (T.L. 8?, 86)
us to

11

St. John urges

live the Truth" because it belongs to the existential

experience of Christian living.

For the Hebrews as it is for

Sturzo, loving and knowing are correlatives.
It was to communicate their love of Truth (to the Semitic mind, loving and knowing are correlatives) that
the inspired writers undertook their task. Their primary purpose was not the propagation of truths, the
composition of a body of doctrines, but the attraction
and conversion of men by exhortation, consolation,
reprimand, and encouragement, so that they might

39 ciaude Tresmontant, A Study of Hebrew Tho~ht, trans. by
Michael Francis Gibson (New York: nesclee Oo., l

o).

40

Philippians, 3:10-11.
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'live the Truth. '

41

As sturzo expresses lt, "the knowledge of truth is a cleaving
of the will, an operative act," (T.L. 89) because truth must
be loved or it loses, for us, the character of truth.

There-

fore, "the fixed point of departure (for education) is the
search for and adhesion to truth as life and truth as good." 42
Thus any purely intellectualist approach to truth as implying

a separation from tta cleaving of the will," can only result in
the evasion of the truth sought, because, as sought without the

sense of love, it can only continually recede into nothingness
before the act that seeks it, much like vapor on a hot summer
day.

We have seen that the historical origin of Sturzo's perspective on the nature of knowledge is Vico's theory, but it
bas its theoretical and ideal basis within Sturzo•s system in
his concept of rationality, because it is rationality that is
the principle of knowledge.

But it is much more than this.

Sturzo states that his concept of consciousness is the key to
bis sociological theory.

This is true, yet, it is equally accu-

rate to state that the concept of consciousness is the lock
to his theory and his notion of rationality is the key that
opens this lock.

In many respects it is just as fundamental

to his theory aa the notion of consciousness.

Sturzo, in fact,

sometimes tends to identify consciousness with rationality (T.L.
41

n. M. Stanley, ''The Concept of Biblical Inspiration,"

~oceedin~s of the Catholic Theological Society of America,
58, p. 6.
42

Sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," p. 118.

217; I.C. 145). Nevertheless, within his overall theory, there
18 a theoretical distinction between them. Consciousness is
more basic and extensive in that rationality is an aspect 2!,.
consciousness, but it is that determining factor which makes it
to be what it is--a human consciousness.

In fact, it is so

intimate to the nature of consciousness that to lack rationality
18 to lack consciousness. Therefore, there can only be human
consciousness because it is rationality that constitutes man
as a man. (I.L. 11)

The dominating motif of Sturzo's social

theory, especially as elaborated in the Inner Laws of Society,
is the function of rationality in the concretization of sociality in the historical actuation of the social forms and in the
formation and dynamism of the social synthesis. (M. 79)
A concept as pervasive and fundamental as that of rational-

ity calls for a careful analysis in

what Sturzo means by it.

o~der

to pinpoint exactly

Unfortunately, Sturzo does as most

major thinkers do with the concepts that are central to their
thought: He uses the term "rationality" with a number of different meanings.

The uses may in no way be contradictory to one

another, but that makes them no less different.

The basic dif-

ferences in the meaning of the term can be reduced to four:
Jirst, a concrete principle of knowledge and activity within the
individual person (I.L. xxiii and 11); second, the ontological
character of reality as intelligible (I.L. xxix); third, thought
itself inasmuch as it is systematic (I.L. xxvii); fourth, the
ideal order transcending the defects and imperfections o! present reality (I.L. 210).

All of these uses of the term
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"rationality" find their logical, ideal and historical locus
in the concrete nature of the human person.

The full signifi-

cance of these various meanings of rationality for Sturzo can
be elaborated only with the entire exposition of his social

theory, especially as it applies to the dynamism of the social
process.

Within the context of the present discussion on the

unity of thought, action and consciousness, the first, and
primary meaning of rationality as

1

an essential principle indi-

vidualized in each man' is what concerns us here.
Sturzo emphasizes that rationality is not a generic and
abstract element, but rather is

rra

concrete factor in the indi-

vidual, in whom this light shines making him what he truly is,
man." (I.L. 11)

Within rationality, then, we touch the very

nerve center of the person.

It is this that expresses, in the

deepest .sense, the human spirit.

The focal point of man's

nature, then, is his spirit, and the attainment of rationality
is the movement over materiality, which encompasses the physical
aspects of man*s nature, toward its spiritualization.
prepositions "over" and "toward" must be stressed.

The

In emphasiz-

ing rationality. Sturzo makes it quite clear that he is not

implying a. movement awa;y froT11 sense reality in the sense of
evading it, but rather a transformation of it by ordering it
toward a higher finalism.

In this process, the physical dioen-

aions of man's life find their fulfillment and completion at
the same time they are raised to a higher level and his spiritual dimensions are deepened and enriched. (I.L. 34-36; T.L. 83)
The form that this concrete factor takes within the indi-
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vidual is that of' "both an intellective-discursive faculty and
a projection brin.girig about the social actiV'ity of men." {f"t. 80)
These words o.f Sturzo are of the utmost importance for understanding not only his concept of rationality, but the entire
thrust o! his socio-personalism.
nerve center of his entire theory.

We are uncovering here the
We must therefore backtrack

over the trail we have traveled to be sure we bring into sharp
focus this nerve center.
The overall context of our :pres13nt exposition is the con-

cretization of sociality.
consciousness.

The principle

or

this process is

Consciousness is achieved and consists in the

activities o.f internalization and projection, the latter of
which is the concretization of sociality.

But Stur.zo's explana-

tion of t11is process of proj':fction made it quite clear that it
involved not just consciousness, bu.t the entire person in his
activity.

This called, then, for an investigation into what

Sturzo • s concept

or

consciousness involved.

'.../i thin the trans-

parent immediacy of consciousness we round the synthesizing
unity of thought and action.

The analysis of thought led us

to its principle, the faculty of rationality.
ity we

hav~

\Jith rational-

come full circle back to the activity of projection.

It is extremely 1illportant, then, to determine exactly the relationship between rationality and projection.

In doing this,

we will not only reveal the ultimate principle of projection

and the :aature of rationality, bllt also the extent to which
thought and action are united in tho theory of Sturzo and the
ultimate basis for this unity.

6i
The first fact to note is that the process of projection
1s not an activity that follows from the activity of rationality such as a wake following from the movement of a ship; nor
15 it concomitant with the activity of rationality.

Rather,

it is a process that is ontologically constitutive of rationality itself.

Projection in the form of activity is the reali-

zation of rationality itself.

Rationality as a concrete and

essential factor of the individual is not "something that is
there" antecedent to the progress of projection itself.

It

consists precisely and wholly in the process of expression and
completion.

Human action, and insofar as it is human, expresses

and completes rationality in its ''inner exigencies."

Sturzo

states that ''rationality, by its inner necessity for expression
and fulfillment, urges to an action that will surmount the conditioning limits." (I.L. 11)

With the phrase "inner necessityu

Sturzo is not indicating the presence of a deterministic principle a.t the core of rationalit.y.

This would be contradictory

since rationality is the principle and ground of freedom for
Sturzo.

Rather, he is giving expression to the inherently dy-

namic, processual character of rationality by pointing up "the
nature of the rational in the concrete as something that cannot
remain potential, but must find fulfillment in a continuous
succession of voluntary acts." (I.L. 11)

We, therefore, find

rationality realizing itsel.f only in a process of projection
which consists in "a continuous succession of voluntary acts.''
In order to delineate the nature of this process, we should
set it within the concrete context of its occurrence--the human
process.
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The human process is, for Sturzo. "an activity essentially

of mind and will, in the psycho-physical complexus of man's
axis t ence. ft {I .L. xxi)

The immanent principle of this process

is rationality "as an essential principle individualized in

each man, so that each man's own experience and personal activity does not pass to others except by way of knowledge and
effects."

Then Sturzo goes on to state that "knowledge and

purpose are features of human rationality but it is through
rationality that unification comes." (I.L. xxiii)

These pas-

sages, all within the context of a single discussion, reveal
the terminological difficulties in.a close textual analysis of
sturzo's thought, because we have placed together so many culturally freighted words--mind, will, knowledge, purpose. rationality--without a clarification as to their precise meaning or
relationship.

~~at

we are especially interested in here are

the statements that ''knowledge and purpose are features of

human rationality" and that rationality expresses itself by

means of "knowledge and effects."

From them we see that ration-

ality embraces within itself the entire.rational dimension of
the person in his knowing and willing, as would be expected
within the synthesizing perspective of Sturzo's integral realism.

It also follows from the inherent dynamism 0£ rationality

toward expression and completion.
through "knowledge and effects.''

Rationality expresses itself
'What Sturzo is indicating

by these terms is the distinction between knowledge and other

kinds of human activity, which could all be subsumed under the
one term of "action."

Sturzo uses the term "action," or

"effects" as in the above sentence, with the realization that
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knowledge itself is action.

We have already seen Sturzo's

-n.ew of knowledge as ·an ontological structure of the person
iS a creative-participatory activity in which the person achieves
that presence which is comTiensurate with the person as such in
hiS subjectivity.

Doing or acting holds the same constitutive

relationship to the person since it is doing that brings about
the realization of knowledge.

The principle of this action is

the will, in the same sense in which rationality is the principle of knowledge.

But as doing is itself the realization of

knowledge, the will is itself identical with that inner urge of
rationality toward realization through action.
sustaining principle of rationality itself.

It is the active

It is for this

reason that Sturzo can say that knowledge and purpose, that
is to say, willing, are "features" or dimensions of rationality.
It must be reiterated here, in accord with Sturzo's integral realism, that as dimensions of rationality they are inseparable aspects of rationality and not separable elements in
a complex.

In separation from one another they are abstractions.

The only distinction between them is formal.

or

They are dimensions

rationality only in their mutual relation through rational-

ity, which in turn finds reality through its constitutive activities of knowing and willing.

"Human process is fundamentally

the continuous striving towards the integral and most intimate
possession of rationality; and towards the transformation of
every element external to us into the reason of our being and

or

our activity, by means of knowledge and purpose." (I.L. xxiv)

We thus discover that the mutuality of thought and action and
their basic unity is ontologically rooted within the constitu-
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tive activity of the. person which has rationality as its principle and term.
we have already encountered the inward synthesis of the
cognitive and volitional faculties of man in treating of consciousness, knowledge, and here again, with rationality,

We

must here examine the actual processes of thought and action
in their mutuality so that this mutuality of thought and action
in the realization of rationality will be specified more completely.

In our analysis of knowledge we have seen that it

achieves reality in fact only through willing and action.

In

accord with the Vichian inspiration of his thought, Sturzo holds
that reality reveals itself to us not through mere speculation,
but ttgradually as the human will and action realize, in fact,
the truths which are known." (S.P. 40)

The metaphysical basis

for this is the corporeal nature of the external world.

In or-

der to be known it must be spiritualized, and since the knowing
process is itself wholly immanent, material reality must be
spiritualized as it is touched and transformed through human,
that is rational, activity.

In this one and the same process,

rationality in the mutuality of knowledge and action achieves
reality and reality becomes rational.
All things touched by man bear his hallmark; the worked
stones, like the tilled fields, the printed papers,
like the quarries and mines, all speak of this living
flame that is human rationality, wherever the foot of
man has rested• transforming the outer world and making
it his own. (I.L. 14)
As transformed material reality embodies rationality as an
immanent principle.

But it is an immanence that is only proces-

~ly relational and transitory because the reality transformed

'
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t;brough rationality "no longer contains the value of the ration-

ality communicated to it unless it is renewed from that undying
fount of vital reality that is man." (I.L. 14-5)
As we penetrated deeper into the analysis of knowledge, we
discovered the ultimate basis for its realization in action

lay in the very nature of its principle, rationality.

There-

fore, sturzo rightly emphasizes that "there is no science however
speculative--not even metaphysics, mathematics, or astronomy-which is not ordered to practical ends, whether individual or
general, subjective or objective." (S.P. 27)

This follows from

the nature of rationality, so that "knowledge of truth is never
purely speculative because it does not reach, as such, the inner
finality of

~an,

who is impelled by nature to transform the

tru-th into living reality

as

good and love." (S.P. 69)

Since knowledge, as a dimension of rationality, is inseparable from action, ideas or theories, as the results of knowledge, are not mere objects of contemplation, but rather contain within themselves the call to action whereby they, and
thereby rationality, are realized in fact.

They are a call to

action because it is the idea that moves the will toward action.
Neither can be taken in abstraction from the other since the
reality of the idea is determined by the extent to which it
sustains the will in action.
In the mutuality of thought and action within the structure
of rationality, this mutuality must also be viewed from the
side of action itself, as theoretically distinguished from the
specific activity of knowledge, so that the fullness of the
reciprocal relationship and unity may be validated.

There are

l

principles of human activity: the interior principle of
rationality which is both the efficient and final principle of
action, and the principle of conditioning, which may be interior, such as ignorance or prejudice, or exterior, such as phy-

sical or historico-social conditioning.

It is conditioning

tbat provides the material ror •ction and as such is an abso-

lute necessity for action, and therefore tor man himself if he
is to live and work.

Sturzo emphasizes the ambivalent character

of conditioning in that it must not be considered just as a
bond, restriction, obstacle, or a limiting of human action, but
conditioning also functions as an urge and stimulus to action
as something to be surmounted, dominated and transformed.

Con-

ditioning may be a positive or negative factor to action according to the individual and to the circumstances.

Taken in its

totality, as internal and external, as physical and historicoeocial, conditioning forms a kind of co-existential solidarity
with the individual.

Whatever the force exerted by condition-

ing an action it is never complete because at the very heart of
action as human stands freedom--always freedom as condition to
be sure, but never entirely absent so long as it is genuinely

human action.

Since conditioning factors are co-existential

with the individual, "freedom cannot be conceived of as an
unconditioned state or as a process towards an unconditioned
state." (I.L. 162)

The inner freedom of human action remains

untouched by conditioning because the ultimate, immanent principle of action remains rationality and free will "is connatural
to any essence as spiritual, intellectual beings." (T.L. 68)

.i

6?
In fact, it can be said without !ear of contradiction that
freedom of the

~vill

follows from the inner necessity of ration-

ality for expression and completion.

We have already seen that

due to this inner necessity rationality "urges to an action

that will surmount the conditioning limits."

Now the action

that "will surmount the conditioning limits" is precisely "a
continuous succession of voluntary acts."

Sturzo emphasizes

that this inner necessity of rationality cannot be separated

trom the voluntary character of its acts of realization.

The

constitutive foro of rationality, then, is precisely that of
treedom.

It is freedom that defines rationality in its onto-

logical character.
It is rationality that gives to man "the faculty of determining himself" (M. 16) and it is precisely in auto-initiative,
in the auto-decision of our action, and in the power to attain
dominion over oneself and over the situation conditioning the
achieving of the autonomy of personality that free will manifests itself.

Since rationality is something to be attained,

and in attaining exists, so too is its dimension of free will.
Free will manifests itself in the striVing for self-detercination of the individual and it is in this striving that it consists.

"What shows free will is the attainment of self-mastery,

in whatever circumstances we may find ourselves •••• Thus we come
to a progressive liberation of ourselves, an achievement of
freedom of will •••• 11 (T.L. 66-7)

It is here in free will that

is the locus for the originality, creativity and indeterminateness--in the sense of open possibilities--of human experience.
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..... within the laws and limits of his being and of the conditioning factors about him, he (man) is not determined but selfdetermining, and by this very fact may be considered a creator

ot his own experience." (I.L. xix)

Between freedom, then, as

individual initiative, and conditioning there is a continuous
interlinking and interaction.

"The interweaving of initiative

and conditioning factors makes up man's experience in his striving for any immediate goal." (T.L. 199; I.L. 11)

But through

the freedom of his activity--and the more so the more he is
tree--man is so able to overcome the conditioning factors ot
his existence that they

0

cease to be a bond and an obstacle and

become a means and a coefficient of realization." (T.L. 198)4 3
It must be stressed that it is only through his activity, as

tree and conditioned, that man masters the conditioning forces

ot the natural and socio-historical world and makes them his
own and in this process his action becomes more free than conditioned.

Man is able to extend this process even to the depths

of nature whereby through a creative transformation even the
laws of nature become self-laws.
The very laws of his being and the limits set by his
psychophysical conditioning (the outer world and even
the human body) become in man experiences of his own and
phases of his own process. Thus the natural laws,
objective though they are, become auto-laws, and psychophysical limitations become transformed into motives of
human activity and experiences. (I.L. xix)
Sturzo states that "in a philosophic analysis of human
action we find· at the root the tendency of each man to make
himself the center

or

his own inner and outer activity, to

4 3Pollock, t•L•uomo nella societ~ e nella etoria, 11 p. 22.
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expand, to realize himself and his own faculties, to seek within

himself and outside for that which corresponds to his needs,
hiS aspirations, his life." (T.L. 68)

The efficient and final

principle of this tendency is rationality.

We are here touch-

ing on the entire thrust of Sturzo's social theory because
rationality "as the moving force and finality of action, expresses itself in truth and love, so that truth and love always
remain the sole and perennial factors of individual and social
perfection." (M. 80)

The use of the term "finality" is highly

significant because it denotes the always incomplete, or deficient, expression of rationality.

Human action never terminates

in rationality as an end that can be grasped in its fullness,
but only as an end-in-view.

This important aspect of Sturzo's

theory will be elaborated more fully in dealing with the dynamism of the concretization of sociality.
!
I.

I'

Also, the term "final-

ity" emphasizes that rationality as the final principle of action is not distinct from the process achieving it.
Although rationality in projecting itself is the principle

I

rationality, is more complex than simply one of equilibrium.

'

Rationality does not stand in exactly the same relation to ac-

;

I
f

t

of both knowledge and action, their unity, which constitutes

tion that it does to knowledge.

Sturzo provides us with the

clue for this insight when he states that thought "is the rationality of action" and action "is the realization of thought."

(I.L. xxix)

Rationality more immediately expresses itself in

knowledge than in action, but action is no less commensurate
with rationality and constitutive of it, as has already been
noted.

Rationality is the efficient principle of action through

?O
)l:nowledge, whether this be in the form of ideas or ideals; and
it is in action that knowledge, and thereby rationality,

achieves the fullness of its reality.

Hum.an action is such

insofar as it is informed by rationality and thereby illuminated by its inner light.

Rationality in the form of knowledge

is that in a human act which makes it a human a.ct and not sim-

ply blind activity.

The common expression of "an enlightened

act" for an act in which the light of rationality is especially
intense reveals this fact.
In order to further specify the relationship between knowledge and action, the concept of action must be further delineated, not in its logical form, but in the form of its actuality.

One aspect of its actuality has already been determined--knowledge.

It is in this that its rationality consists.

bas been defined as the realization of thought.

But action

All the other

aspects of action in which knowledge is concretized or externalized can be subsumed under the one term of

0

doing."

Action,

then, as the realization of thought, consists in the unity of
knowledge and doing.

The unity of these two aspects of action

cannot be over-emphasized.

from one another.

They are abstractions in separation

They must be viewed as inseparable within

the structure of action as action and knowledge are within the
structure of rationality.

It may appear that action can be

broken down into two further activities, the one subjective,
knowledge, and the other objective, doing.

are abstractions.

As so analyzed they

"The analytic forms of speech are always

incomplete; they elucidate only insofar as they presuppose or

?l
prepare the synthesis." (T.L. 43)

Also, these distinctions,

subjective and objective, are operative only from the standpoint of reflection, not of action.
to and derivative of action.

And reflection is secondary

In addition to these objections,

and more basic to them, is the fact that as aspects of a single
process, their reality consists only in their mutual relation
within the process.

Knowledge achieves the fullness of its

reality only through the doing of action and the reality of
doing is the externalization and realization of knowledge.

It

is well to recall here that when we say that knowledge achieves
th;e fullness of its reality only through doing, the idea, for
sturzo, contains within itself the power for action, or, more
specifically, doing is the expression of the inner necessity of
rationality for completion.

As Sturzo puts it, one cannot ndis-

tinguish the idea from its realization, but every realization
contains the idea and is the fruit of individual activity."
(T.L. 42-3)
Sturzo states that there is a "reciprocal flux between
thought and action. 11 (i?.P.I., Vol. I, 104)

In another instance,

in discussing the reciprocal influence between theory and practice, he speaks of "a mutual action and reaction between fact
and idea, for the fact is the fulfillment of the idea and the
/

idea the classification of the fact." (I.e. 17)

On the level

of our present analysis, this mutuality between knowledge and
doing can be expressed in several ways.
to "see" what he is doing, and doing
reality what one sees.

Knowledge enables one

enables one to bring into

More basically, knowledge is doing

~t

?2

realized in its spiritual inwardness and doing is know-

ledge itself realized in its external concretization.

Knowledge

1s the interiorization of doing whereby it is illuminated by
the inner light of rationality and doing is the externalization

of knowledge whereby it is concretized in lived events.

Al-

though the unity between knowledge and doing in action is an
inseparable unity, it is not for this reason a static union,
but a dynamic one within which there is a mutual action and
reaction.

In the concretizing of a particular idea through

doing, the feedback from the process alters the idea which in
turn reacts on further doing.

This becomes clear when knowledge

and doing are viewed within the matrix of the total lived experience of the individual.

In this long exposition of Sturzo•s understanding of knowledge and action and the nature of their unity, we have discovered that the basis for their unity lies in the very ontological structure of the person as rational.

It is in ration-

ality that is the locus for the ultimate quality of being for
the person and it is rationality that expresses the mutuality
and basic unity of thought and action because it, rationality,
is ontologically constituted only in its two-fold dimensional
projection of knowledge and action.

The inward dynamism of

rationality extends beyond thought to the realization of thought
through action.

This requires a radical shift in perspective

on the nature of rationality, and therefore, on the nature of
man who is viewed as such in terms of his rationality.

Tradi-

tionally, rationality is viewed as the capacity for thinking

?3
and since rationality is the specific difference that determines man as such, man was studied in terms of this essential
difference and therefore viewed as primarily and essentially a
thinker.

Of all the errors and dilemmas this perspective has

given rise to, the basic result is the alienation of man from
himself and his own realization because thought is realized
only through action.

Therefore, basically and ultimately ration-

ality is not the ability to think, but the power to act, that
is, to give real life to thought.

Man, therefore, is primarily

a.nd essentially an ''actor" and is only secondarily and in a
derivative sense a thinker.

This shift in perspective in no

way degrades the value that has traditionally been attributed
to thought.

It has just the opposite effect of enhancing its

value because by overcoming the traditional cleavage between
thought and action, knowledge ceases to be viewed as something
extraneous to daily human life, but rather is seen to be precisely that which is of worth and value concretized in lived
experience.

It also ceases to be viewed as merely the principle

and term of speculation, but rather is seen to be the principle
and term of lived experience.

In fact, it is the theoretical

separation of thought from action that undermines the value of
thought.

This perspective leads to an indifference towards

knowledge since it is not seen in its actuality within the living matrix of personal action.

It becomes divorced from the

practical life of the person and thus results in the condemnation of the practical life itself.

The separation of thought

and action is the virtual absence of the person from himself

?4

because it rips asunder personal life as a coherent unity of
thought and action.· It is the alienation of the person from
himself because his inmost nature is constituted in and through
this union, so that "the man of thought and the man of action
are interwoven in the living reality which is one, single, and
collective, a reality that can be analyzed but never divided." 44
The present analysis of this living reality, in an attempt
to determine the nature of its constitutive process which has
already been discovered to be constitutive of both the individual person and society, has moved in a full circle with the
concept of projection as its starting and finishing point.

We

began our analysis with the projection of consciousness, because
it is this that is the concretization

or

sociality--the process

in which both the person and society are constituted.

This

process Erima racie presented itself as involving not just
consciousness, but the entire person in his activity.

The rea-

son for this can now be determined with some accuracy: the
inner dynamism of rationality--which is the specifying principle

of the person--for expression and completion through thought and
action.

The projection of consciousness can also be defined

more precisely; it is the expression and realization of rationality through thought and action.

Rationality embraces within

its constitutive process knowledge and action as inseparable
components.

Rationality itself is rooted within the more primi-

tive activity of

0

that one individual-social consciousness hence,

as from a living spring, comes the whole complex and dynamic
44

sturzo,

11

History and Philosophy," p. 62.
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mode of life of man." (I.L. 60)
Consciousness, ·as rationality, achiever; actuality only in

4

rational activity, that is, thought and action. (I.L. 301) 5
It is for this reason that Sturzo stresses activity in his description of society.
society is nothing but the projection or single activities in the interweaving of all activities. (T.L. 186)
society is a kind of multiple, simultaneous and continuative projection or individuals in their activity. (I.L. xvii)
Society is only the simultaneous and progressive projection of the activity of man's personality concretized in
the multiplicity of individuals who ••• cooperate among
themselves.46
Since; as has been noted, rationality, and therefore consciousness, finds fulfillment only when thought is realized in action,
it is action, as rational, and the conditions necessary for it
that carries the ultimate significance in the defining process

of the person, and together with him 9 society.

It is primarily

to meet the demands of action--always understood as the means
of realizing rationality in the world and thereby transforming

that world through the creative touch of rationality--that the
necessity of society as conatural to the person is made evident.
"The activity of men postulates association between them. postulates order in such association, postulates the guaranteeing
of this order." (I.,L. 60)

For this reason Sturzo defines the

social instinct of the person as "that projection of the ego
into an environment necessary for action.'' (I .L. 311)

4 5see also the very significant article of Sturzo, "The
Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Conceptiona,u Thought, 20
(March, 1945), 110.
46 sturzo, "The Philosophic Background of Christian Democracy," pp. 9-10.
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Since the projection of consciousness is the concretization
of sociality in each individual, it follows that this process
at one and the same time gives rise to the concretization of
society.

Yet, it is clear that although the ooncretization of

society is simultaneous with the concretization of sociality,
yet sociality of the individual is not commensurate with society.

In the concrete individual consciousness there is a two-

fold, opposing directionality in its activity: a personal directionalj.ty and a social one.

Under the movement of the per-

sonal directionality the person views himself as the center of
his surrounding world and feels that everything around him
resolves itself into his life and whose value is determined in
terms of his own life.

Under the movement of his social direc-

tionality, the person has the instinctive and reflective conviction that his thoughts, aspirations and activities belong to
others and the world just as they and it belong to him.

It is

an "instinctiveu conviction because it arises out of his very
nature and it is at the same time reflective because as the
individual reflects upon himself, and his own life, he becomes
increasingly aware of his own indigence in separation from association with others. {I.L. 4, 5, 300)
It must be noted that this twotold directionality is related
to but not equivalent to the processes internalization and projection.

The latter processes are ontologically constitutive

of the individual consciousness, the twofold directionality is
not.

The evidence fort.his is that internalization and projec-

tion are never in opposition to one another.

In fact, they are

mutually interdependent whereas there can be and often times is

??

an opposition between the
conscious activity.

pe~sonal

and social directionality

or

An exa.Ilple of this would be the domination

of one movement to the stifling of the other.

The danger here

16 usually on the side of the personal directionality when it
develops into an individualistic egoism, but there can be a

movement towards the social group without a corresponding gain
in depth and strength of personality.

When these two movements

do not stand in opposition, they may "now integrate, now counteract each other, now act as a mutual stimulus, now are combined."

(I.L. 156)

These two movements are reflected in the direction-

ality of social dynamism, where the movement to a widening and
amplific~tion

of social nuclei is generally the positive moment

in the social process, while the movement back towards the
personal world of the individual, as often marked by egoism,
violence, and intransigence, is usually the negative moment
in the process.

Although often in opposition to one another,

these counteractive movements within the social process generate a thrust that nmakes possible the great social achievements,
which could not come about in a society where all dynamism is
artificially prevented." {I.L. 15?)
Now that the development of the individual consciousness
through the processes of internalization and projection has
been adumbrated. the factors involved in the coneretization of
sociality from the perspective of the individual person have
been determined.

Since society as well as the individual is

formed in the concretization of sociality, this process must be

approached from the viewpoint of society in order to fully articulate the nature

or

the union between the individual and society.

?8

our

investigation has f ooused on the actuation of consciousness

since it is in this· process that is the loous for the union
between the individual and society inasmuch as it is constitutive of each and both together.

From what has already been

said about sociality as an ontological structure of the person,
it follows that since it is through consciousness that the
individual is a person, the determining element of society is
also consciousness.

"The element o.f consciousness is so neces-

sary to animate society and to render it effective that without
it there cannot exist a true human society.'' (M. 19, 22, 91)

"Just as without consciousness ot self, human individuality
cannot be appraised ••• so without consciousness

or

the society

in which we live, of its value and continuity, there can be no
true society but only approaches, conjunctions brought about
more or less by chance or force." (I.L. 6)

Society in the con-

crete essentially involves a cooperation or communion among
individuals for the attainment or preservation of a common end.

The formality of society consists in the consciousness ot this
communion as it is interreflected among the members of the
groups in thought and action.

Thia consciousness as interreflec-

ted in thought and action forms the collective consciousness,
and through it society.

A society is organized through the

formation of a collective consciousness "which alone can give
it being and t'unetionalit;y." 4 ? The problem confronting us now

is to determine the process whereby this collective consciousness is formed, the exact nature that Sturzo assigns to it and
4 ?sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," p. 124.
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relationship to the individual personal consciousness.
The problem

or·

the nature of colleetiv6 consciousness and

its relationship to the individual consciousness is inseparably
tied up with its formation.

The reason for this is clear rrom

what already has been stated concerning the processual nature

of both the individual and society.

The nature of each is

process and both are constituted together in a single process.
Although the reality of each is constituted only in a reciprocal
relation with the other so that each is the sine qua non condition for the reality of the other, even to the extent that
person and society constitute together a single reality, nevertheless, these two ''components" of' the socio-historical process
cannot be resolved into a unity of identity.

Sturzo is very

positive in his affirmation that collective consciousness is

not something that is ontologically distinct from the consciousness of those who together make up the collectivity (I.L. 4;
T.L. 203;.

c.

&. P.

55)

At the same time, he is equally clear

that society• and therefore, collective consciousness does have
a reality of' its own which cannot be reduced to a relation of

identity with the individual consciousness. (I.L.

~03)

Tb.us,

the individual consciousness and collective consciousness stand
in a complex dialectical relationship of reciprocity and differentiation, or more precisely, of differentiation-in-synthesis.
The more the individual and society reflect and reveal the
reality of each other, the more they are differentiated.

There

is no release for the tension that develops in this dialectic
of differentiation-in-synthesis because it is rooted in the
ontological structure of the individual person.
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This relationship between collective consciousness and the
individual consciousness is a manifestation of a fundanental
Blondelian thesis that reality cannot be explained by the principle of identity.

The attempt to reduce reality to identity

"far from satisfying the mind ••• is a counterfeit ot any explana-

tion."48

Sturzo's theory is in too close a contact with reality

to be prone to the danger of such a counterfeit.

His theory

faithfully mirrors the complexity and diversity of reality;
but, as a result, just a.s physical reality yields its treasures
only with great labor, so does it require no leas exertion to
mine the insights of Sturzo•s theory.

Out of this dialectic, the collective consciousness stands
in a paradoxical relationship with the individual consciousness.
It at one and the same time is formed in the same developmental

process of the individual consciousness and is a presupposition

tor this process.

It is the former in the fact

th~t

its forma-

tion is simultaneous to and coterminus with the projection of
the individual consciousness.

It is the latter in that the

development of the individual consciousness presupposes the
collective consciousness of society as a sine qua non condition
of its development.

There are several factors that give evi-

dence to the fact that social life is a precondition tor the
development of individual consciousness.

Most immediately is

the fact that the individual comes to self-awareness only in
relation to another person, and in terms of the entire milieu

ot limiting and determining concrete factors which mark this
48 sturzo, "Maurice Blondel's La Pense"e: the Philosophy of
'L'elan spiritual,'" p. ~3.
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relationship.

"Human coexistence is as necessary for individual

existence as air is necessary tor respiration.

Even before a

child has a notion of himself he has an idea of the other--of
a mother, foster mother, nurse, playmate." 49 Knowledge, too,

18 social in its origin. It arises only within a social context.
A language structure, for example, is an expression of an aspect

ot a collective consciousness that precedes the development of
the individual consciousness and influences the .formation of the

individual consciousness.

The total social environment, in

its tradition, institutions, laws, language, all that goes to
make it up, provides the necessary matrix within which the
individual consciousness develops.

As Sturzo puts it, social

lif'e, "as it .fulfills itself, is knit up (even while it modifies

them) with traditions, doctrines, and theories that through
the ages often form strata in the consciousness of associated
members." (I.L. 4;

er.

207, 210)

But while collective consciousness is a precondition for
the individual consciousness to become present to itself, to
develop and perfect itself, at the same time collective consciousness is dependent on the individual consciousness for its
life.

As Blondel puts it, society is at once the mother and

daughter of thought.

Sturzo describes this relationship as

"fulfilling a cycle that runs from the person to the collectivity and from the collectivity to the person, a cycle of inward
thought finding outward expression, of practical activity
4 9sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," pp.
107-08.
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noeived and actuated." (I.L. 300)50
In tracing this·cycle from the person to the collectivity,

it should be clear that just as the development of person con-

sciousness is rooted in and realized through action, so also is
collective consciousness.

It has al.ready been indicated that a

society is such not through just the association of its members
in cooperation for a common end, but through the consciousness
of this association and common end as it is mutually reflected
among the menbers.

But this consciousness is mutually reflected

only through the social activity of the individual members.
Without this activity one could say at most that there is only

an individual orientation in sympathy with that or others.
-The collective consciousness may be considered a resultant of
the individual consciousness only when the individuals express
in !acts, in however inchoate a fashion, the ends of their

association." (I.L. 254; M. 92)

An

essential fact to note

about character of the collective consciousness which is formed
is that it does not mean that all the members or the group understand their association and ends in exactly the same way.

In

tact, it is essential to the vitality of the collective consciousness that some understand the ends of society "in a different
way and dissent therefrom, so that in the end there comes about
that maximum and that minimum of consent and of reciprocal influence which create action." (N. & I. l?)
In order to indicate both the reali ~, and the vitality of

5°cr. also Sturzo' a, "Maurice Blondel • s La Pense'e: the
Philosophy of 'L'elan spiritual,'" p. 351.
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of collective consciousness, Sturzo poses that through its
collective consciousness a particular society achieves a social
personality analogous to that of the level of the individual
person.

The term "personality" indicates the active conscious-

ness of a group, giving it a spontaneity, vitality and autonomy
of its own. (N. &. I. 13)

The use of the term "personality" in

this instance is in no sense a mere figure of speech. a metaphor,
but neither does it indicate an entity standing by itself above
individuals, whether it be a bio-physical or spiritual reality.
It is a reality, a moral socio-historical reality that is "born

of consciousness and developed through consciousness, resolves
itself into consciousness as its natural center." (I.L. 300)
Although the social personality, or society, formed through
collective consciousness is not a

~ertium

guid, neither is it

a merging of the many into one, nor yet can it, as a vital
unity, be dissolved into its components.

Collective conscious-

ness is the vital bond that unites and organizes the members of
a society, while it at the same time transcends them, much in
the same way that the individual consciousness inwardly synthesizes all the faculties of the person while at the same time
transcending them.

Although Sturzo views society in terms of

social personality to point up its character as a vital reality,
he nevertheless warns against viewing particular societies
analytically as individualities in a conventional framework.
Such a perspective is an abstraction from reality.

Societies

must be viewed in their activity.
From within this perspective their reality will be revealed
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as "a particularizing through means and ends, a converging, a
dualizing, a grading." (I.L. 255, 301)

Although the .full signi-

ficance of this will be brought out later in an analysis of the
social syntheses, it is clear in the light of what already has
been said that what Sturzo means by these words is that the

conjunction of persons in society is at one with the development,
a "particularizing" o.f their own personality.
The unity

or

the collective personality is not a psycholo-

gical or mechanical unity, "but moral-historical, founded on an
intercommunication of consciousness.u (T.L. 201)

This unity is

primarily achieved through the development of an historical
consciousness through which its continuity is established and
those values expressed that form the nexus or the intercommunication of consciousness.

Just as the individual "preserves and

recognizes his identity through his consciousness of himself and

ot his past. so society in the concrete, that is. a given society,
through the succession of years and generations preserves its
identity through the consciousness formed among all its members
that it is the same society as in the beginning." (I.L. 3)

This

historical consciousness gradually comes into being as a society
little by little evolves and extends itself from the initial

II
I

consciousness of the elementary tact of association to "the
consistency of several families bound together by a bond that
unites, organizes and transcends them." (T.L. 204)
is the collective consciousness of the group.

This bond

The development

of collective consciousness. then. contains within itself the

movement to transcend a given social nucleus to a new sphere ot
relationships, which coexists with its composing nuclei but is

11

I:

II

.
L

1
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not commensurate with them as it always reaches beyond them.
"The transcendence is achieved when the collective personality
18 felt simultaneously by its diverse components, in their common activities and in their conflicts or interests and domin-

ion." (T.L. 205)
The moving force behind this transcendence of social nuclei
in the development of collective consciousness, ever impelling
it toward unification and a better future. is a collective finalism, which through the strengthening of inner forces engenders
the spirit of achievement.

Just as the individual seeks ends

that transcend himself in the very process of fulfilling and
perfecting himself, so does the collective activity of the
group ever strive towards a goal that transcends the present
situation.

This impulsion generates the spirit of achievement

that "gives vitality and unification to the collective personality."

This spirit of achievement is the expression of the

"desire for greater welfare, seen each time as a necessity or
an enhancement of 11.fe. n

The term

11

welfare 1' must not be re-

stricted to the plane of material interests, although these
are certainly to be included, and not just as "a necessity"
tor life but also for "an enhancement" of life since they f'urnish the foundation for man's moral, intellectual and religious

life.

It includes the entire range of man's needs, feelings,

and aspirations, "from the most primitive to the loftiest." (T.

L. 202)
As collective consciousness takes shape the past is experienced as the present "in tradition, language, customs, continuity of place, and representative symbols." (I.L. 3)

These
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embrace within themselves those values, idealized as a reality
to be preserved and defended or yet to be attained, which unify
and express the collective consciousness.

For the collective

consciousness is unified and formed by that past which continues
to live in the present as the principle of life and collective
activity.

This past that continues to live in the present is

that which corresponds to the present situation and needs of

the collective consciousness.

Just as the memory of the indi-

vidual is selective, so is the contact of collective consciousness with the past filtered through the mesh of its present
needs, circumstances and popular orientations.

nThe systematiz-

ing of these memories is not theoretical and abstract, but
realistic and concrete like social life itself. 1• (I .L. 4)
Just as the life of the individual person follows a path
from birth through periods of maturation. and then to decline
to death. so does the life of the social personality.

The

social personality formed through the collective consciousness
continues to live as long as its past continues to animate its
present and provide an orientation towards the future.

It is

this inward vitality and continuity, rather than simply outward
events, that makes the life of a social personality.

Events

are a potent influence in increasing or diminishing the vitality Of the collectivity, but the principle Of this vitality is
not in outward events but in the collective consciousness.
This continues to exist and survive the greatest cataclysms,

"so long as the people concerned maintain the consciousness of
its own continuity." (T.L. 206-?)

An example of this is Ireland
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which maintained its consciousness as a nation throughout its
subjection to England even though it lost its language and did
not have its own independent political configuration for centuries.

'w'hereas on the other hand, the collective consciousness

of ancient Greece was not reborn with the modern Greece because
there is no continuity of consciousness.

Despite the same

approximate territory and even a similarity of language, the
collective consciousness of modern Greece is not animated by
the past of ancient, Greece.

This past no longer lives in the

present as the source of collective activity, but is only preserved as a pure memory of something that once had life, but
now is in a state of petrifaction.

Rome and Italy today.

The same holds true for

Its collective personality, that is, its

active collective consciousness, is other than that of ancient

Rome.

Ea.oh has their own rhythm ot life, their own finalism

and spirit of achievement, their own institutions and culture,
in a word, their own history.

As Robert Pollock has acutely

pointed out, this originality reveals itself in the difficulty
every epoch encounters in trying to imitate the works of another
--works which so many could produce at one time, even with a
certain natural facility.51 Therefore, the collective personality that objectivates human action and makes it lasting lives
and has value insofar as it is animated by a collective consciousness and its processive continuity.
broken, so

is

Once this continuity is

its life-line.

5lPollock, "L'uomo nella societ~ e nella storia," pp.
232-33; T.L. 20?; 200-01.
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What gives collective personality its dpecific determination is its ethico-organic nature.

The term "ethico-organic"

indicates the finalistic and, therefore, ethical character of
society and its organic structure which follows from the coordinated activities of the associated individuals.

Although the

social personality does have a life of its own, it is the individual that gives it this life and its ethico-organic structure.
In the development of collective conmciousness, and hence
the social personality, there is no factor that is external to
the individual that brings about this movement from the individual to the formation of a collective consciousness.

This should

be clear from the fact that sociality is an ontological struc-

ture of the person.

However. in tracing the formation of the

collective consciousness we have spoken of a collective finalism,
which is sometimes interpreted to be extraneous to the individual.

It is true that the movement from the individual to the

formation of an organized society there is always functioning
a common end which gives impetus to, and thereby organizes
around it, a whole complexus of personal.activities.

But this

collective finalism is intrinsic to the individual person.

In

tact, it is his very nature ttconsidered as a tendency or exigency to seek fulfillment and perfection." (I.L. xv)

Since

the person achieves his own reality in the concretization of
sociality into social forms, social finality is the inner finality of his own activity. (I.L. xvi)

In view of this, since it

is the human person that is realized in society, it is the indiVidual person that is the end of society and not vice-versa.

L
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society is the means whereby the indiVidual is able to attain
bis end.

"Such expressions indicate the theoretical and prac-

tical value of the unicity of the consciousness and of the end
which from individuals passes to society." (I.L. ?)
This position does not

~dercut

the reality

or

social ends;

but it does emphasize that their reality is rooted in and
arises from the interior finalities or coordinated personal
activity.

Finality is the conscious rationality that directs--

and in directing is itself realized--personal activity; and
there is no extra-social personal activity.
the ontological structure

or

It is clear trom

the person, in which the individual

and society form one constitutive process, that there is no
aspect of personal activity which, although originally indivi-

dual, does not have a social character.
is no life.

"Without society there

Pain is personal as thought is and like thought

it is at the same time social.

Neither the experience nor the

overcoming of pain are so personal as not to be at the same time
a collective experience, a collective victory." (T.L. 166)
same applies equally as well to persona.l finality.

The

Society is

the projection of personal activities, which of themselves
involve a network of inter-individual relationships, so that
within this process it attains its own reality, not apart from

or above individuals, but consisting of individuals united together.

It is a reality that is collectively produced, and

exists only as collectively maintained, but it is not for this
reason any less real than something that is produced by a single
person.

Its reality is manifested in the fact that it cannot
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be dissolved into the single and isolated individuals that
together constitute· it.

It is a whole that transcends the

sum total of its parts.

Social ends hold the sane relation-

sbiP to personal ends.

But to try to determine the reality of

society apart from the individuals that compose it, is to move
as far into the realm of abstractions as it is to try to determine the reality of individual persons apart from society.
As sturzo states, ordinary language is delusive when it opposes
individual to society, the individual good to the common good.

(M. 86)

The reality of each is constituted together.

However,

this fact does not lessen the dynamic interplay and tension

between the two.

The situation can be summed up in this way:

individual ends and social ends are both real, but only as they
together form a single reality.

Within this single reality

they do not stand in opposition to one another and neither can

they be reduced to identity.
In regard to the general end of any society, this has traditionally been designated as the common good.

Sturzo generally

does not use this traditional term, but rather the terms "social euds,"
for this.

0

finality," or "finalism."

There are two reasons

One is his effort to clarify the specific end of

every social form according to their intrinsic characters as
they correspond to the natural requirements of human nature. (M.
84-5)

Another is the more active and processive connotations

conveyed by the term "finality" or "tinalism. ''

And the social

ends are never attained in their fullness, but only partially
and temporarily within the flow of the human process.
fore, instead

or

There-

speaking of a common good, Sturzo prefers to

L
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talk

or

''a collective finalism which is the welfare of the group

and its members, and which, taken as a whole. transcends the
exigencies of individuals and even present life, pressing forward into the future." (T.L. 201)
But by combining the few statements Sturzo does make about
the common good with those he makes in terms of a collective
tinalism we can get some picture of the relationship between
the individual personal good and the common good.

In view of

the fact that the collective finalism is the nature of the individual person considered as a tendency toward fulfillment, the
relationship between the individual good and the common good
is not one of a lesser good, the individual, and a greater good,
the common good, but rather that in which the one, the individual good, finds its realization in the other, the common good.
Yet, the end of society is the individual person, and the common
good is real and effective, that is, achieved within a society
only to the extent that it is resolved into the individual good,
that is, becomes a good actually participated in by the individual persons united together.

Although the individual, per-

sonal good, which of itself is individual-social, becomes
through itself the common good• and although the end of society
is the individual person, yet the common good, taken as a whole,
transcends the exigencies of the individuals taken,singly, and
cannot be dissolved into the individual good.

Sturzo states the

relationship in this way:
Collective consciousness is based on two value judgments which are correlative: 'The community is worth
more than the individuals who compose it--insofar as
it provides them with a common good; 'The individuals

92
are worth more than the Community--insofar as they are
the end for which the Community is formed.52
The organic structure arises from the coordination of individual activities for the attainment of the social end.

The

individuals themselves are the organs of society as they participate in the pursuit of the social end.

They are the func-

tional organs taken either individually as mother and father
within the family, or as united into intermediate groups within
a larger society, such as towns and classes within the state.
Since not all participate in the social finalism in the same
way, this specification of functions makes up the organic
structure of society.

This organic structure is essential both

from the perspective of society and of the individual person.
On the level of society intermediate organizations are necessary
to meet the complex needs of social life.

On the level of the

individual, it is only in an organic social life, that is, a
social life which each contributes to, that individuals are
able to achieve consciousness of their own being (I.L. 175)
Considered in the abstract, social organs are distinguished
from social ends.

But within the concrete process of social

life, they are the processive realization of the social end.
The end is the conscious rationality of the practical action

of individuals and the social organ is proceasive actuation of
this conscious rationality through the coordinated activities

or

individuals.

Therefore, social ends and organs are simply

the practical manifestation of "the consciousness of individuals

52 sturzo, "Some Notes on the Problem of Education," p.
~4; er. M. 84-9.
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of being in communion among one another and of acting accordingly." (I.L. 6-8;.cf. also xvii• 174-5)
In discussing the organic structure
frequently uses the term "organism."

or

society, Sturzo

Sometimes he uses it

where he means the organization of a particular society.
"Societies are usually distinguished by the end and by the
organism of each.n (I.L. 6)

Other times he uses it to refer

to social units composed of various organs, as when he states
that the members of a family "all together form a single organism.'' (I.L. 1?4; cf. I.L. 1?5; M. 35)

The use

or

this term

is not compatible with his strong rejection of any organistia
view of society, either in the sense

or

viewing society as a

real organism with its own structure and life independent of
the individual composing it or in the sense of building up a
theory of society on the basis or similarities drawn between
social and biological organisms.

cannot create a science.

"The play or analogy, however,

To speak, for instance, of social

biology reduces itself simply to transporting biological data
into the social field, on grounds of analogical or imaginary
resemblances.,. (I.L. xii; M. 33-4)

Sturzo's opposition to a

social theory modeled on a natural science such as biology has
its roots in his historico-processive view of society.

The

tendency of an organistic perspective is "to consider society
as morphologically fixed, once and forever, and not to observe
it historically, both in its progressive phases or sudden
arrests, and in its variable forms according to time, place,
and civilization." (M. 33; I.L. xii)

The error of viewing society-
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a self-subsistent reality also follows from not viewing it
its processive activity.

In addition to these objections to

the biological model, there is also the factor that the model
o! a biological organism presents a totality that is relatively
colored in its structure, whereas the wholeness proper to society
is equivalent to that on the personal level--open-ended, as is
evident in the continual emergence of new social groups.
view of these objections, Sturzo•s use of the term

0

In

organism"

should be interpreted not as an unfortunate figure of speech,
but as indicating the importance he placed on the organic struc-

ture of society and the autonomy of intermediate social groups
within a larger society, such as the state.

To call these

intermediate groups "organisms" served to emphasize their
natural origin and autonomy in opposition to any theory of
both individualism and statalism. (I.L.

175)

In tracing the growth and development of society through
the formation of collective consciousness, Sturzo sought to
pinpoint the definitive and original irresolvable principle of
this process that would include all social forms and resolve
them into itself.

In this quest, Sturzo discovered it to be

rationality, as concretized in the individual, and thereby
threaded his way between the protruding shoals of determinism
and voluntarism.

The exponents of determinism place the origin

of society in bio-psycho-physical conditioning or in such forces
as the instinct of self-preservation or the preservation of the
species.

Although Sturzo recognizes the presence and necessity

Of conditioning factors in thed:ivelopment of social life, as
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well as the function and value or such elementary forces, yet
they can never of themselves give rise to true social living
which transpires only when "there comes to be a true mental
communion among those associated in an active convergence lit

by the ray of human reason." (I.L. 10)
Within a voluntaristic social theory, a social contract,
either tacit or explicit, is considered to be the source of
society.

Sturzo raises several objections to this theory, but

they all have their ultimate basis in his theory that sociality
is an ontological structure of the person.

In view of this,

there could be no human situation, such as an alleged state of
nature on which voluntaristic theories are founded, that is
extra-social.

Also, whereas there are no necessary societies

for social contract theories, within Sturzo's theory not only
are there necessary societies, but society in general is correlative to the field of the personal.

Sturzo recognizes the

function and value of the voluntary factor in the origin and
development of society, but as has already been noted. this
voluntary aspect in the process is rooted in the inner exigency
of rationality to seek expression and fulfillment "in a continuous succession of voluntary acts.n

Since sociality is part

of man's rational nature, it too is caught up in this incessant
dynamism of rational\ty, and it is this that brings it to fruition.

Thus the original irresolvable principle

or

sociality

is "the rational capacity of individuals to acquire consciousness of their associative nature, and this they actuate endlessly

by their own individual voluntary activity." (I.L. 13; cf. 8-13)
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It is precisely

t~is

inner dynamism of rationality for

completion that renders the concretization of sociality prooessive and dynamic.
time." (I.L. 13)

As Sturzo states, "it is realized through

It is important here to determine the exact

relation between the inner dynamism of rationality and this

tourth dimension of society--time.

We have already seen how

rationality as a concrete and essential principle of the individual person consists entirely in its impelling drive for
expression and completion.

This process, in which the person

and society are constituted together, is a process of unceasing
becoming because
••• in no moment does rationality find adequate and entire
expression in the human concrete •••• Neither the individual taken in himself, nor society as the outcome of
its individuals can be said to possess themselves wholly,
and, hence, to be able to rest on the realization of the
moment as final and definitive. (I.L. 13)
Rationality continually realizes itself through the process

or

projecting itself and, in this process, it becomes objectified
as language, institutions, laws, cities, monuments, works of

art, all as the objectified outcome of rationality seeking
realization.

All these are expressions or the activity of ra-

tionality which in generating them is itself realized.

But

they are never exhaustive of that activity; and, although they
are concrete embodiments of rationality seeking completion, they
are never adequately expressive of that urge that gave rise to
them.

As mentioned previously, the various meanings assigned

to rationality by Sturzo have their ideal and historical locus
in the concrete rational nature of the person.

, I

II

It is here in

the inner dynamism o! the concrete individualized rationality

9?

that the world in its intelligibility is rendered intelligible
to us, and it is here that individualized rationality is related
to

rationality "conceived as an absolute" or as an ideal order

transcending the defects and imperfections of present reality;
tor this ideal order is both the presupposition and term of
tbiS inner dynamism.

It is a presupposition as latent within

this dynamism seeking to burst forth in the grandeur of its
actuality.

It is this which gives the thrust to this inner

d)'namism and the orientation of its creative energy, incessantly
iJllpelling it toward further realization.
also the term ot this dynamism

or

This ideal order is

individualized rationality

as that in which it finds completion.
The process

or

rationality is marked by two dialectical mo-

ments, the negative and the positive.

The negative moment

reveals the incommensurability of the concrete embodiments

or

rationality with its creative energy, while the positive moment
reveals the continued thrust ot this creative energy in the
form ot "the idea to be realized which

~ill

supply the lacks,

the incompletenesses and the limits of what has already been
achieved." (I.L. 14)

The negative moment of this process is

the result and manifestation

or

the finitude of man's being.

It man were infinite, he would at once and in a single act
achieve the fullness of his being.
situation.

But this is not the human

Man's being consists in an unceasing becoming

through a succession of acts.

In no single act does he possess

himself wholly and entirely, with the result that it always inoludes an element of otherness which must yet be cancelled out
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transformed into his own being.
In addition to.this metaphysical viewpoint, the negative
moment in the process of rationality can also be considered

trom the perspective of the dialectic of human action and from
the ethical standpoint.
tude.

Both of these are rooted in man's fini-

Within the confines o! this finitude, human rationality

can realize itself only in dialectic with material reality

through human action.

In this dialectic of human action the

negation of rationality is that moment in which a concrete
embodiment

ot

or

rationality has become separated from the source

ratio~ality

vity.

and thereby becomes an obstacle to further acti-

That which has been rationally achieved retains its

value of rationality only as it continues to be renewed "from
that undying font of vital reality that is man."

From an

ethical viewpoint, the negative moment is manifested "as the
erroneous and faulty actuation of rationality when the end to
be attained and good to be realized have presented themselves
to human action in defective or equivocal guise." (I.L. 15)
This too comes about as a result of man's finitude which
aeans that rationality as coneretized is always limited and
relativistic in character.

The further achievement of ration-

ality is always the urge to action.

Yet, due to the limited

scope of the rationality already achieved, we often are unable
· to distinguish true rationality from se:mi-rat1onali ty, which is
rational only in certain aspects and in an incomplete fashion,
or from pseudo-rationality, which is rational in appearance
only. (I • L. l?)
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It should be no.ted here that Sturzo uses these terms, the
semi-rational and the pseudo-rational, to refer to the rational
element contained in the negative moment.

For in regard ta the

overall process of rationality, the rational element contained
in the negative moment always is the semi-rational or the
pseudo-rational in comparison with the rational element contained in the succeeding positive moment.
This negative moment, whether viewed in its metaphysical
roots or from its dialectical or ethical aspects "unfolds in
its true value man•s continuous endeavor to win for himself his
own rationality." (I.L. 15)

This endeavor consists in overcom-

ing the negative moment and resolving it into the positive.

It

is a continuous effort because just as the rational element
contained in the negative moment is revealed to be the semirational, or even the pseudo-rational, in the light of the
1deality of the positive moment, so in turn will the deficiencies of the rationality achieved through this identity eventually become manifest.

Although within the concrete flow of the

human process, whether on the level of the individual person or
society, one or the other moments may dominate, nevertheless,
there is for Sturzo no relaxation of the tension between these
two moments, and most assuredly there is no denouement to it.
Since the term of this process is absolute rationality, in
which the process finds its unification, the inward drive of
the concrete individualized rationality for completion is continually frustrated by its negation.
The claim to a human society founded on pure reason,
overcoming once for all any admixture of the irrational,

i

11
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lacks a realistic.basis, tor it presupposes the transformation of the dynamism of human process into a
rationalistic staticism which, being against nature,
is fundamentally irrational. (I.L. 16)
The dynamism of the human process is that inner necessity

or

individualized rationality for completion in absolute ration-

ality.

It is precisely here in the inner dynamism of rational-

ity that Sturzo locates the origin of time.

We need points of reference in order to establish time.
But it is not the clock that makes time, nor the rising
and setting of the sun that makes the succession of
things, nor the material evolving of our aging body,
nor the succession and pressing on of the generations,
which arise and vanish, nor the succession ot Kings and
governments. These are outward indications of a consciousness that is never exhausted, and that tinds
realization at every instant of its inner process
while, projecting itself into the outer world, it gives
it its imprint. (I.L. 14)
Although Sturzo uses the term consciousness, it has already been
explained how, within the inward synthesis of consciousness, it
is the projection of rationality that constitutes its most
primitive activity and marks the ultimate quality of its being.
This is clear from the continuation of the passage: "All things
touched by man bear his hallmark; ••• this living flame that is
human rationality."

Since rationality is the essential prin-

ciple of the human person, this drive of rationality is the
constitutive activity of the person, and thereby society.
Therefore, the most intimate reality of the person consists in
this movement from the presentt but partial concretization of
rationality towards its complete realization.

\

And the present

actuality of the person resides in the tension between the negative and positive moments of the process.
tension that constitutes time.

It is precisely this
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Time is the very form of the personal field as the modality
according to which ·the individual person constantly moves from
bis present actuality toward the further realization of rationality--a movement that finds no cessation short of absolute
rationality.

Sturzo states that "we need points ot reference

in order to establish time.''

Time marks the rhythm, or more

exactly, is this rhythm, of the inner dynamism ot rationality
toward absolute rationality and it is this absolute rationality
that in turn ultimately measures time.

It is in terms of abso-

lute rationality that there is the unceasing movement of individualized rationality• and this movement is the essence of time.
In uncovering Sturzo's theory of time, we, at the same
time, lay bare the theoretical basis for his most basic understanding of the person that is the supposition for his entire
social theory.

For it is here, in the essence of time, that

the process that is human reality reveals itself to be fundamentally and constitutively a tendency towards absolute rationality, or in a word, "rational becoming." (I.L. xx111-xxiv; 16-1?)
It is precisely this that

define~

the person in his ulti-

mate character: the tendency towards absolute rationality in
time.

Time is the inner rhythm of this tendency that is the

person.

Temporality 1 then, as the internal, necessary and con-

stitutive dimension or the person is that which defines the
person in its ontological character.
In arising from within the dynamic structure of the rational
nature of the person, temporality is also an intrinsic element
or sociality as an ontological structure of this nature.
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society, then, as the concrete outcome of sociality, has temporality as one of its essential factors.

This is the theore-

tical basis for Sturzo's insistence that "to fulfill its scientific purpose sociology should carry the study of society in
the concrete into the fourth dimension, that of time •••• " (T.L.
')

To do otherwise is to be guilty of abstractionism.

Time,

as an inward dimension of the person, is the inner lite ot society.

To study society outside of time, therefore, is to

study a nonexistent abstraction.
Since sociality is an ontological structure of the person,
the tendency towards rationality embraces within the totality
of its dimensions both the person and society.

Or more exactly,

this movement towards rationality is the realization of individuality in sociality. (I.L. 36)

At the beginning of our

analysis of collective consciousness it was noted that the
individual consciousness and collective consciousness stand in
a complex dialectical relationship of dif ferentiation-in-syntheais, and that in the working out of this dialectic, the collective consciousness develops together with the individual consciousness and at the same time is a presupposition for the
formation of the individual consciousness.

We have already

seen an articulation of this differentiation-in-synthesis relationship between the person and society from the side of the
person in Sturzo's formulrition of the law of "individualitysociality.1153
t

!

The nature or this relationship can now be more

specifically determined through Sturzo's theory of sociological

~

53see p. 41 of this chapter.
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resolution.
In tracing the.contours of the realization of individuality
in sociality, we have seen that the person is constituted in
the conoretization of sociality and yet that there is a feedback from both the process itself and the social forms that are
the result ofthis process--a feedback which has a formative and
determining efficacy that functions both internally and externally upon the individual.

within the concrete historical pro-

cess the individual comes into an already formed society.

How-

ever, we have already seen that society is as open-ended in
its structural process as the individual person, so that "never
is society so complete that a new existence can add nothing to
it." (I.L. 302)

The individual penetrates into an already

existing social structure in a way that can be figuratively,
but concretely, pictured as similar to that of a fish breaking
through the surface of the water that contains him.

The person

is born into and immersed in a social environment in the same
life-giving and determining way as the fish in water.

And as

the fish draws the strength from within its aqueous environment
not only to move within it, but even to rise up out of it to
penetrate back within it, causing an ever-expanding sphere of
ripples in the surface of the water, so the individual through
the radiating vitality of his thought and action ripples the
surface of his social environment in an ever expanding sphere

ot influence, even to the extent of transforming it.

The social

environment in its turn, even while being modified, pours back
upon the individual the complex values, attitudes, beliefs, all,
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in a word, that has .been formed within it through collective
activity.
Within the socio-historical process, then, the dialectical
coexistence of the person and society is such that the more
tbeY influence one another and interpenetrate to form together

a living synthesis, the more they develop and deepen their own
reality.

This is explained by the fact that their coexistence

"is a continuous succession of resolutions." (I.L. 300)

The

process of sociological resolution is that whereby "all that is
produced as social returns to the individuals according to the
capacity of each, and such capacity is more or less developed
according to the greater or lesser participation in social lite,
in its ends and its values." (I.L. 305)

Sturzo uses the term

resolution, which is derived from the physio-mathematical sciences, to indicate that social values are such only insofar as
they pass into the consciousness of each individual to !orm a
deeper and more complete personality.

Since the synthesizing

resolution transpires in the individual consciousness, it is
fundamentally "a deepening of consciousness."

This resolution

takes place according to the capacity of the individual consciousness and this capacity is in proportion to "the greater
or lesser participation in social life, in its ends and its
values.''

Thus, there is between the individuals and society

a reciprocating vital cycle in which the closer and more intense
the relationship, the deeper and more extensive is the reality

ot each.

The more the individual participates in the social

lite the more vigorous the social life becomes and the deeper
and richer is the personality of the individual.

This is the
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result of a feedback from both the process of participating
in the social life and its ensuing results.

From the process

itself the individual has a greater capacity to receive the
feedback of the resulting social values because he feels the
social life to the extent he participates in it and makes it
his own.

And the more intensive the social lite, the greater

the feedback of values and advantages upon the individual.

We have seen that the point of contact between the individual and society is on the level of consciousness, understanding
that term now in all the richness

or

its meaning tor Sturzo,

and that just as it is consciousness that specifically determines the individual as a person, so ia it collective conscious-

ness that determines society.

Since resolution transpires in

the individual consciousness, when Sturzo states that it is
accomplished "as a deepening of consciousness," he is referring
to the individual consciousness.

But it is clear that there is

a teedback onto society from this process so that collective

consciousness itself

becom~s

deeper and more extensive.

Since

this resolution takes place according to the degree of the active synthesis between the individual and society, their relationship as one

or

differentiation-in-synthesis therefore

clearly manifests itself.
Although the process of resolution makes it ever more clear
that the individual person is the efficient and final principle

ot collective consciousness, nevertheless, it at the same time
gives .further evidence of the reality of the collective consciousness.

For in this process whereby social values and factors
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are resolved into th.e individual consciousness there are always
remainders.

This is the term Sturzo uses to denote those per-

manent elements of society that cannot be resolved into the
individuals of society taken singly and persist beyond the
collectivity that has produced them.

These are such objectifi-

cations of collective consciousness as traditions, language,
beliefs, laws, institutions, all that goes to make up the living
heritage o! a civilization.

Since these permanent elements con-

stitute the social nucleus that is the socio-historical presupposition for the process of resolution, without them "there
could not be that very resolution into personality which thus
would not be able to achieve its ends." (I.L. 303)
In this chapter we have traced Sturzo•s theory on the
inward formation of society.

It began with the individual per-

son as the active and efficient principle o! this process, since
society, for Sturzo, is the simultaneous and interweaving
projection of individuals in their activities.

His theory ot

sociological resolution is rooted in this conception of society
and reveals the person as "the term towards which the social
oomplexus is directed." (I.L. 303; et. M. 88)

Hence, the emer-

gence of the person, then, is the end of society so that it is
efficacious in its social values to the extent that they resolve
themselves into the individual consciousness to form a more
complete and a spiritually and morally richer personality.
"Without such resolution, the whole effort ot social activity
would be in vain and incomprehensible, and man would be out of
Place in an absurd complexus of impenetrable elements.'' (I .L.
303)

In the formation of society, then, the person stands
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revealed as the efficient and final principle.
The entire thrust of Sturzo's theory, therefore. is directed toward unveiling the reality of the person because it is
this that realizes itself in society.

The ultimate basis for

this lies in the very ontological structure of the person which
is constituted in and through sociality.

It is in the concre-

tizing of sociality that men win their personality.

''Therefore,

we say that sociality starts from the individual person and
resolves itself into the individual person. like the continuous
cycle of the synthesis of human becoming." (I.L. 302)

CHAPl'ER II
SOCIAL FORMS: THE STRUCTURAL PROCESS OF SOCIE1'Y

The inward formation of society is at one with the process
whereby the individual person achieves his own being.

For the

ultimately constitutive act of the person is the concretizing

ot sociality, that is, the associative dimension of hie nature •
.And

the aoncretizing

or

this is constitutive of the person

because as we have seen in articulating Sturzo's theory of this
process. the intrinsic determinant of this process is the inward
synthesis of consciousness with rationality, "either as principle of communion or as unifying value or as finalistic tenden-

cy." (I.L. 19)

As society takes shape, then, it reveals the

emerging of the inner reality of the person since its concretization is the realization of this inner reality.

From the point

of view of the structural formation of society, there are
several significant factors in this process that must be noted.
First of all, the associative nature of the person never realizes
itself through just random individual relations, but tends
rather in the formation of its own structural process through
these relations to generate nucleated clusters ot relations that

become concrete forms of organization.
'!'he social tendency is towards the organization of
every special associative trend. (I.L. 1?4)
Human society seeks to give form to the constant or
semi-constant elements in human relations. That is,
108
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it tends to create and develop social types justifying
their demands. molding their customs and enforcing
their laws. so that by a kind of gradual crystillization institutions emerge able to withstand the flux
of events and the anarchial forces ot destruction.

(I.C. 36)

Yet. while on the one band. the concretization of the relational nature of the person does not remain a matter of unorganized individual relations but rather gives shape to concrete
organizational structures, on the.other hand.

11

not all social

relations, even if indefinitely repeated, succeed in forming a
concrete society, but only those relations to which the historical process has given prevailing significance in the social
structure.

These relations acquire such significance when they

express a group of general interests--in the sociological and
not the economic sense; only then do they materialize as social
institutions with an autonomy and personality of their own."

(I.e. 3?)

These general interests are generated by natural

needs and historical developments, function in the concrete
formation of specific kinds of society and social institutions
and also to their continued development and modification within
the complexity of human society. (I.e. 3?-8)
There are two ways in which one can view this complexity
of human society that embrace the earth in a web of consciousness.

It can be viewed either as a multiplicity of interacting

societies, each of which is individuated but all joined together
in a vital network of relations, or in terms of its totality
as constituting a single complex society composed of many individualized, but interrelated social forms. (I.L. 22)

In either

case, whether one gives emphasis to the complexity as in the
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first instance, or to the totality, as in the latter, it is
clear that sociality, although common to all nen, is not concretized as a single homogeneous society that embraces within
its monolithic structure all men.

Rather, it is concretized

as specific individuated societies or social groups within a
larger society.

The differentiation of societies is the nega-

tive moment in the concretization of sociality that is necessary tor social unification.

We have already seen indications

ot the individuation of society in dealing with its organictinalistic character.

In organizing together around a common

end, a group of individuals distinguishes itself from every
other group in terms of its organizational structure and finality.

The differentiation or the group is the negative moment

in the formative process of the social group aud the positive
moment is the actuation of the unitiva principle, the collective
consciousness. (I.L. 19, 20; ct. also p. 174)
Only as individuated can society "respond to the need
inherent in each individual not to lose his own individuality
by his association with others." (I.L. 20)

This need is rooted

in the nature o.f social1 ty as an ontological structure ot the
person.
diaension

Since it is in the concretizing of the associative

or

his nature that the individual achieves the auton-

omy and the individuality of his own personality, tho social
groups formed in this process reflect, in projecting, this inner
reality.

"In the differentiation of his own society from every

other, that is, in the group consciousness and in its unity, the
. individual feels not the suppression of his own personality, but

~
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its projection, reflection, enlargement." (I.L. 20)

The indi-

yiduation or society is another aspect of the differentiationin-synthesia relationship between the individual and society.

ror, as has already been seen it is the social consciousness
o! those who belong to a group that its reality consists in
and by which it is therefore individuated.

The individuation

of society, then, is an expression of this relationship on the
social level, viewed from the angle of the society as thus
differentiated from other social units.
ferentiation must be

exa~ined

The nature of this dif-

in order to understand Sturzo's

theory of the structural process or society and thereby shed
further light on the more basic differentiation-in-synthesis
relationship, or in other words, the field of the personal.
Every concrete society is individualized, and it is individualized through a form.

Just as every individual entity is

such through a form, so, too, do collective realities, "in order
to be realities, call for a form that will embody them in their
being and in their activity." (I.L. 23)

By a social form Sturzo

means "the mode or specific reason of the concretizing of society."
Since society is the projection of interrelated persons in their
activities, the social forms, then, will be "the projection of
the f'inalism of human action."

The formation of the collective

consciousness, in which the reality of a particular society consists, is in terms of a common finality nwhioh invests the whole
complexus of individual-social activities."

In fact, Sturzo

calls this common finality "the soul of society."

Thus the

structural eoncretization of society is "an immanent actuation
Of this !inalism." (I.L. 23)

This structural concretization is
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a social form.

Since it is through a form that a society is

individualized. Sturzo uses the term "social form" as synonymous with the terms "social group" and nsociety", understood

as individualized "society in the concrete," although in

a

atrict sense "social forms" refers to the kinds of concrete
society, such as family, state, class, township, nation.
This terminology of Sturzo, "the structural concretiza-

tion of society," is highly significant in revealing his procesaual perspective.

We have already seen that even in dealing

with society in terms of its structure, Sturzo views it as
process. 1 He speaks of the social form as the cooperative
prosecution of a common end "in a direction that we may call
structural." (I.L. 23)

The term "structure," then, within

sturzo's theory does not carry its usual connotations of a rigid
or fixed stability.

There is a certain stability to the social

forms, but it is a stability of process, not of form.

A dis-

tinction in Sturzo•s social theory, such as Timashett makes in
his analysis, 2 between "social morphology" and "social dynamics 0
is misleading, because the social forms themselves are marked

by an intrinsic dynamism that manifests itself in several ways,
as will become clear in the course of this chapter.

Sturzo's

social theory is grounded in the thesis that reality is process.
Therefore, the distinction that should be made is not in terms

ot social structure and process, but rather between structural
1

see chapter I, pp. 33-35.

2 Timasheff t The Sociology of Luigi Sturzo, cf. Chapters
V and VI.
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process and dynamic process.

The first regulates the dynaraism

ot the second, both by tending to function as a brake for its
dynamism, but only by offsetting it with a different rhythm, and
by channelling its fluctuations into a patterned flow, while it

itself is undergoing modifications due to this more dynamic
process.
The meaning and function of social forms is grounded in

the inward synthesis of consciousness with rationality as
realized in action.

Since the concretizing of sociality is the

active realization of this inward synthesis, the social forms
that are concretized in this process must be explained in terms

ot human activity.

In relation to individual action the social

torms are through consciousness the conditioning factors and
means, associative organs and ends.

In explicating these

aspects of social forms Sturzo relates them to physical and
mental habits on the level of individual action.

These habits

are forms of action through which the individual expresses his
meaning, his will, his ability.

They are intrinsically final-

istic in that they are ordered to the end of human action.
Betore they are acquired as habits, they are themselves the end

ot a particular activity.

Once they are achieved they serve as

a means for attaining further ends.

The social forms function

in a parallel fashion on the social level.

A social form

starts out as a cooperative working towards an essential end,
around which the activities of the associated individuals are
coordinated.

As the end becomes actualized in and through the

coordinated activity, this activity takes on an organic structure

l'l.4

that in turn becomes.a means for realizing further ends, or
the further actuation of the essential end.

As the social form

takes on an organizational structure with a relative stability

it will also be a conditioning factor for the activity engaged
iD within this structure.

"The social term therefore, starts

as an end, and becomes a means for a further end, tor it beoomes structure. organization, continually readjusting itself
tor new realizations in the direction of new ends, or better,
in the direction of an end, its proper end, and finding endless
It
.
(I.L. 23-4)
actua t ions.

In this passage Sturzo speaks of the social form "continu-

ally readjusting itself for new realizations."

He also speaks

ot "their transformation if they are no longer adapted to
man's incessant urge to act." (I.L. 25)

Although it is the

torm that specifically differentiates a given society from
another society, and although Sturzo recognizes certain fundamental forms, the family, political and religious forms, as
present in all social life, these forms cannot be interpreted
within Sturzo's theory as constituting unchangeable and fixed
types.

Social forms, tor Sturzo, are structural processes

within the dynamic matrix of the human process so that every

torm. has its own inner dynamism and its adaptation to the dynaaism of both other social forms and the total social process.
Within such a dynamic conception of social life the social

torms are perpetually becoming and being modified.

The law of

human evolution cannot "be evaded even by the societies that
appear to be fully formed and definitive, such as political

'
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·. ,ociety as represented by certain individual States.

Just as

political society today is in a process of evolution, with its
~)l7thmt

crises, involutions, so also are the family and reli-

gs.ous forms. Therefore, even in its fundamental forms human
80018 ty is not fixed in concrete types that, while channelling
the social prooess, are not themselves subject to the process.

sturzo goes so far in his procesaual stance as to state that
"everything is a flux and reflux among the forms themselves,
within each form and in the various social agglomerations, on
the margins of the separate forms or or several forms together."

(I.L. 15?; cf. I.e. 40-1)
Such a processual view Rrima facie seems to give such a
protean character to the social process as to deprive the social
torms of the minimum of consistency and stability required if
one is to properly designate them as structural processes.
Sturzo recognizes this objection and answers it by reminding
us that "the axis of this dynamism is the social consciousness,
which is what makes every society coherent and stable, and

makes it evolve in a process realized by immanent forces unified in rationality." (I.L. 24)

True, social consciousness is

not only the wellspring for the inner dynamism of the social

torms but also the unifying principle and stabilizing factor.
This stabilization by social consciousness manifests itself

concretely in the fact that every society has its external
features such as traditions, beliefs, rights, customs, laws.
Sturzo presents two reasons tor these external features which
clearly show the stability of the social forms.

The fundamen-

tal reason lies in the inner necessity ot rationality

to

i

II

~
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project itself so that "every fact of consciousness ••• must !ind
e11bodiment, for its explication,

~ust

as our soul. in order to

11ve and act, must form a single personal principle with the
b04Y•" (I.L. 32) In addition to this reason arising from the
nature o! consciousness, there is another reason following from
the nature of the social forms themselves.

As formed by social

consciousness the social forms have a nuclear development consisting of a network of intersecting and interacting relations.
'.fhis kind of nucleated structure with its inner dynamism gener-

ated by the social consciousness has no fixed, enclosing frames.
Since the social forms are set within the dynamism of a wider
social process. if they are to maintain their own autonomous
movement, they must be circumscribed and guaranteed, both from
within and by the other interacting social forms.

Such objec-

tification ot social consciousness as laws and traditions do

this.
Since the activity by which the social forms are esttblished
is the activity by which the person achieves his own being,

there are certain fundamental social forms that correspond to
the permanent and irreducible exigencies of human nature.

In

the light of evidence from historical, experiential reality
Sturzo discerns three such basic requirements: affective-procreative communion, the guaranteeing of order and defense, and
tinalistic-ethical principles.

To each of these basic needs

the family, political and religious forms of sociality, respectively, correspond. (I.L. 25, 51; T.L. 262; M. 34)
It is important to note that although these tlindamental
forms are, for Sturzo, co-relative to permanent aspects of
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human nature, he arrives at designating these three forms ".from
bistorical, experimental reality," and not by deducing them

from an antecedent theory of human nature.

The reasons for

this have already been suggested in that hum.an nature is not

even logically prior to the socio-historical process.

Its

ideality is established in and through this process and it is
rrom here that it must be derived.

Although in view of the

aims of this essay it is sufficient here for our purposes to
briefly indicate more the conclusions of Sturzo's argumentation
than its historical eVidence, nevertheless, he does present an
extensive historical analysis of the fundamental social torms
in the Inner Laws of Society in order to establish them as
fundamental, as well as coeval and irreducible.
Since the fundamental forms do correspond to the permanent
exigencies of human nature, it follows that they are, in their
essentials, at least, present in all ages and all ciVilizations.
This may not appear to be actually the case historically since
a clear-cut distinction between the social forms belongs to a
fairly advanced stage in the developmental process of human
society.

In tact, it was only with the appearance of Christian-

ity that there was produced a clear-cut distinction between all

three fundamental forms.

Thus it may seem that a kind

or

tem-

poral linear progression characterizes the respective emergence
or the different forms, beginning with the family, then the
religious form and finally the political form.

It is true that

the family appears as the first fully articulated social form.,
but even where it appears in primitive societies as the prevailing
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torm• "the other two subsist in an embryonic state and tend to
evolve and win a physiognomy of their own as little by little
tbe family nuclei interweave and multiply; and. ceasing to be
nomadic, become stable. forming widespread tribes and creating
villages and towns." (I.L. 25; cf. 68. 8?-8)

Just as only

gradually did the various kinds of families take concrete
expression. so only gradually did concrete political and reliBut these forms were also present from

gious forms take shape.

the beginning of the first familial social form, it only tendentially and in an embryonic stage, though always towards a
positive and autonomous concretization.

Even in an elementary

and primitive state a social form requires a guaranteeing of
order and defenae--a function it may initially perform itself
but contemporaneously giving rise to a distinct political
form. (I.L. 50)

Also, it is only in its religious expression

that the primitive family was able to subsist as a stable and
continuative social form.

And this religious bond, although

initially coinciding with the family, at the same time reached
beyond it towards the formation of an autonomous form.

There-

fore, these fundamental social forms cannot be interpreted as
appearing in a progressive temporal sequence even though they

do not simultaneously appear as clearly distinct trom one

another.

But when the one, that is, the family, does emerge

as a definite, even if elementary and primitive. form., the others
are also present in an inohoative manner.

As projections of

innate exigencies of human nature, the fundamental forms are
coeval to one another.

One can say that by definition they,
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individually and together, traverse the entire span of the
bUl'llan process so that they are not temporally related to one
another as different moments in a linear development of human
society.
The contemporaneous coexistence of the three fundamental
social forms, as well as their close connection, is also manifested in the three kinds of guarantees that have always and
everywhere ensured the autonomy of the family.

One is intrin-

aic to the family consciousness, that is, the pervasive awareness of belonging to each other and expressed "by the trepidation and reserve of a rite responding to the instinct ot puden-

OJ• tt (I.L. 32)

The second guarantee is the recognition by a

wider human group that what hae been formed is an autonomous
tamily unit, to which the children to be born will belong.

In

this public recognition the family receives from the existing
political form the legal guarantees necessary for its stability,
its social status, and economy. (I.L. 93)

The third guarantee

is provided by the religious consecration of the family.

This

may not be distinguishable in rite and spirit from the other
two, but it is none the less present, giving the family its
stability and the ethical elevation ot its natural end, which
results in a stronger and more respected moral and social union.
"What reaches beyond the historical fact and touches the root
of the nature of the family as institution, is the constant
exigency

or

these guarantees which 9 whatever concrete form they

may taket in their essentials are never absent." (I.L. 33; ot.
p. 324)
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Even if one accepts the contemporeity of the three fundamental forms, the question remains as to how one form, that is,
the family, could be the undifferentiated organ ot the other
two if they are fundamental and irreducible to one another.
Pirst of all it is recognized that in primitive society the
ends proper to eaoh of the three forms were achieved through
the one familial form, as in the patriarchal family in which
the paterfamilias was also law-giver, judge, rulerand priest.
fhis historical fact indicates that human consciousness had not
developed to where it felt the diversity even of social relations that are substantially diverse, and therefore the merging
or the confusion of social !unctions in a single organ did not
create inner disturbance.

In these elementary circumstances

the fields of activity were limited and the margins of freedom
restricted so that the finality proper to each fundamental form
did not require an autonomous sphere of activity of its own in
order to insure the freedom necessary for its realization.
In these rudimentary eon<itions human consciousness was not able
to differentiate its projections beyond the family form.

But

once any social relation, and especially those that are fundamental, comes to be experienced as autonomous, then "a stage of
historic evolution is reached in which the need is felt tor the
corresponding distinction of social organs and then activities."

(I.a. 40; I.L. 76)

Once the autonomy of a social form has been

asserted by its members with the differentiation ot its organicf1nalistic character, any suppression or confusion of its organs
and ends is a regression in the social process. (I.L. 118)
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Also, in considering this problem of the irreducibility of
tbe primary forms ot sociality and their original--original in
a temporal and not ideal sense--lack of differentiation and
their continuing movement of interference after they do achieve

an autonomous form, an analytical distinction may be made in
each social form between form and content.

The form is the

organio-finalistic structure that the interrelated activities

ot associated individuals assumes.
activity.

It is the modality of this

Content is "the whole practical activity in which

aen engage within the various forms." (I.L. 51)

There can be

a transposition of the content, or activities, of one form into

another one.

Thus, in the example of primitive society when

the family was the only prevailing form, it carried out the

functions of the other two.

Another example would be a theocracy

such as that of the Hebrews at certain periods when it assumed
the functions of the political form.

Today there is a transpo-

sition of activities to the political form from the
forms, both primary and secondary. (I.L. 51-2)

oth~r

social

The reason why

this transposition of content continues even today after the
social forms are differentiated is that the dynamism of collective consciousness tends to outstrip the relative stability of
the historically established forms.

This process tends to bring

about modifications in the structure of the form.

If there is

no_change in the form, a dualism is created between form and

content, which leads to the great crises and revolutionary
•oments of history.

"Yet, never can content and form be really

•eparated, so that, even through analytical disintegration, they

come always to new unifying syntheses." (I.L. 57)
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In the dynamic flow of the socio-historic process there is
a continuous dialectical movement by the social forms, tending
on the one hand towards autonomy and on the other towards reciprocal interference and the predominance
others.

or

one torm over the

The limiting points in this fluctuating motion are,

on the one side, an autonomy that is never totally achieved,

and, on the other, an interference that never succeeds in
merging and suppressing the others.

All social forms, even if

they nave not in tact actually achieved it, tend to individuation and autonomy.

This tendency to autonomy by the social form

1s rooted in the very thrust

or

the concretization ot sociality,

•ince it is in this act that the individual achieves his own
personal autonomy.

Therefore, this tendency can never be com-

pletely suppressed, although the counteracting movement ot
interference between social forms may, in certain instances,
appear to have done so.

It is this constant tendency toward

autonomy that provides the dynamism to the social processes

which makes possible human process.(I.L. 118)
Given the character of the social process, it is clear that

the term "autonomy" does not mean a separation from other social
forms nor even from other social relations.

It does refer to

the self-dependent existence of one social form from another
and the independence of activity, but it is not the self-dependent existence or independence of a biological organism, but
rather of a "specific and characteristic personality." (I.e. 3?)
'-

That is, the term must not be interpreted in a biological sense,
I

but rather in a personalistic, and therefore, relational sense.

I
11
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t'bS autonomy of the social forms is not that of a self-contained,

complete, and self-subsistent reality such as a biological orgaThe reality of the social forms is a nucleated network

ot relations bound together by a collective consciousness, so
that sociological autonomy, the autonomy of a social form, is
achieved once there is the consciousness that a communion of
interests and ends has been created.

"Just as for an autonomous

society to affirm itself its members must be conscious of it as
such the moment that this consciousness is formed, autonomy is
affirmed." (I.L. 88)

This is true for all forms of sociality,

whether fundamental or secondary; but since the fundamental
torms are original and irresolvable into any other, the consciousness that constitutes their autonomy includes a recognition of
their originality and irresolvability.
That the autonomy of the social forms is never complete or
self-contained is due to the tact that it is the individual
person that is the efficacious and vivifying element of the
social forms.

The relational nature of the individual person

extends beyond the confines ot any one social form to help give

shape to several according to the various needs of his own life.
'l'he social eomple:xus that arises from. the interaction of indi-

viduals involves, then, the intertwinings and interferences
among the social forms.

It is only by reason of a logical or

legal abstraction that we think of social forms as complete,
self-contained realities.

"Thus we speak of the family, but

no one thinks that the whole category of the relationships of
those persons constituting a family is exhausted within its
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circle.

It is the same when we speak of tribe, village, city,

state, Church." (I.L. 245)

Within the social process the collective consciousness of
a larger society will encompass various social forms that
express all the spheres ot the interrelated activity of the

associated members.

According to the times and circumstances,

there will be a transposition of content from one to another,
or to one from all the others, or even a confusion

or

organs

and ends depending on the orientation of the collective consciousness.

These interferences among the social forms are

regulated by the consciousness of autonomy the members ot these
torms have.

"It this consciousness is keen on both sides, there

arises a tension that may become a conflict.

If, on the con-

trary. it is weak on the one side, the weaker side suffers an
interference that may become a superposition or a contusion of
organs and ends." (I.L. 92)
In this two-fold movement towards autonomy and interterence, history presents an undulating series of combinations

with one of the other of the three fundamental forms predominating.

As Sturzo states, "the sociological problem of inter-

ference of forms is highly complex and can be clarified only
on the historical plane, in which all experiences have their
concrete expression." (I.L. 51)

It is sufficient for our pur-

poses to note three historical experiences that mark salient
Phases in this movement and at the same time cover its range.
The first experience is that which we.have already noted
in the case of the family in primitiYe society in which one

~
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contains within itself the other forms.

The second exper-

ience is "that of the nearly always unequal development of the
tbl'ee forms with a marked tendency towards autonomy." (I.L. 26)

In this instance two of the forms struggle with each other in
aeeking their own autonomy, while the third is subordinate to
•hem and develops within them.

The third experience is "the

semi-autonomous development of all three forms, with juridical
ties, tending towards unification on a higher plane," either on
the religious plane as in the Middle Ages or on the political
level as in the modern period. (I.L. 2?)
Several important conclusions can be drawn from this fluetuating movement of the social forms towards autonomy and reciprocal interference.

First of all, as each fundamental form

achieves its own autonomy, this disengagement brings about a
greater sense of autonomy in the others, with a clarification

ot their own intrinsic value, organic structure and raison d'etre.

But at the same time the tendency towards autonomy never attains
the stage of complete independence or unrelatedness to the
other forms.

Even at the maximum degree of autonomy they ever

achieve in the socio-historical procesa they are always relative to one another within the sphere of a collective consciousness that is differentiated according to the exigencies of
human nature.
Even when the domestic form contains within itself
all other forms, it remains inwardly bound and bounded
by them, while the other two forms, tending in their
turn to evolve and to assume their own structure and
organs, permeate the further evolution of the domestic form, with a mutual exchange of influence. (I.L.
2?; cf. 93)
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fbus, these forms at any moment in the social process never
attain more than a relative autonomy.

They form a complex

network of relations with one another in which they give even
turther expression of the inexhaustible oapac1t1es of the
'.1.

individual person.

For, as the religious and political forms

are articulated they develop a wider social complexua that

weaves a web of relationships around and through these differentiated semi-autonomous forms.

This continuing process brings

about a transformation in each while at the same time it
receives from each its unique imprint in its always present
autonomous movement.

Therefore, the second general conclusion

that can be made of this two-fold movement is that the fundamental social forms can never be merged, or one totally suppressed or absorbed in another because even in their interrelations and transposition of functions, each always tends towards
its own autonomy.

For example, even in the fiercest persecu-

tions of the religious form, when it is held in complete subjection to one or the other fundamental form, its continuing
trend to its own autonomy manifests itself in its eventual
reemergence.

A third conclusion that can be drawn from histori-

cal experience is that there is never a stabilizing balance or
moment of perfect equilibrium between the three primary forms.
Rather, one of the three always attempts to predominate over
the others, to resolve them into itself and unify them.

This

produces either a temporary period of social stasis and reces-

sion or an immediate or eventual counter-movement by the others
towards a reaffirmation of their own autonomy because one form
cannot resolve into itsel£ the intrinsic value and raison d'etre
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ot the other two.

The reason tor this lies in what constitutes

tbe central theorem of Sturzo's social theory, namely, that the
one and only substantive principle

or

society is the individual

person so that "it is the individual consciousness alone, that
18 , rational man, that effectually resolves into itself every
social form, and which in its autonomy unifies all the various
elements of human sociality.

It grades the ends of the various

social forms within which it unfolds its activity, since metaphysically it is the term and end of society itself"." (I.L.55)
Although the fundamental forms express permanent and irreducible dimensions of human consciousness, they by no means
exhaust its power. depth and range.

In addition to these

tundamental social forms there are also other secondary or
derivative forms.

The term "secondary" as applied to these

forms does not imply that they are not essential to the social
structure or are not significant in the social process, but
rather signifies that they are not original and irresolvable
I

into the fundamental forms, from which they derive the elements

tor their constitution and development.

11

11

As a sociological clas-

sification, the secondary forms are reducible to the three fundamental areas.

They function as a "structural nexus of society,

develop its continguity, and create particular states of consciousness ••• but as a whole they serve as a mediation between
one form and the other, giving a fuller development to their
dynamism." (I.L. 156; cf. pp. 15? and 129)

They are vital

ligaments that form the connecting tissues, as it were, between

'I',

I

the fundamental forms, integrating them and conditioning their
development.
'I
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Among the secondary .forae, one of the most important is
economy of which Sturzo makes an extended analysis.

Economy

aaY be considered from two points of view, either as a conditioning of social life or as a special social form.

The first

refers to its function of providing means of subsistence, the
iecond to the communal labor and organization that is required
to obtain the means of subsistence.

This latter requirement

1s part of the two-fold aspect of economy that transforms its
crude materiality into a social value of unquestionable worth
transcending its physico-hedonistic nature and becoming a moral
factor of communal life.

This two-told aspect of economy is

that of solidarity, in that those who are able provide tor
those who cannot, and this in turn leads to the second aspect,
the tendency to establish an economy in common as a sharing
in the material resources made available by communal living.

These two aspects together "represent the ethieo-social tendency of economics as such." (I.L. 9?; cf. pp. 95-?)

.Economy

is one or the immediate ends o:f all human activity, even religious, since the material means for living is obviously an indispenaible aspect of any social form.

Therefore, it is not a

fundamental social form, for Sturzo, because it ''is not autonomous and has not a finalism of its own, but it shares in the
nature and finalism of the fundamental forms of sociality."
(I.L. 9?;98)

It depends on the fundamental forms, but at the

same time is a necessary element in them "as conditioning the
manner in which these can develop and attain their end.n (I.L.
26)

It must be emphasized that economy is only "one

immediate ends"

or

social activity.

or

the

There is always the danger

I
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of an inversion of ends within a social form so that the quest

tor and accumulation of material goods becomes the primary and
prevailing end, in which is the negation of the very essence

of the social form in which this inversion

or

ends occurs.

As with all social structures, the economic structure
should be organic.

This means that within a given society the

economic structure should be assimilated into the total com-

plexus of' the society so that in functioning through its organic structure the materiality of economics would be transformed
into its ethico-social value, "through the creation of a communion and soliqarity in the production and distribution of

goods. 11 (I.L. 124)

In doing this the economic organs function

as instruments tor the social forms and as a co-ordinating link
between them.

At the same time the economic structure of a

social form is closely associated to the autonomy of' the social
torms since it is this that allows for an indispensible margin
of freedom within each social form.

For Sturzo, a margin of

freedom is never lacking in any social form, "but the question

is whether it be sufficient or not to create the necessary

social dynamism." (I.L. 119)

The economic structure helps

proVide for this.
Economy is so basic to individual and social life and its
influence so pervasive, that the misinterpretations
nature and role abound.

or

its

Among these, two are of special theor-

etical and historical significance.

One is the interpretation

ot the economic structure as a tertium quid whose process is
governed wholly by deterministic laws.

Sturzo admits to the

I:
I'

130

causal role and influence that physical elements and forces play
in economics, but there are also functioning such human factors
as ethical, psychological and political considerations.

The

primary agent in economic causality remains the individual

person who regulates it and makes it serve his needs.

"The

synthesis of the two factors, man and nature, gives us human

economics neither wholly free nor wholly deterministic." (I.L.

97)

The other error, of which the historical materialism of

Marx is representative. consists in making economics the single
tundamental law of history, which means that all ethico-social

tactors are materialistically resolved into the material fac-

tor, and thereby giving rise to a fundamental determinism.
'!'his theory is a prime example of the fallacy of abstractionism,
inasmuch as it presents "an interpretation of concrete reality
which makes abstraction of its essential factors and their

concrete syntbeses.n (T.L. 9)

For what this theory does is to

overestimate one of the factors--as important and indispensable
as it ia--o! human life and to give it the value ot a synthesis,

resolving in it all the complexity of human reality in its
socio-historical process.

Sturzo himself, as has been indi-

cated, emphasizes the economic influence on society, but he
denies "that it forms the sole social, historical causality,
and

that it is a deterministic causality." (I.L. 101)
Other examples of secondary forms besides economy which are

considered by Sturzo are the international community, class
organizations, political parties and religious sects, labor
organizations, racial, national, or religious minorities, uni~ersities,

the organs of local government such as villages,
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cities, regions, federated States, all of which have their own
historico-ethical personality, so that they are not just political units of a State.

"Their moral reality is greater than

their political character. 0 (I.L. 154; ct. pp. 129-58)

All o!

these forms, with the exception of the international community,
which is an amplification in extension and depth of the three
tundamental forms, are either "intermediate forms between the
totality of a society and the elementary nucleus, or remaining
on the margins of the various forms, or grouping men together

in special categories." (I.L. 153)
All of these concrete social forms, both primary and
secondary, can be considered in two ways: either in terms o!
their individual character, which constitutes their positivity,
or more importantly, as process, that is, the dynamic intertwining of relationships and activities by which they sustain
a continuity and thereby establish a socio-historical complexus,
which embraces all the social forms together while at the same
time stretching beyond them.

The term that Sturzo uses to

explain this process whereby the primary and secondary forms

are united in socio-complexus is "sociological synthesis,"
which itself constitutes a wider social unity in the context

ot which all the social forms may be viewed in their relations
to one another. (N.

& I. 13) Sturzo also uses the term "syn-

thesis" to apply to specific synthesizing aspects of sociality:
liberty-authority, law-morality, duality-diarchy.

Each of

these is a social force within the structure of a special form
and in their dualistic polarization they bring about the social
•Y?ltheses that give to the social forms their cohesion, movement
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and oontinuity (I.L. 158; 189)

In either use of the term,

sturzo does not explicitly explain
the two uses.

it nor does he coordinate

But in the present context its meaning is clear

as referring to a wider social unity that embraces smaller
social units while these maintain their own individuality and
autonomy.
Sturzo applies the term "society" to both the wider social
unity and to smaller social units that compose it.

One place

where he clearly distinguishes these is in discussing the secon-

darY forms as "intermediate forms between the totality of a
society and the elementary nucleus." (I.L. 153)

The "totality

of a society" is a higher social unity such as an ethnic group

or nation •.
or simply

0

He also uses the term "human society as a whole"
human society" as distinct from its concrete expres-

sions in specific social forms or groups.

For example, in dis-

oussing the alternation of dynamic and stabilizing currents in
society, he states, "It is to be found in all social groups that
are really alive; and it is in human society as a whole, in the
continual movement
(I.L. 256)

or

groups and development of activities.''

In International Community and the Right of War he

distinguishes between "the generic concept of human society" or
"human society in general" and its concrete materializations,
i.e. family, city, nation, etc. (I.e. 36; 39)
The social groups which compose this higher totality are
not by this fact dissolved into the totality so as to form one
overall homogenous society.
a holistic sense.

Society cannot be interpreted in

The "totality of a soe1ety 0 that Sturzo speaks
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ot 1s not any kind of closed totality, but rather is a tendency
within a process.

It is the constant process of the emergence

of social groups each with the two-told tendency towards autonorAY and interference.

"No one therefore, can doubt that outside

the circle of his own particular nuoleus ••• there are relations
perpetually developing in a two-fold sense, both individual and
collective, which tend to acquire juridical status and to give
birth to incipient institutions." (I.e. 39)

They are not ab-

sorbed by the tendency to complexity and totality.

Societ7,

then, is structurally pluralistic, composed of a multiplicity

or

social groups each with their own individuality and ends.

This structural pluralism contains within itself a principle of
social organicity because a plurality o! social groups cannot
exist without organic structu~al co-ordination.3
But pluralism, for Sturzo, not only is an analytical formula of the nuclear and organic structure of society, but also
is expressive of "the need of individual initiative to form
always a new series of nuclei, in agreement or in opposition.
This is a centrifugal dynamism truly necessary to counterbalance
centripetal dynam.ism." 4 The character o! society, whether on
the level of particular social forms taken singularly or on the
level of wider social unities, "is not static and final, unable
to overstep the limits of a determined order that in substance
ia nothing more than the quasi-present, or that which we have

3sturzo, "The Philosophic Background of Chris'tian Democracy," p. 14; M. 121.
4

Sturzo, "The Philosophic Background ot Christian Be mooracy," pp. 13-14.

'
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pown and experienced." (I.e. 39)
Since it is the individual person that is the efficient
principle of society, this continual expansion of society indi-

1

1

oates on the part of the individual person "a continuous
aspiration to transcend the concrete experience of actual life
s.n wider participations •••• 11 (I.L. 310)

We have seen that the

individuation of society is that aspect of the differentiationtn-synthesis relationship between the individual person and
society that corresponds to the attaining of personal individuality and autonomy.

This aspect of the concretizing of sociality

limits him to those determined societies to which he belongs.

But that basic thrust of sociality, or the other side of the
differentiation-in-synthesis relationship, by which the person
attains his individuality precisely in and through relationships
impels the individual beyond the limits of those societies.
reason tor this has already been suggested.

The

The projection ot

rational consciousness, although the generative principle of the
concrete social forms, is not identical with these !orms whether
taken in their specific and diversified positivity or in the
fullness of their higher synthesis.

It is the inexhaustible

principle of these forms, which are expressive ot, but never
adequate to, that fundamental act.

The thrust of this act then,

whereby the individual person and the social forms are constituted together, extends to an ever greater sphere of relationships--greater not only in extension but also in intensity,
whereby there is effected a higher synthesis of values--and
by that very fact deepening the value of the individual personality.

__J
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fb1s process constitutes a basic sociological law, the
iaw of transcendence, which Sturzo formulated as "the transcenaence of a given social nucleus through the formation of a

vtder collective consciousness." (T.L. 204)

Tb.is law has

aiready been indicated when we were dealing with the develop-

aent of collective consciousness and its unification.

The

term "transcendence" in this instance simply means "the proces-

sive passage to another term that elicits it,n or in other words
"the overstepping ot the limits of one stage into another."
fhis law encompasses several processes.

It involves the ini-

'ial projection of the individual into society, the passage of

consciousness trom one group to another, the interference
among the social forms in the transposition of content and
the formation of a wider social synthesis.

The progressive

passage from primitive man to ourselves is also considered by
Sturzo as the process of transcendence.
Primitive man is, for us, on the border of animality;
the distance between him and ourselves is almost immeasurable. The process between these two terms, a
process made up of the strivings of ages, has been a
continuous surmounting of the predominance of animal
nature with its strong instincts so as to make possible life in common in kindred nuclei. In the face of
primitive man, society presents itself as a transcendence with intellectual and ethical characters. (I.L.

309)

It has already been established how this process has a
reciprocating movement so that its outward current flows back
upon the smaller social units to the source of its movement,
the individual person, who is thereby able to further project
himself.

"The sphere of human personality may thus widen out

into immense cycles which we call civilizations, transcending
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single peoples, particular languages. geographical and political barriers and even oceans." (T.L. 208)

Sturzo, however,

holds that the formation of ever wider social synthesis arising
out of the process ot transcendence terminates "on the threshold
of the society of mankind." (I.L. 21)

The reason why Sturzo

denies the possibility of a social synthesis that would embrace
all of mankind is that on this level there would not be the
differentiation that is the negative moment necessary not only
tor a social unification. but also for the dynamism of the

social process.

Sturzo rejects

any

hypothesis that would

bring the dynamism of the social process to any kind of teleological staticism.

The theoretical basis for this rejection

lies, as has been suggested, in his theory of rationality.
Although Sturzo denies that a universal social synthesis is a
concrete possibility, nevertheless, he recognizes the idea
itself both as an efficacious ideal and as expressive of the

actual orientation of mankind.

0

Within the active totality

of men we may conceive of a web of individuated societies, with
ever widening relationships, so as to touch the idea of universality, without ever wholly achieving it." (I.L. 21)
The most concrete expression of this idea of universality
was achieved with the advent of Christianity.

The reason for

this does not lie solely on its unique and transcendent characteristics, although it is through these that the orientation of

mankind towards universalism and solidarity above families,
classes, nations, and races is actualized, but in the very
nature of religion as a social form.

In fact, it is religion
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that is the moving force of sociality and its ultimate expression.

It is both the presupposition ot the other social forms

and an irreducible form in its own right.

As mentioned previ-

ously, it was only with the advent of Christianity that there
was a clearcut distinction between the three fundamental
social forms.

These factors make it imperative to present the

role that religion plays in the structural

proc~as

ot society

according to Sturzo•s social theory.
The originality and irreducibility of religion as a social

torm is indicated by the fact that whereas the family is rooted
in man's affective procreative need and the polity on the need

tor order in his social life and its defense, religion is grounded in "the exigency of an absolute principle, and the consequent projection of sociality towards the absolute which commands the present reality.'' {I.L. 66)

This exigency does not

follow simply, or even basically, from the contingency of human
existence, but rather is inherent in our very nature as persons.
It is tor this reason that this need of the absolute is concretized in a distinct and fundamental social form.

If this exi-

gency were a consequence simply of the contingency of our existence, it would not give rise to a distinct social form that
is common to every human society from the most primitive to
the most advanced, while, yet at the same time, there is no
analogue to it on any other level of reality.

As John Macmurray

has pointed out, this indicates that nthe universal, common
root of religion in human experience is definitely personal.
Religion is bound up with that in our experience which makes
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persons and not mere organisms."5
It has already been established that, for Sturzo, the
process constitutive of the person is the concretizing of
sociality, so that it is only in transcending himself that
the individual actualizes his personal nature.

This process

finds the ultimate expression of its dynamism in religion.

The

constitutive principle of this process, as has been determined,
is rationality.

The interior necessity of rationality tor ful-

fillment generates a movement that draws in its wake the need

tor the infinite and the absolute.

The only spark that can

ignite that movement·and haV,e the power to sustain it is the
obscure, but concrete conscious exigency for the absolute.
This relationship with the absolute reveals itself in the
modality of our knowledge.

In every act of knowledge there is

an intuitional awareness of a totality that encompasses within
itself both the subject and object while at the same time
transcending them.

This totality cannot be identified with the

spatial-temporal whole that constitutes our existential world.
Beyond space and time there is still a comprehensive
and transcendental totality that calls us, ma.king us
feel the finite place we occupy and the infinite towards
which we ascend •••• Nor should it be said that we have
no consciousness of such a religion as emergent with
every act of knowing, because it is implicit in us and
may become explicit whenever we attempt to search more
deeply into the object known and the value of knowing.

(T.L. 214-5)

'When Sturzo states that the consciousness of our relationship
with the totality is "emergent with every act of knowing," he
is referring to the tact that it is not antecendent to the act

5Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 156.
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of knowing, nor a product or experience, but is present in and
concomitant with every act of knowledge.

Just as we only

: I

gradually come to an awareness or ourselves, so do we only
gradually come to an explicit awareness of our relationship with
the totality.
But as we only achieve self-awareness in the presence of
others, the primary and basic relationship must be 'o a Per-

sonal Absolute, so that a primitive awareness of this Absolute
is the ground for self-awareness; it is within the ambit of
the primary relationship to this Absolute that the relationships
with other persons are established.

Thus, this relationship

to the Absolute, as intrinsic to the process constitutive of

the person
is connatural to the thinking subject in such a way
that it must be attained in some manner or other by
every subject in its intuition (or awareness) or itself. In such an act, the subject forms a distinct
idea neither of the absolute nor of the contingent,
nor of their connection; but it understands the necessity of a stable reality to which it is related and
in which in a certain manner it participates. The
intuition or the "whole'• as we have explained and
discussed it is a movement of interior necessity
towards the absolute. (S.P. 39)

It is precisely this movement that is the inner impulsion of
rationality toward expression and fulfillment.

It is this

relationship with the Absolute that gives to the tendency of
rationality its inexhaustible dynamism.
With all its superstitions, aberrant and false beliefs, and
perverse deviations in its historical realizations, religion
is the social embodiment of this relationship with the Absolute.
'l'he distortions and erroneous paths that the projection of

iI
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this need has given rise to are simply a manifestation of the
constitutive tinitude that generates this need.

By reason of

this finitude the absolute "reveals itself to us gradually as
the intellect understands particular reality in its essences
and individualizations, in its systemizations and in its rela-

tions; it reveals itself gradually as the will and human action
realize, in .faot, the truths which are known.n (S.P. 40)

Reli-

gion, then, even in its primitive and instinctive forms in its
aberrations and errors, is essentially, as a tendency in process,
"the transcendent expression of the truth thought and ot the
good willed." (T.L. 209)
Since the irrepressible tendency of rationality is revealed
to be essentially a movement toward the Absolute, religion is
revealed to be the root and ultimate expression of this movement
and thereby the concretization o! sociality.

Religion, then,

is the focal point of the unification of consciousness, both
individual and collective, and of the convergent activity ot
associated efforts, giving value and stability to the development of collective consciousness.

"At bottom, the elements

that may draw the people together in mutual understanding and
fruitful contact are only the ethico-religious; and on these,
through practical collaboration, a historical consciousness

and a wider civilization ma;y be created." (T.L. 211)

Since

religion is the focal and stabilizing point of the concretization of sociality, human solidarity and universalism can only
be realized and preserved through a universalizing religion,
Which is Christianity alone.
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In pre-Christian times the religious orientation of con•ciousness was expressed in attributing to the family, the
tribe, the dynasty, the empire perpetuity and even an absolute
quality so that they became divine manifestations.

Although

tbeY were not commensurate with religious consciousness, it

was through these other social forms that it expressed itself,
10

that they became the expression of religion.

Religion, then,

and the unification of consciousness was particularistic and
iplit-up.

The concretization of religious consciousness was

always restricted to the collective personality of specific
eocial groups, each with their own cult and gods.
~onsidered

Religion was

to be the relationship between the particular social

group and its gods, because there was no direct sociological
resolution beyond the group itself.

As sharing in and manifes-

ting the divine, each unifying group, whether it was the family,
'b'ibe, or an empire, was looked upon as an entity complete in
itself, the end of all collective endeavors.

In order for there

to be a universal religious social form whioh would transcend
the boundaries of every group personality there had to be
attirmed not simply the idea of one true God who supplanted
all particular deities, but rather one God in whose presence
all men stand in a direct and personal relationship.

The Hebrew

people arrived at the conception of one God but the religion
founded on this belief did not establish a direct relationship
between the individual and God, but between the Chosen People

and God so that this relationship was exclusive to the chosen
People.

They, therefore, had no sense or solidarity with other
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peoples. It is only in the direot and personal relationship
with one God that men acquire the sense of equality, solidar-

1_, and universality above classes, nations, and races, because
oonoomitant with the recognition of this relationship there is

an awareness that all men stand together in the same order of
)eing.

It is precisely Christianity that effected this rela-

tionship and it is this that is at the basis of its originality
trom the viewpoint

or

..The novelty ot Chris-

a social theory.

tianity, from the sociological standpoint, as compared with
other religions, lay in its breaking down every obligatory
s-elationship between religion and the family, tribe, or nation,
toun.ding it on the personal conscience." (I.L. 81J

Christianity

has released the personal conscience from the external chains

ot the family, tribe. caste, or nation, by giving to it the
primacy of value and responsibility.

This is a permanent and

always present liberation placed at the base ot every liberty.

lut at the same time it imposes on the individual the obligation
to unite with others in a joint embrace

al'• bound by a mutual

or

free men because all

love, a single love with a two-told object:

Clod, in Whose presence all stand together as brothers, and one's
D.eighbor.

1'his shitting of the center of gravity ot religious

experienae from the mediation ot other social'forms to the
individual person is at the foundation

or

the slow penetration

into the social structure of the spirit and ethics ot Christianity, which has left an indelible imprint on the socio-historical process, t~anstorming and elevating it without any comP&rison to all preceding and concomitant social forms. (ct.

&P. 61)

c.
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The universality of Christianity, which is another compo-

oent in its sociological uniqueness, logically follows from its
foundation in a direct and inviolable personal relationship
with an all-embracing God.

As St. Paul states it, "For in

Christ Jesus you are all sons of God through your faith.

For

all of you who have been baptized into union with Christ have
clothed yourselves with Christ.

There is no room for 'Jew• and

•Greek'; there is no room for 'slave' and 'freeman'; there is

no room for 'male' and 'female'; for in union with Christ Jesus
6 For Christianity, then, Christ has destroyed
10u are all one."
the ancient boundaries and divisions of religion or race or

social stature and replaced them by Himself in Whom all men must
come together.

Only with the preaching of the Gospel was there

a moral spirit capable of unifying different peoples and making

effective the principles of human solidarity and universality
to be extended to all classes, races and peoples.
and transforming power of this

The unifying

Gospel lies in the spirit of

love on which it is based as a personal religion.

As such, it

makes a direct appeal to men for an acceptance in the inner
freedom of their own consciences.

"In this inner freedom the

aoral act and the religious act coincide and complete each
other.

Any external and imposed morality and any purely formal-

istic religion would never be able to reach man's inner life
and bring the sense of universality." (T.L. 254)

It is only as

rooted in this inner freedom that the spirit of love can draw
the strength and vitality to extend to all men.
6 Galatians, 3:26-28.

I
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It may

be

objected that Christianity itself does not over-

come the particularism of other social forms and previous religtons since it does not in fact embrace all men.
~•alitY

But since the

of a social form consists in the associated conscious-

ness of its members, it is from this consciousness that it
derives its characteristic features.

Universality characterizes

it "if the consciousness of the members of a society affirm it
as a special characteristic, as a belief, as a mission.

Such

is the Christian consciousness; it is and cannot but be catholic, that is, universal." {I.L. 89; ct. T. L. 247)
dynamic universality that is a tendency in process.

It is a

It would

not be brought to completion even if all men were in fact Christians because it has a two-dimensional directionality, not only
extending outward toward all men in ever:y generation but also
penetrating inward into the hearts of men.

It is a universality

that is open-ended in both directions because it extends outward

only to the extent that it penetrates inward.
A third social innovation etf ected by the advent ot Ohristiani ty was the complete disengagement ot the religious torm
from the other social forms, establishing a complete, permanent,
and universal religious organization that is independent o! any
and all domestic and political institutions.

This does not mean

that the pre-Christian religions had no autonomy or their own;
tor this would run counter to the nature or religion as a fundamental torm.

Even in the merging and superimposing of forms

there is always operative an intrinsic tendency towards autonomy.
What it does mean is that it is only with Christianity that the
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religious form achieved autonomy in both its content and organizational structure.

The reason for this lies in the same

fact that gave all pre-Christian religions their particularis-

tic character:
••• no pre-Christian religion, not even that or Israel,
was founded on human personality in its spiritual
value, so as to reach society as a unitary complexus
through personality and only through it. On the contrary, all the pre-Christian religions were founded
on society as a unitary complexus without any direct
resolution into human personality. Such resolutions
were always indirect and incomplete. (I.L. 85; ct. 81-2;

C. & S. 21; T.L. 245-6)

In the intertwining and compenetrating influence

or

the

social forms, the positive actuation of Christianity with the
uniqueness of its socio-historical features has worked a truly
transformative effect on the entire structural process of
human society and its relation to the individual.

The first

consequence of the advent of Christianity was the humanization

or

the other social forms.

They were no longer considered as

divine manifestations. and therefore, ends unto themselves to
which the individual was subordinated.

As they lost their

religious expression in the light of Christianity, domestic
and political forms were reduced to the level of purely human
forms, becoming means for man and not ends unto themselves.
Yet, while Christianity did remove all prestige of participating
in the divine from the social forms, reducing them to their
human relativity, it at the same time "gave them new life by
its ethical inspiration and unified them in a religious spirit

and purpose." (I.L. 83; ct. p. 82;

o. & s.

21)

This overthrowing or old social conceptions brought about
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• fundamental revaluation of the human person as the center

ot gravity o! the socio-historical process shifted from the
iocial forms to the individual person.

"Human personality,

until then ignored or unappreciated, became the center and end

o! all collective activity, in virtue of a religious recognition.

It was called to reconstruct society from the beginning,

as though by a rebirth." (I.L. 83; C.

& S. 22) Since society

is in fact grounded in the individual person toward whom all
social values are ordered, the subordination of the individual

to the social form, as in pre-Christian societies was a distinction of the social order.

The reordering of society toward the

individual person, then, was in effect a conversion and restorati on.
Through its religious elevation of the individual person
and in establishing the equality of all men before a single
God, Christianity effected a transformation in all social relationships throughout every level of society, modifying the
entire social process.

To point out a rew examples, beginning

with that basic unit of every society, the family, Christianity
removed the ethical basis of the polygamous family because
such a family structure is based on the inequality of the sexes.
Christianity made effective the basic equality of the sexes in
their mutual relationships because it established it on the
spiritual solidarity or every man and woman before God.

If it

bas taken centuries tor this equalitarian concept to take root
in social consciousness and acquire an ethical and social efficacy, it is because domestic, economic, and juridical traditions
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and legislation have perpetrated the inferiority of women in

all areas of activity.
~be

Christianity also cut at the root of

notion that the inequality between different social orders

was one of nature, gave the concept of justice its firmest
toundation and widest extension, removed the ethical basis of
slavery, although its economic basis remained, and every other

torm ot social oppression or injustice (I.L. 46-?, 83, 112;

o. & s.

22)

Finally, another effect that resulted from the advent of
Christianity was, as noted previously, the clarification of the
specific functions, organs and ends of the fundamental social
torms, bringing about an increased sense of autonomy in each

ot them.

"Sociologically, the disengagement of one social form

develops a greater sense of autonomy in the others." (I.L. 93)
Since it was only with Christianity that the religious form
assumed its own autonomy, only then was there a clear-cut distinction between the three primary forms.
religion

or

As separated trom a

their own, the domestic and political torm.s were

more able to define and develop their distinctive consciousness
since their own content and organization were both more clearly
distinguishable from those of the religious form.

Also, in the

Church's struggle for its own autonomy whereby its members
acquire an ever clearer and deeper consciousness of it as such
--which is precisely what constitutes its autonomy--this struggle produces a similar result in the other forms from which it
is disengaging itself.

The fact that this struggle is never-

ending, especially with the political form, simply gives evidence
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an autonomous religious form has arisen because, as such,
in the counterpuntal movement of interference between the forms,
it limits the political form and is itself in turn limited by
the political form. {I.L. 88)
In Sturzo's theory of the structural formation of society,
then, the social forms are the concrete expressions ot the
concretizing o.f sociality.

As such, they express the individual

person seeking to define himself in the multi-dimensional structure of his nature.

Since they unfold together on the level of

I

human activity, they are processual in nature, being shaped by
1

their own inner dynamism as well as that of the other social

forms and of the total socio-historical process.

Therefore,

in accordance with the fundamental cognitive orientation of
his theory, Sturzo states that, "so long as we consider groups
and groups

or

groups analytically as individualities by them-

selves, or as individualities in a conventional framework, we
are simply dealing with an abstraction.

wise.

The reality is other-

We must consider them in their activity." (I.L. 255)
Therefore, it is to their activity we must now turn.

I:

I
I

CHAPTER III
SOCISTY IN DYNAMIC PROCESS
An "open pluralism" is the phrase that best oharacterizes
the structure of society.

This holds true both in the consti-

tution of its totality as composed of a multiplicity ot social
nuclei, with each conscious of its own autonomy and purpose,
and in the make-up of its composing social forms.

Collective

consciousness of its very nature, is, !or Sturzo, intrinsically
pluralistic, whether it is considered on the level

or

associa-

ted individuals or on the level of a higher social unity, composed of associated groups.

The principle of differentiation-

in-synthesis is a principal leitmotiv in Sturzo's theory that
is operative on every level of society, from the individual

person to the widest social unity because it flows from the
very nature of sociality as an ontological structure of the
person.

As a result. the entire thrust of his theory runs

counter to any monistic view of society in which the composing

units, whether individuals or groups, are viewed as merging
into the collectivity like drops of rain falling on the ocean.

Nevertheless, the term "pluralism" carries a certain negative connotation in Sturzo's social theory.

To view society

as pluralistic is, for Sturzo, to view it abstractly, analytically, and statically because it denotes a static. "snapshot"
Picture of society either of its structure alone as separated
149

from its process, or of its process as frozen in a moment of
disintegration.

Society in the concrete is set in the matrix

o! a continuous process and is itself an expression of this

process--the life of the individual person seeking to define
himself, or, in other words, an expression ot the tendency
towards rationality in time.

We have already established that

the processive and dynamic character of sociality flows from
the inner urge of rationality for expression and fulfillment.
The constant element in the historical process and
in the social forms--the rationality that becomes
collective oonsciousness--is never full and entire,
never static and definitive; it is a trend towards
rationality, the practical attainment of rationality, the surmounting of the irrational, the correction of the pseudorational. (I.L. 216)
Society, then, as the concretization ot this vital and
dynamic trend, is itself a living being marked by its own rhythms
of life, continually changing or renewing its vital energies,
either perfecting itself or deteriorating in moments ot stasis,
either progressing or regressing according to the given directionality or the social forces released by the activities of
its vital components, the associated individuals.

In this

process there is a continuous polarization of the social forces

at work in any given social form and between the forms, moving
toward two antagonistic terms, either tor struggle or tor collaboration.

This polarity of forces is not a mere transient

stage in the social process, but is rather a constant social
phenomenon.

When we view society not analytically and abstractly

but as it manifests itself in its concrete process, "then we
shall see that in each group the forces coalesce into two, in
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each association of groups the forces coalesce into two, and so
on. until the widest ambit of society is reached.

No individual

can escape this continuous dualizing ot forces, through the

rbYthm within which he lives." (I.L. 255-6)

Consequently,

polarity or duality, and not plurality, is the keynote to
society in its concrete process.
As the manifold forces on any level of society, and in
every sphere of activity, becooe polarized in two directions,

two focal points of power take shape around which the various
social forces gather.

This Crystallization of the social

rorces into two focal points of power, which occurs both within
each social form and in society as a whole, constitutes what

sturzo calls "sociological diarchy."

The word ''diarchytt is the

most apt for expressing the idea of a social duality, finding
concrete manifestations in two forms of power, whatever their

sphere, whether moral, political or religious." (I.L. 249)

As

crystallized into diarchy the basic polarization of social forces tend toward a further synthesie whereby one or the other
forms of power becomes the unifying center, so that every society

is always, at one and the same time, dualistic in the practical
working out of its social process and unitary in ita directionality.

In the totality of its reality, then, as a structural

process, society may be viewed "either as a plurality, in the
multiplicity of social nuclei conscious of their individuality
and purpose, or as a duality, in the affirmative and negative
Positions taken up in the contest of action, or as one, in its
unifying and transcendental orientation." (T.L. 248; ct. I.L.
242)
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Our task here is to trace out the main lines of this process according to Sturzo•s theory, the sociological laws that
are operative in the social process and the theoretical underpinnings of the laws.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding

here at the heart of Sturzo's proeessual view ot society, we
must briefly clarify what Sturzo means by the term "lawn as
applied to the social process.

Sturzo is quite well aware of

the risks involved in formulating laws that govern the human
process, as the history of human thought is littered with their
residue.

Yet, at the same time, he recognizes that if we lack

any kind of sohematization of the social reality ot man accord-

ing to rules, norms, constants, laws--whatever one designs to
oall them--we would not be able to render this reality intelligible to us.

We would be limited to handling it only through

statistical methods which tends to reduce:it to the level ot
qu$ntitative tacts.

But even these are not intelligible in

and of themselves, but are rendered such only through evalua-

tion and interpretation, so that even the statistical method
demands an underlying interpretative theory, at least in the
form of working hypotheses. (M. 39)

But Sturzo is convinced

that in the flux of the social process there are constants that
are operative.

For if one considers the imposing complex ot

social phenomena from the perspective of psychic-social movements, there are some which are beyond individual free will on
the one side, and the limitations of conditioning on the other,
and therefore, appear as constant aspects of these phenomena.

Sturzo uses both the term "sociological constant" and "sociological law" in his writings and sometimes with a similar meaning,

I

I'I
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although generally• the term "constant" refers only to those
perennial aspects

or

the structure of society, whereas the term

"law" is reserved for the permanent regularities in the social

For example, the familial form is a "constant fact"

process.

ot human life. (I.L. 31; 49)

But he maintains the use of the

term "law" rather than "constant" as applied to the social
process in order to "indicate both a human fact--individual
and associative--and a normative fact of an intrinsically final-

1stic order." (M. 37)

Sturzo stresses that while sociological laws are analogous

to physical or mathematical laws, they are not of the same
nature.

Rather, sociological laws correspond to historical and

moral laws.

They are based on the natur·e of man not in the ab-

stract, but in its processual realization as living and acting
on both the individual and social level, as single and associa-

ted, tree and conditioned, orderly or tumultuous, intelligent
or instinctive.

These laws are not external laws that are

imposed on man from the outside, but rather are the inner laws

ot the associative nature ot men. (M. 26-7; 63)

The interiority

ot these laws cannot be over-emphasized because as such they
cannot be viewed as subjecting the individual person and the
entire human process to a deterministic pattern.

It must be

remembered that the function of freedom in the social process
was one

or

Sturzo's initial concerns in the formulation of his

social theory and it remained a dominant theme because it touches
the human person at the innermost principle of his uniqueness
and creativity.

Any deterministic theory of the human process
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deprives man

or

that very quality of his being that precisely

J&B.keS bis process human.

To insure this freedom, both theore-

tically and practically, was an integral part of Sturzo's
effort to restore the individual person to his proper place
in society, to reorient the direction of modern society.
Every determinism, whether external and environmental
or internal and instinctiviat, would reduce human
society to a fixed agglomeration without self-determination, without creative activity, without intellectual
and moral idealities. The individual man, dethroned
by modern anthropological and sociological science,
ought to be returned to his place as author and organizer of society in which and through which he lives.
(M. 33)
As a result Sturzo is extremely careful to avoid the snares of
a deterministic social theory.

It is to be expected that his

sensitivity to this problem is most obvious in the formulation
of laws he discovers as operative in the social process.

Mind-

ful that the laws of his theory may be interpreted as deterministic, he reiterates throughout the Inner Laws

or

Society, in

which he presents his most extensive treatment of these laws
that they must not be understood in this way, while at the same
time insisting on their constancy as inherent in the nature of
the human process.
If the social laws, when examined in the abstract,
may have an appearance of determinism, this should
not make us falter in our judgment that, like economic and moral laws, they are laws expressed and
actuated by men with their free nature and their
necessary conditioning. It would be a mistake to
think that there are no sociological and historical
laws because man if free, or that such laws are
deterministic because human con.ditioning is a necessary datum. (I.L. 258; ct. 16; 90; 220; 241)
As Sturzo himself also states, his concept and formulation of
sociological laws must be viewed within the systematic complexus
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ot his entire social theory, while keeping in mind the cognitive orientations that animate it.

From this perspective it is

clear that Sturzo is not going to set up any barricades to the

pl8Y of freedom.
In fact, as the inner laws of man's associative nature,
the sociological laws must not be considered in the same light
as the limiting factors of freedom, such as the conditioning
elements of hum.an experience, whether they are physical or
historico-social.

We have already examined the interplay

between freedom and conditioning and have seen that while conditioning factors do limit freedom, man at the same time can
master them by his activity and make them his own.

Now the

sociological laws must be clearly distinguished from such
factors because they do not mark the limits of freedom, but
rather they mark the paths according to which freedom is enacted

in the social process.

Men do not suffer these laws which they

therefore must strive to overcome, as they do in the case of the
conditioning factors of their experience.
to these laws.

these laws.

They act according

This is the significance of the interiority of

But this must not be interpreted as meaning that

man's freedom consists in conforming his actions to these laws.
It means, rather, that in their constitutive activity, that is,
in the concretizing of sociality. men follow certain general
trends that give rise to regularities of action in the social
process.

The sociological laws express these regularities.

Sturzo emphasizes the distinction between sociological laws and
conditioning factors when he points out that the conditioning
factors of hum.an experience are not even regulated by the
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.·

~ciological

laws, but by physical and historical laws accord-

iDi to the manifold nature of the conditions which function as
I,'

I

aaterial for human action. (M. 63)
The interiority of the sociological laws reveals the chass
that separates Sturzo•s theory from those that pattern the

I

I i

bUJIS.n process on the model of nature.

The human process, for

II

sturzo, is not governed by objective laws which are analogous
to. much less identical with, the laws of nature, and to which

man must submit.

This would reduce history1X> a determined suc-

I

cession of events devoid of every human value.
i

In addition to their interiority, another aspect

or

Sturzo's

I

'I
ll
Ii

I
11

understanding of sociological laws is worthy of attention, and
that is their practical orientation as rooted in action.

This

I
I I

1

11

I

is evident from the fact that they are the laws of man's associ-

ative nature and this nature is realized only in and through
action.

It is for this reason that Sturzo states that "sociolo-

gical laws are always laws of action in society." (M. 6')

They

express the regularities and trends of the activities that are
constitutive of this nature.
This practical orientation of the sociological laws also
provide a clue as to how Sturzo arrived at formulation of them.

In his treatment of the sociological laws in Del Metodo Socio!ogico he states:
In every scientific analysis, one always makes a distinction between the active element and the receptive
or passive element and then puts in relief their reciprocal reactions in order to determine their natures
and characteristics. This must also be done in the
investigation of society. It is known that the active
and finalistic factor o! society is the individual man.
And man is not an abstract idea but a living reality ••••
(M. 28)

I
'

I !
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In Inner Laws he states that "ours is a sociological vision of

-

iaws derived from human nature, from its rationality, from its

aode of action, from its social effectiveness." (I.L. 258)

It

18 of extreme significance to note that Sturzo makes this statement in couaidering the objection that his laws constitute an
aprioristic pattern "into which we are trying to force all
social phenomenology."

This objection runs counter to the

entire methodology of Sturzo•s theory.

We have already seen

that human nature for Sturzo is not an antecedent structure
from which one can deduce the sociological laws.

Rather, hum.an

nature realizes itself only in action so that it is only in
examining history that the laws of its constitutive activities
become manifest.

"It is precisely history--not the outer history

of the material facts but their inner reason, their logical
connection, the metaphysic to which they give birth--that enables
us to learn the laws of our social nature." (T.L. 5)

This is

in consonance with Sturzo's historical method and also provides
an effective counter-thrust to the objection that he is present-

ing an aprioristic picture of reality.

The risk of presenting

a pre-established scheme is lessened according to the extent

that those patterns which appear to be always present in the
socio-historical process are presented in matrix of that process.

We find Sturzo carrying out this form is historical

testing in his monumental work, Church and State.
Given the open possibilities of human experience, due to
the unceasing thrust of rationality; whereby man has the power
to transcend his own history, Sturzo moves very cautiously in

1.
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assigning a definitive character to his sociological laws
before there has been sufficient verification of them.

Thus,

be views them as working hypotheses or as points of orientation.
As he states, "The search for sociological laws is a very delicate task, given the lack of a clear scientific tradition and
o! a rigorous methodology." (M. 63)

Due to the tact that the

sociological laws are based on the open-ended nature ot man,

or what Vico aptly calls man's "indefinite nature," Sturzo
warns that the

i~ner

laws of this nature as living and acting

in society are so complicated and complex and have so many dif-

ferent aspects, that it is difficult to explain the bonds and
coordination between them and to place their significance in
proper perspective. (M. 2?)

The cautious, open-minded spirit

with which he articulated his own theory is revealed in the following statement he made concerning his basic theory on the
polarization of social forces and their diarchic crystallization.

urn such terms, we analyze the reality, seeking its

general lines, but the reality is very different from what it
appears in analysis, nor does it lend itself to generalization.
None the less. this attempted analysis helps us to form an
approximate idea of it." (I.L. 252)

It is this task that we

now undertake.
'l'he process that is at the base of all sociological laws,
and is itself a fundamental law. is the movement towards ration-

ality.

This is clear from the fact that this is the process

that is constitutive of the person and society together.

Ration-

ality is the moving spring of the social process because it is
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the ultimate generative principle of the concretization of
100

1ality.

As individualized in the concrete person, ration-

ality is marked by the inherent finitude or human existence,
but it retains its orientation towards, and dynamic energy-

tor, complete and perfect realization.

Since it is individual-

ized rationality that constitutes the essential nature of man,
this means that man is fundamentally a being that not only

opens out onto the absolute, but also tends towards it with
the inner impulsion of his very being.

In fact, it is pre-

cisely this movement that constitutes his being.

But it is also a movement that contains within itself the
principle of.its own contravening movement--the movement towards
animality.

This principle is the principle of materialit7.

Rationality is the determining principle of human existence,
but as it takes concrete shape it is limited by another prin-

ciple, the principle of materiality.

These two principles

together constitute the concrete individualized rationality
that is the individual person, with the result that rationality is touched in its very core by this limiting principle.

This generates a struggle within the individual person that
spreads outward throughout the entire ambit of society.

For

whereas our essential nature lies in the movement of rationality towards completion, which is the realization of individuality in sociality, there flows from within this very same
movement, through the principle of materiality, a counteracting
movement toward self-contained egoism.
Vie

These two principles

with one another for domination within the individual person.

~
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file movement toward rationality is toward the affirmation and
attainment of one's personality, the movement of materiality is

toward animality and the negation of one's personality.

'Whereas

the movement of rationality is outward and unifying, the movement of materiality is inward and divisive.

The movement

or

rationality is a centripetal force, generating a dialectic of
differentiation-in-synthesis, in which our being is increased
and deepened as we move toward convergence--Sturzo uses this
term with all the richness of meaning it conveys in a Teilhardian

~eltanschauung.

The movement of materiality is a centri-

fugal force, generating an egoistic tendency that lessens and
constricts our being as we move toward an antagonistic plurality.
The polarization of forces, to use a physicist's image
always takes place in social form. The syntheses are
rational in character and indicate the movement towards
rationality. The disintegrations are always in the
domain of materiality, and indicate egoistic regression.
There is a struggle which, from within the individual,
develops in all the forms of sociality, even the loftiest, even those imbued with supernaturalism. (I.L. 12?)
Although the movement of materiality is away from the fultillment of our personal beingto its diminution, this does not
mean that it is any less real than the movement of rationality.

"The world of oppositions is as real, in ev&ry

~ense

and on

every plane of concrete existence, as the world of convergences."

(I.L. 12?)

The "world of oppositions" is simply the reflection

of the finitude of our being, which ontologically is the limitation of

~ationality

by materiality.

This limiting factor or

materiality is as real as rationality itself, as the condition
and modality of its being.

Its reality is manifested in the

field of the personal in both a negative and positive manner.
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tor although it does generate a countervening movement to that

ot rationality--a movement that results in now absence and
alienation from oneself, now lack, insufficiency, defect-nevertheless, as the limiting factor of rationality that marks
it with a fundamental deficiency from within its concrete individualized being, it is that deficiency that gives rise to the
1nner dynamism of rationality to overcome it.

This brings

about within the process of rationality two dialectical moments,
the negative and the positive.

We have already dealt with

these two moments, and the process as a whole, in discussing
the concretization of sociality as the constitutive process of
the individual person.

Now the ontological basis for what

Sturzo calls the sociological law of the trend toward rationality lies in the ontological structure of the individual person as rational; and it is in these terms that the law includes
the constitutive process of the person.
But this law also relates to this process in another way.
Since it is the tendency towards absolute rationality in time
that defines the person in the ultimate character

or

his being,

in establishing the trend toward rationality as a law of the
social process, Sturzo is also affirming not just that the
person defines himself in the social process, but more fundamentally that he generates the social process in defining himself.

This law, then, is also the formal articulation by

Sturzo that the individual person is the efficient and final
principle of the social process.
There is another aspect to this law that manifests the

'

~

I
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depth and internal consistency of Sturzo's theory: its role as
the fundamental sociological law.

---

For in setting this law of

the trend toward rationality at the basis of all the sociological laws, Sturzo is establishing not only the fact that the
800 10-historical

process is rooted in the ontological structure

of the person, and that its laws are generated in and by the
constitutive activity of the person, but also, and ultimately,
that the emergence of the person in the plentitude of his being
is the final term of this process and the ultimate criterion

of its rationality.
In viewing the entire socio-historical process, Sturzo
finds an ever rising level of rationality, which is the expression of the trend toward rationality on the social level.

This

trend toward rationality that originates in the individual
person seeking to realize himself, reverberates throughout the
entire temporal-spatial span of the socio-historical process,
giving it in the entirety of its process the continuously
upward movement toward an increasing personalization ot the
process.

That is, in the reciprocating and constitutive dia-

lectic of differentiation-in-synthesis that is operative between
the individual and society, the overall socio-historical process reveals an ever fuller and deeper amplification of the
field of the personal, within which the social order more adequately corresponds, and responds, to the drive of rationality
for completion.
The whole thrust of the human process is to transcend the
limitations

or

the present in every sphere ot human endeavor,

to overcome and eliminate the deficiencies and evils that are

11

I
I
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encrusted in the social order, to break through the bonds of
oppression in any form that breaks the weak, deforms the strong
and keeps whole peoples shackled to a state of remorseless

squalor and constant human degradation.

This unremitting

!inalistic impulse awakens within any society or social form
8

spirit of achievement, which is the vitalizing and unifying

factor of the collective personality.
to achievement is itself a

This ever-present urge

sociological law, the law of achieve-

ment or conquest, nwhich in.forms the co1:irse of a.11 history, in
large or in little.

But in large or in little, in every field

and sphere, collective activity must either be directed towards

achievement or fail •••• the renunciation of all conquest, insofar
as it denotes pure acquiescence in the present state, petrifies
and dissolves that personality." (T.L. 202-3)

There have been

and will be specific and short term failures.

Particular soci-

eties may fall into such prolonged and widespread periods or

stasis and inertia that the spirit of achievement atrophies and
is finally extinguished, bringing about the collapse of that

society; nevertheless, that spirit is still at work in the
broad sweep of the socio-historical process, and its impelling
surge will sweep over the ruins of that society, giving rise

to another one.
without actually designating it as a sociological law,
we have already referred to this urge to achievement in explaining Sturzo's theory on the development of collective consciousness and the transcendence of social nuclei, which itself constitutes a sociological law, as we have indicated in the pre-

i64
-yious ohapters. 1

These two laws are related on the social

leYel, as has been noted, in a collective, finalistic impulse
which takes concrete expression as the spirit of achievement

and• as such, is the moving force behind the transcendence of
iocial nuclei.

This collective finalism is an expression of

and is sustained by the trend to rationality that is operative

on the social level.

The laws of achievement and transcendence,

then, are corollaries of the law ot rationality.

viewed either simply as expressions

or

They can be

the law or rationality

as presented from different perspectives, or as means of separating out and giving formulation to the various processes
that are involved in the trend to rationality,
But the law of rationality cannot be reduced to these two
laws.

For it includes the affirmation that in the striving for

conquests. in the various processes of transcendence taking place
in the social process, there is an actual increment ot rationality
in the socio-historical process.
Man as he gains in self-consciousness, in oonsclousness
of the world and its causes, takes his own inward progress as the measure for a better estimation of humanity
in its past and present. He thus rejects as repugnant
and inadequate to human nature many practical beliefs,
rules, and criteria that in another age or another
environment, were judged to correspond to the greatest
individual and social good, and hence to the intimate
laws of nature. (I.C. 144)
The entire endeavor of the human process has been to overcome
the predominance of animality in social life, to storm the
citadels of irrationality or pseudo-rationality that have held
sway over the process as ingrained social phenomena.

To men-

tion a few of the more obvious and notable conquests, there
have been those over polygamy, the family vendetta, serfdom,

-

1see Chapter I, pp. 84-85 and Chapter II, p. 133.

~
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.nd slavery.
conquests such as these have modified and uplifted the
entire social process. sending shock waves throughout the
remaining 'strongholds of irrationality in the social process.
It may take generations for the effects of these reverbera-

tions to surface and shake the

founda~ions

of these strong-

holds, but once a practical, rational trend is set in motion,
its finalistic impulse releases a dynamism which moves inexor-

ably towards goals not yet attained, and which gains impetus
in the face of resistence, as it is now slowed down, now Vitiated and turned aside.

And "the more important is the practical,

rational trend, the greater the reactions that it determines in
the irrational substratum of human life.It (I.L. 146)

A prime

example in our day is the civil rights movement in America which
is penetrating through the irrational incrustations of social
consciousness that remain a hundred years after the abolition

of slavery.

But it will prevail because the gains it has

achieved as well as "other moral conquests, which in our times
trom the realm of ideals and theories have affirmed themselves
in that of practice, becoming laws and customs, and from the
domain of pure aspirations have passed into vast realizations,
correspond to the unceasing trend towards rationality." (I.L.
146)

And so will the trend towards rationality prevail over such
institutions now under attack, as for example, the death penalty
and war.

The possibility of eliminating the death penalty has

already passed from "the stage of Utopian idealism to that of
Practical realization"; that is, it bas become a ''sooiological
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problem."

"Sociologically, a problem is such when it is raised

. bY the social conscience as a practical problem to be solved,

'I

I

I

or when, though it has been solved in one manner, it comes up
again for discussion tor a further solution.n (I.L. 230) 2
i

The question of the legitimacy and juridical propriety of war,

'1

and thereby the necessity of eliminating it, is today in the

process of transversing that passage in social consciousness

troro the realm of Utopian idealism to being grappled with as
a sociological problem.

This is a step of the utmost importance

because once a question becomes for collective consciousness
"a practical problem to be solved 0 that signifies that the
trend of rationality has already been set in motion in that
direction.
As in the case of the abolition of war, so in that of
the death penalty, the public conscience is not yet
formed and decided, and hence has not reached a complete solution; it has merely covered the intermediate
stages •••• Only the far-sighted, the bold, the reformers
have the courage of great ideas, and outstrip the common world by tens of years or even by centuries •••• but
it is impossible for the trend towards rationality to
be wholly arrested. When the death penalty (like war)
will have been abolished, then it will no longer be
legitimate, nor will the attempt be made to present
it as necessary. (I.L. 231)
As these conquests of rationality little by little penetrate into human consciousness, there is a greater awareness
of, and sensitivity to, the intrinsic value of the human person.

1

1

"The value of human personality is like a hidden treasure that
must be sought,

li~e

a vein of gold that must be laid bare and

purged of dross." (I.L. 21?)

The needs of the person, therefore,

i'
: I

2 cr. also Sturzo•s "The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical
Conceptions," Thought, 20 (March, 1945), 103.
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~ecome

more strongly felt, the social customs and institutions

are continually reformed to meet the demands of these needs,
and thus the potentiality that is in the human person is able
to reach out to higher levels of achievement.
Even where some institutions are only tolerated in order
that some ethical norms are functioning to bridle the forces
of animality released by the principle of materiality, the
slow and laborious process towards rationality is not lacking.
It extends into every sphere of social activity, bringing
about what Sturzo terms "the pseudo-rational or semi-rational
institutions" towards a deeper rationality. (I.L. 101)

For

example, the material basis of society, its economic structure,
is formed, continually modified, and reformed by the trend

towards rationality, always pointing towards--even when not in
practice actually moving towards--a better distribution ot the
material goods of the society.
The optimistic hue of Sturzo•s theory is clearly tempered
by a vivid pragmatic realism, shaped on the anvil of practical

experience.

In tact, it is precisely by reason of the diffi-

culties involved, the efforts exerted, and the obstacles to
be surmounted in attaining the gains of rationality that Sturzo
calls them "conquests."

"Any creation of welfare insofar as it

implies activity, efforts, failures, crises, the overcoming of
difficulties, cannot but be called a conquest." (T.L. 203)
For Sturzo, social progress is born in struggle, conflict,
opposition.

But even here, Sturzo does not view the forces of

opposition to social progress as having only a negative function in the social process.

This they do have in a very real

, I
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sense, but they also play an extremely positive role.

For one

thing, their very resistence to the trend of rationality is a
generating factor in the dynamism of the social process, whereby
this resiatence is overcome.

It is conflict that polarizes the

social forces, giving rise to the progressive movement of the
social process.

"Without conflicting finality there would not

be struggle, and without struggle society would never overcome
the pluralistic stage which is chaotic and non-progressive."

(M. 17)

Also it s through struggle with the moral and material

obstacles to a social transformation that this transformation
takes root in the social consciousness with an ever clearer and
deeper consciousness of it.
Sturzo was personally aware that the conquests of the
trend toward rationality are slowly and laboriously achieved.
The pace

or

achievement more often than not must be measured

not by years, but by generations and even centuries.

The

achievements of rationality do not take root everywhere at
once.

There always remain the backwaters

or

the human process

which the currents of rationality reach only tardily and with
diminished force.

It is only with great difficulty that the

gains of rationality are preserved and equally herculean is
the effort required to attain the full import of their social
effects.
As any form of welfare won (freedom, for instance) must
be guaranteed, defended and re-lived, so its conquest
is always a becoming, in the continuity of action ••••
The achievement of welfare is always partial, never entire. It is precarious, never conclusive. To be defended, it must be renewed, augmented, restored. In a word,
the good won must be continually re-experienced so as
to ensure its existence, continuity and development.

(T.L. 203)

I

I
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Any stable ethico-civilized achievement of its very nature
aust be rooted in the collective consciousness.

In accordance

with his relational, integral realism, Sturzo stresses that any
change in the orientation of collective consciousness calls for
concurrent changes in all the conditioning and shaping factors
o! consciousness, social, political, and economic "because the
factors of our everyday lives are deeply engraved in the mind
o! each one of us." (N. & I. 26?)

Sturzo lists four require-

aents that are necessary to bring about, maintain and make
effective the conquests of rationality: an educational preparation and formation to open the way for it and establish its
foundations; a political order to recognize it and guarantee
its stability; a social maturation in which it takes root;

and a continual process of acquisition and readaptation whereby
it is maintained in and responds to the changing conditions of
the social process.

These tour requirements, each and all

together, indicate the difficulty and slowness with which gains
in rationality are achieved.

These factors also point to the

very real sense in which Sturzo grounds the achievements ot
rationality in the total matrix of socio-historical process.
Thus, for example, in regard to the overall human process, that
which is seen to be less rational, auch as the polygamic family

as compared to the monogamic, may be relatively more rational

as set within the total context of a particular environment.
Sturzo states that "this fact may be noted even today in semibarbarous countries when Christianity is introduced.

It is

here not enough to prescribe that the family should be monogamic, but it must be given an enabling environment by an
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adequate transformation of political and economic society."
(I.L· 18)

sturzo's law
taci~

-

or

the trend toward rationality seems Erima

to align his position with theories of progressivism,

which hold that there are linear and inwardly determined trends

unfolding in time towards ever higher forms of human progress.

As will become clear in the next chapter, Sturzo's theory is

far removed from a strictly humanistic progressivism in which
there is no principle other than men operative in the human
process, so that human rationality would be considered to possess within its own power the resources needed to overcome the
contravening force of materiality in attaining its ideal and
actualization.

Although Sturzo does posit the need of a trans-

cendent principle operative within the human process, nevertheless, be that as it may, the fact that Sturzo views the trend
towards rationality as a law of the social process in which
there actually is an ever increasing realization of rationality
seems to indicate a movement that is intrinsically progressive.
It must be acknowledged that the radical optimism of Sturzo

does verge on overflowing into progressivism.

In fact, in his

early writings he views the human process more in terms of its

progreBsive character than its processual flow.

He speaks of

"humanity in its historical ascension towards progress," and
even of "the historical law of progress."

"Human thought does

not stop before any obstacle; it is the law of progress, which
pursues us even if we are unwilling, which drags us along even
if we want to resist, or it at least moves on over us.

This is
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history.

fl

(L.C. 207, 203)

One of his major early essays is

entitled, "Social Cont"lict as a Law of Progress." (c.f'. S.S. 24-

56)

What prevents the optimistic orientation of Sturzo's thought

from actually

falling into any form of progressivism is the

determinism that underlies such theories.

And any form of

determinism is radically opposed to the fundamental thesis of
sturzo's social theory: that the efficient principle

or

the

social process is the autonomous, free individual person,
whose freedom is rooted in the ultimate quality of his being,
rationality.

Since the individual person is the sole substan-

tive principle of the socio-historical process, just as freedom
stands at the heart of human action on the individual level,
so must it necessarily characterize the human process in its
collective activity.
any

In tact, it was Sturzo's concern to avoid

deterministic overtones of his theory that led him to shift

the emphasis of his early speculation on human reality from the
notion of progress to that of process.

It is for the same

reason that he purposely avoids using the term "evolution,"
substituting in its place the term "development" as characterizing the historical becoming of human reality.
is process.

"Human reality

We say process, that is, succession, and not pro-

gress, nor evolution, because all human activity is individual,
even if developing, as it does, collectively or by groups."
(I.L. xvii; ct. M. 14)

It is significant to note that 8turzo•s

adversion to a deterministic theory

or

the human process lies

in the fact that it undercuts the historical efficacy of personal experience because it shifts the locus of the dynamism

ot the process from the individual person to the deterministic
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forces ot the process.

This in turn ultimately undermines the

reality of the individual, submerging it in the deterministic

r1ow ot the process itself.
Just as human process cannot be called progress, so
it cannot be called evolution in the sense ot a reality contained in a germ and developing from it according to a law of maturation and continuity •••• But,
underneath, both ideas of evolution and progress presuppose a deterministic conception. This as such denies
the idea of individuality and of personal experience,
and, hence, the idea of liberty, reducing the whole of
human activity to a more or less unconscious necessity.
(I.L. xix; ct. T.L. 198)
This does not mean that Sturzo does not admit to the evolutionary or progressive character ot the human process.
clearly does, as has been indicated, although

11

He

not indeed a.s

deterministic and absolute elements, but as relative elements
of appraisement of the pa st and orientation of the future."

(I.L. xix)

"While we cannot admit a deterministic human pro-

gress, we must grant the fact that humanity makes progress in
its experiences."3

In a continuous flow of intertwining per-

sonal experiences there is a rising level of rationality that
becomes the common patrimony of succeeding generations, so that
"the new men who come forward in making their own experiments
start from a determined common level, which they insensibly will

have reached." (I.L. xviii)

Yet, given the limited and proces-

sual nature of human experience, as well as the relative character of the gains in rationality and their tenuous and precarious foothold in the onflow of the human process due to the
counteracting forces of materiality, each generation must make
its own achievements of the past to insure their continuity and
development.

And it does this only on the individual level by

3sturzo, "The Roman

~uestion Before and After Fascism,n

Rev~ew of Politics. 5 (Oct •• 1943). 504.

I
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reason of the personal character of experience so that it is
tbe individual person alone that is the "undying fount of vital

reality."
Thus, in associated life there were contemporaneously
developments, arrests, renewals, involutions, all the
stages that experience implies. Hence, there is not
always progress, never a real regression, but in a
relative sense both progress and regression, that is,
experimentation and achievement. (I.L. xviii)
Sturzo also argues against a constant, progressive motion
to the trend of rationality by reason of the relative character
of rationality.
Between the idea of a constant rational becoming and
that of a process not intrinsically progressive, there
might seem an irreducible conflict. But, once the
purely rational and the purely irrational are excluded
by concrete reality, the movement falls within relativistic lines, in which, besides the true rational, what
we have called the semi-rational and the pseudo-rational
have their function, now positive, now negative. (I.L. l?)
Thus we may conclude that although Sturzo is clear in his
affirmation of the ultimately progressive movement or the sociobistorical process, he is equally clear in affirming that it is
not a direct, linear and inwardly determined movement, but
rather it is marked by uncertain steps, with regressions, deviations, and periods of immobility.

There is always and only

particular and relative progress, now in one direction, now in
another.
The trend of social consciousness towards rationality
is not direct, nor swift, but slow and uncertain, with
pauses and with baokslidings. Today, through the advent of the authoritarian governments, in this matter
as in many others a backward step has been taken, but
it is impossible for the trend towards rationality to
be wholly arrested. (I.L. 231; cf. 16-?, 36, 90, 220;
M. 104)
Before we conclude our exposition of the trend towards
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we should note several· other aspects of this trend

in order to avoid any
sociological law.

mi~interpretat1ons

of this most basic

First of all, the trend towards rationality

can be conceived of as a continuous surmounting of the principle of materiality, with its contravening movement towards
animality, which is an egoistic disintegrative force within
the social process.

Yet, the movement towards rationality must

not be understood as an escape from materiality, but rather as
its fulfillment and spiritualization through a higher finalism
and inner purification.

Since the individual is composed of

both material and rational principles, the purification and
apiritualization of the material principle are essential features of the concretization

or

sociality and therefore "aspects

of rationality that give meaning, end and unity to all human
activity."

(I.L. 36)

This does not mean that in stressing the

predominant role of rationality in sociality Sturzo ignores or
even undervalues the positive function of the sensible and emotional substratum of human experience.

He clearly acknowledges

this substratum as an integral part in the fabric of communal
living.

For example, he states that "since we are sensible

beings, it is the life of feeling that makes a community effective and practical, increasing acquaintanceship, stimulating
affections releasing energies and helping to give the spiritual basis of society the natural means of affinity and consolidation." (T.L. 63)
It is this bipolarity of the spiritual and the material
which constitutes the nature of man that is the metaphysical
basis for the incessant polarizing

or

forces in every sphere or
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activity.

For this bipolarity constitutes the radical f1nitude

of concrete individualized rationality, always aborting its
•ovement towards absolute rationality.

The concrete realization

o! rationality is always partial, insufficient, and marked by
an inherent deficiency that is an urge for us to overcome it.
There is always a gap between the concrete realization

or

ration-

ality and its ideal actuation in every sphere of human endeavor
on both the individual and associated levels.

This divergence

between the ideal and the real is a metaphysical, ethical, and
intellectual vacuum that draws rationality on to overcome it,
oreating in the social process currents of reform and renewal.
Within the present temporal-spatial sphere, our efforts to overcome this vacuum, the limitations, evils and errors of the
present will always be only temporally and partially successful.
The resulting and alternating ups-and-downs of life are formulated by Sturzo in the law of "critical cycles."

"What we may

call a 'critical cycle' is overcome by passing to a higher
'critical cycle' and so on, in a continual relationship between
individuals in the singular and society in the whole •••• Mankind
and its history cannot be conceived outside pain and limitation,
in the continual effort of confronting them." (T.L. 16?)

The

"critical cycle" Sturzo is referring to here is the dialectic
in the trend toward rationality between the negative and positive moment, or, in other words, between the deficiency of
achieved rationality and the effort to resolve it.

The synthe-

sis achieved is never definitive, but is itself insufficient,
giving rise to a dialectic on a higher level, which in turn
Calls for a further synthesis.
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Whatever the limitations, whatever the sphere of activity,
vbether the."critical cycle is confined to the individual parson
or involves an entire people, what is constant in the dialectic
18 the polarizing of forces reaching for a resolution of the
critical cycle. Although the duality will take a variety of
forms, it fundamentally "presents itself to us as an oppoa.tion
between the ideal and the real, between the spiritual and the
Jll,8terial." (I.L. 240)

It must be reiterated that this is how

the duality presents itself in its fundamental form.

We must

avoid a simplistic interpretation of it as though it always took
shape in such clear-cut terms, any more than that it always involves a conflict between good and evil.

In the manifold forms

it takes in every sphere of human endeavor the polarization can
take on a myriad of shadings, and is seldom, if ever, tree from
ambiguities.

The polarization of forces may not even be simply

one of antagonistic opposition, conflict, and struggle, but may
even enter into collaboration.

Therefore, to say that the

polarization is fundamentally an opposition between the ideal

and the real, between the spiritual and ttie material simply
means that "the forces of consciousness and of individual
activities become oriented towards one of two terms in such
fashion that the one may represent the rational, spiritual and
ideal element, the other the practical, the material, the realistic. u (I.L. 240)

This basic duality is always tending towards unification,
reaching out for a "further resolution, a further synthesis,
otherwise it would be barren." (I.L. 240-1)

This tendency

iowards unification is rooted in and is an expression of the
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ontological structure of the person. his sociality, and

therefore constitutes a fundamental sociological law.
is a corollary of the law of rationality, since
rationality that unification comes.

It, too,

itis'~hrough

There can be no unifying

element that does not resolve itself into rationality." (I.L.
xxiii)

In fact, the tendency towards unification ultimately

reduces itself to the tendency towards rationality, as viewed
from the perspective of its finality because the end to be
attained is the unifying term and this end is always represented
in terms of its rationality.

More precisely, it is a unifying

term to the extent that it conforms to absolute rationality.
It is clear from the preceding exposition of sociality and
rationality that the unification sought is at one and the same
time inward and social, but it is fundamentally personal since
the person is the term of every social resolution.

This means,

then, that all social values resolve themselves into the individual person.
It is also a unification that is at the same time immanent
and transcendent, since the tendency towards rationality that
constitutes the person is a tendency towards absolute rationality.

Therefore, the thrust of our own being towards comple-

tion never finds pacification short of this unification with
absolute rationality.

It is only there that the movement of

our being finds that higher unification that comprehends, and
pacifies it, while still transcending it.

"This unification in

rationality. which is immanent in us, would lead us to an exasperating rational anthropocentrism (pseudo-humanism) if it were
not for the unification that makes us transcend it in the
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absolute, the unification of' the human in the divine." (I.L.
xxiv)

This unification of the human in the divine, and its

implications will be the area of our concern in the next chapter,
because, as Sturzo himself states, "since this unification,
though essential in the idea of creatureliness, in order to
find fulfillment with its cognitional value in each man, must
in some way be inserted into the human process, it will be well
first of all to make it clear what human process means." (I.L.
xxiv)

And this is the aim of the present chapter as it has

been in the two preceding ones.
The tendency towards unification manifests itself in the
concretizing of sociality whereby social life always tends
towards a spiritual unification on a higher plane than that of
particular economic and political interests and aspirations.
The movement toward a transcendent unification in absolute
rationality reflects itself on the social level, in "the
rational movement towards order and peace, and the need, inherent in nature, for human, peaceable and useful relationships
between peoples.

This tendency actually is elaborated through

the unifying tendency of every civilization, which is what gives
the moral structure to any international community, transcending
particular, economic and political egoism and the intolerance
of castes, classes or national religions." (I.L. 141)
Just as the tendency towards rationality is frustrated by
the contravening movement of materiality, so is the tendency
towards unification.

The unification achieved, both personally

and socially, are always partial, temporary, and contested.
Thus it must continually be augmented, restored, and defended.
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therefore find in the tendency towards unification a tendency

that is always more or less unsatisfied.

It is always a case

of a unification in process, never final, but always a tendency,
a dynamism. (I.L. xxiii)

Thus, "every society that grows up

out of human relationships is always practically dualistic and
tendentially unitary." (I.L. 242--italics in the text; c!. xxiii)
When Sturzo states that society is always "practically
dualistic" he is pointing up not only that its movement actually
is so in fact, but also that the dualistic orientation is a
practical orientation, rooted in action.

It is only in action

that society takes shape, develops and continues, and it is
only through this action that social forces are generated.

It

is precisely in their generation that they are polarized in a

two-fold directionality.

What allows for the polarization of

forces in action is that which is at the source of all action
that is human: freedom.

"For me, the first element of indivi-

dual and social dualism is free will." (M. 100)

It is personal

freedom that makes possible for the free play between the principles of materiality and of rationality, which gives rise to
the fundamental option that orients individual activity, and
the~eby

social life, towards the materializing of life or of

making it ever more rational.

It is interesting to note that

Sturzo places freedom at the source of the dualistic nature of
the social process because it is precisely this which others
maintain calls for, and results in, the pluralistic nature of
society.

Sturzo's rejection of this theory has been indicated

and his reasons will become manifest as we elaborate his own

''
I

ii'
I, ,
I

theory.

I
11
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This polarization of forces, both within the individual
throughout every aspect of social life is inherent in the
creative process that gives rise to the continuous development
of the individual person and society together. and it is this
polarization that generates the dynamism necessary for the
process.
In no moment of history, in no social concretization
whatever its aspects, religious, political, juridical
or cultural, shall we fail to find not only traces of
a duality of grouped forces, but also the dualistic
elements of the different social syntheses. Ir this
were not so, the 3piritual process of mankind would
stagnate, motionless, the movement towards rationality
would stop short at the irrational, ethical values,
law would lack its historical relativity, and institutions would not be able to take form. (I.L. 245-6)
It is well to note that the dualistic polarization ot social
forces which must develop dynauically in the realization of
social forms, providing for their continued development and
movement, occurs not only within the particular social torm.s,
but also in the relationships between them in their movements
towards autonomy and interference, which we examined previously.
The entire range of the social process then, reveals a constant
dynamic pattern of moveoent--a pattern that is generative of the
continuous dynamic movement--"the dualization of forces, in the
name ot one or the other social form, the unifying tendency,
expressed in the prevalence of one form over the rest, the
falling asunder of such unification, making a new duality, the
drop into temporary pluralities, which will be polarized anew
in a two-fold sense, and tend towards a oneness never perfectly
to be attained.tt (I.L. 245)
Although this polarization does generate a powerful dynamism

I

i
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on every level of human experience, the most significant and
basic expression of this polarization of forces is in the moral

sphere.

This follows from the fact that all human activity can

ultimately be reduced to morality, since

mo~ality

actuation of rationality in human action.

is simply the

Thus, "man acts

ethically whether his purposes are economic, political, artistic, cultural, recreational or what not.

The ethical urge,

that is to say, simple moral reason in action, is inherent in
all human behavior and is revealed in every social fact. 114 But,
given the negative moment in the achieving of rationality,
there is always a disparity between the ethical ideal and its
social realization of such a distance as to justify a continu-

ous revision of traditional norms and to call for an unrelenting
advancement of "the frontiers of reform."5
The whole of human activity may be said to be a continuous process of reform, correction and integration of
what is by what should be. The should-be (the deontological) presses upon us in the guise of rationality, that
is, of a laudable, desirable, attainable ideal. The
should-be is the spirit that quickens the letter and the
reality having become open to criticism, is the letter
that has lost part or the whole of its spirit. Hence
the dialectic of the negative and positive moments
gains an endless potentiality. (I.L. 15)
In the movement of the social process the most fundamental
and concrete expression of the polarization of the social forces
is that between the forces directed toward the conservation of
the status gu9 in the social order and the opposing forces
directed toward the transformation of the social order.

The

4 sturzo, "The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Oonceptions," p. 110; cf. I.L. 212.

5Ibid.' p. 112.

-

182

tormer are a reflection of the social process in its crystallization in stable social institutions while the latter manifest

its unceasing becoming even within its already established
institutional forms, impelled onward towards a better future
by moral and matertal exigencies.

These two asynchronous rhy-

thms of the social process give rise to two broad currents of
social forces which Sturzo calls, respectively, the organiza-

tional and the mystical.

Two currents, then, are always at

work and interacting with one another, both within the complexity
of the individual social forms and throughout the entire social
complexus: the reforming and renewing mystical current and the
stabilizing and consolidating organizational current.
These two currents constitute the fundamental and perennial
polarization of social forces for three reasons.

First

or

they reflect two opposing tendencies within the person.
flows from the inner urge

or

all,

One

rationality for completion which

gives rise to the inherent sense of process and o! the urgency
for further actuation.

An opposing tendency· is derived trom

the limiting principle of materiality which defuses the thrust
of rationality and manifests itself within the person in an
innate dread of change and a need tor resting in the reality
attained, which is viewed as definitive: hie manebimus optime.
(I.L. 221-2)

Secondly, they reflect the two asynchronous

rhythms that are inherent in the social process, that of the
collective consciousness and that of its structural concretization in social forms.

The movement of collective consciousness

continues to !low at a faster pace and is much more mobile and
flexible than that of its structural concretizations.

Collective

'
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consciousness, then, tends to outdistance the developmental
process of the social forms which, as the stabilizing factors

of a reality in process, have to overcome more resistances
before it can be transformed. (I.L. 221)

Finally, the organiza-

tional current tries to establish and concretize ideal values
and the benefits accrued to the social process in social institutions; but since this will be only partially successful at
any given time, the mystical current will always be at work,
pushing towards renewal and the realization of a better future.
Sturzo indicates three liberating or reforming currents
which are operative in every society and which, needless to say,
can be expressed in a multitude of ways: the rational which is

the natural movement from an established past and deficient
present towards a better future; the artistic which gives
expression to beauty containing the true and good and as such
directs the spirit of man towards the true and good; and the
religious current without which "it would be impossible to
restore the human solidarity shattered by the spirit of evil ••••
In it the rational and artistic currents are completed and
transformed •••• " (T.L. 190-l)

Of the interaction between these

reforming currents that between the rational and religious is
of the utmost importance.
The point at which rationality and religious feeling
converge lies in the condemnation of evil;' the point
at which evil may be overcome lies in the legal recognition of given acts as evil, and therefore punishable;
and social progress consists in the effort to eliminate
evil. But till rationality and religion unite in recognizing that a given social fact is evil, the elimination
of that social fact is impossible. Religion is necessary as a social premise and as the ethical application
of rationality on a plane of obligations transcending
ethics and society. (I.C. 203)
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There are several miscellaneous aspects of these currents
that should be clarified in order to avoid misinterpretations
of sturzo's position on them.
minology involved.

There is, first of all, the ter-

Sturzo was dissatisfied with the appella-

tion of mystical for the reforming current, but he preferred it
to the term, ideal.

"Whereas the word, ideal, generally signi-

fies something intellectual and rational, perceived as an idea,

the word, mysticism, has a sense of faith, adherence, affection, and, at the same time, hints at something mysterious, like
a higher force with a compelling power." (I.L. 247)

But Sturzo

did refer to these currents in one of his writings as the "organizatory" and the "idealistic." 6 When he first formulated his

theory on these two trends in society, he called them, respectively, the conservative and the progressive currents.

This is

also the terminology he used in one of his last writings. (M. 9;

ct. also S.S. 48)

He has also spoken

or

the static and dynamic

phases of the social process, which correspond to the two currents. (I.L. 16; 221-2)

In summation, we can conclude that

Sturzo remained generally dissatisfied with his terminology for
these two currents; but since he uses the terms '•organizational"
and ''mystical" most frequently in his writings. we will also.

Also, one must be careful not to identify these two currents with the negative and positive moments in the trend towards
rationality.

Both currents represent the trend towards ration-

ality and there is always a negative element operative in both
currents.

In regard to social progress, the roles of these two

currents should not be categorized in negative and positive

termeG

with the orianizational current playing the negative

-Ibid.' p.

115.
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role and the mystical the positive role.

Only a superficial

analysis of the socio-historical process could lead to this
conclusion.

Both are equally necessary tor social progress and

both perform positive functions, while at the same time either
one may impede progress or even cause a backward step to be
taken.

"Both among conservative organizers and idealistic

reformers there are always some who are moved by selfish interests or false conceptions; but equally in both there can always
be found a fundamental ethical drive urging them in the direction
of the common good.,,?

In fact, their roles may actually be

reversed, "so that the organizational current expresses itself
in mystical terms and the mystical current in organizational

terms. 0 (I.L. 247)

This is not surprising since the two cur-

rents do not represent two logical positions, but are composed
of individuals, "both sides expressing what they can of ideal
or organizational .factors, in order to resist and conquer."
(I .L. 248)

The essential fact to remember is that unless both of
these currents are efficaciously operative within a society,
there cannot be orderly, constructive and lasting progress.

It

is the organizational current that coneretizes the ideals ot
the social process into the institutional structure of society,
consolidates the benefits accrued to the social process, and
conserves what has been achieved and constructed in the past.
It also functions as a stabilizer for social transformation so
that it remains an orderly process and a lasting achievement,
deeply rooted in the collective consciousness.

"In this sense,
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even so-called 'reactionaries' can fulfill the necessary ethical
.runction of serving as a bit and bridle to a 'changing' world•
provided only they do not try to rein back all social progress
by putting a soulless, formalistic Pharisaic ethic in the sad-

dle.118

It is the mystical current that makes the social insti-

tutions living and dynamic, taking on _the rhythm of progress.
renewing the ideal values of society and rending them fruitful
when they cease to be efficacious, orienting the collective
consciousness towards reform by arousing it to a lively awareness of the incompleteness, deficiencies and evils of the existing social structure.

Given the differential velocity of the two currents, and
the unifying tendency of dual forces, there is constant tension
and interference between them.

But if there is not an active.

fluctuating equilibrium between the two currents. the social
process either on the one side falls into stagnation and becomes
sterile 9 or on the other is ripped asunder by the convulsive
crises of revolution and war.

In their extreme and perverted

forms, the organizational current becomes a stultifying reactionary force in society, trying to hold back all social progress, while the mystical current becomes a violent. revolutionary force 9 seeking not to renew and reform the existing social
structure, but to destroy it.

Sturzo compares the interference

between the two currents to the interplay between the motor and
the brake.
There must be a margin !or movement unimpeded by the
brake. If this margin is harmonic, the movement
8 Ibid.

-

t

p. 116.
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proceeds regularly, that is, it becomes rational. If
it is restricted, at the expense either of the dynamic
or of the static side, then we find either immobilized
situations, as in regimes of closed castes, or revolutionary or disorderly ones, aa in all periods of great
upheavals. (I.L. 222; cf. M. 9)
Since every form of duality always tends toward unification, either in the direction of one or the other of the dual
factors, depending on which one is able to predominate, the

same unifying tendency applies to the polarization between the
organizational and mystical currents.

At one time the organi-

zational forces will prevail so that the stabilizing forces of

the institutional side of the social complexus will mark the
rhythm of the social process.

At another time it will be the

mystical current, pushing ahead for reform and the transformation of the present social structure.

It is the variance of

these organizational and mystical forces, as the concrete expression or the tendency toward rationality, in the ebb and flow
of their reciprocal influence that produces the dynamism of
the socio-historical process, making of it a continual and
creative process.

"It is inevitable that in this rhythm or

mutual contact or conflict there should emerge those decisive
'movements' that make for the progress of humanity."9
It is of the utmost significance to note that, for Sturzo,

in order for these currents to be effective within the social
process, at whatever level of society and in whatever sphere of
activity they are operative, they must take up a position "in
the realm of organizational reality." (I.L. 248)

That is, they

must take on an organized form in such a way as to both enter

9 Ibid., P• 115.
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into and share in the power structure that forms the active
foundation of a social complexus and the institutions within
it•

It is precisely through the autonomous participation in

social power by the forces that compose the organizational and
mystical currents that a sociological diarchy is formed.

By

diarehy Sturzo means the more or less stable organization of
the dualistic polarization of social forces into two concrete,
contending principles of power.

All the manifold social forces

within a social complexus overcome their chaotically non-progressive state, acquire a continuative stability, and become
effacacious factors in social life only by passing through a
dualistic polarization to its diarchic oonoretization.

"The

emergence of the diarchy may be considered as the consolidation of the dualistic movement.

The organized diarchy should

stand for order, the duality for its dynamism.'' (I .L. 252)

What are the conditions that account for the transition

from the relatively unorganized duality of social forces to
their diarchic systematization?

Whatever form the diarchy

takes, the important fact to remember in explaining this transition is that the basic polarization of social forces is into
the organizational and mystical currents, so that the sociological diarchy is always the organized concretization of these two
currents.

The two powers forming the diarchy, then, will always

manifest themselves as the focal points of the two currents, so
that they must be considered, ''the one as the guarantor and

defender or the status guo, the other as the motive-power of
changes." (I.L. 251; 249)
The essence of diarchic power lies in its organico-social

'
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tunction, so that it must have an autonomous participation in
the social power structure.

There is no difficulty involved

for the organizational current assuming "its position in the
realm of organizational reality,n and becoming a principle of
power in the power structure of society.

or

its very nature it

1s already functioning within the existing social structure,
with its forces actually dominating, or even in some instances
constituting, the power structure.

Therefore, the clue for

accounting for the transition form duality to diarchy lies with
the mystical current.

This transition, then, actually occurs

when the mystical current is so penetrated by rationality (or pseudo-rationality) and responds to such
needs, spiritually felt, as to form the consciousness
of power. Only then is an antagonistic power created,
and given a certain structure. Placed face to face
with the reality, the new power limits that which
already existed and forces it to share with it or to
oppose it. The diarchy has been formed. (I.L. 254)
There are several noteworthy factors that must be emphasized
in this process.

First of all, this transition to a diarchic

power by the mystical current does not necessarily mean that it
actually becomes an internal part of the power structure, in
an authoritative and juridical form.

It may legally remain

extraneous to the power structure and yet function as an effective diarchic power.

For "the reality of power resides less in

the form than in the consciousness of possessing it.

The diar-

chy is above all a consciousness of the social duality and of
the power which it releases." (I.L. 253)

An example of this

would be the diarchic power of the Church that continues to
function in a totalitarian regime that seeks to become, and
is actually conceived of as the absolute, unlimited, absorbing

'

power of the State.
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The Church may continue to exist and func-

tion only in the consciousness of the faithful without any
institutional structure.

Yet, as long as the faithful maintain

a consciousness of its autonomy and power, it continues to
exert an ethico-social limitation on the power of the State.
Also, this process of the dualistic polarization of forces
and the formation of a diarchy must not be interpreted as con-

sisting in a linear movement; neither is it contemporaneous in
all the branches of social life, nor is its pattern rigorously
fixed.

It may happen that unification would precede the diar-

chy or that a diarchy would subsist during the process of dis1'

integration.

"Tb.ere may be periods in which the consciousness

of power has not awakened or bas not fully found its orientation
in the two dualistic terms.

There may then be a prolonged

lethargy, or else disorderly and convulsive agitations." (I.L.

253; M. 99)

The polarization of forces and the formation of a

diarchy occurs in that sphere of social life and over that area

of concern that sufficiently moves the collective consciousness
to act on it.

Generally, the dualizing forces arise out of the

existing social institutions and struggle within the framework
of these institutions, although this is not always the case.
New social organizations may take shape by extraneous forces
which assume the aspects of a reforming and liberating current.
The Reformation and French Revolution provide historical exam-

ples of this phenomenon.

Once the diarchic powers are formed,

they must keep pace with the orientation and needs of the collective consciousness.

"Otherwise there will arise a third force

1'
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in opposition to them which, creating a new duality, will prepare the advent of another power." (I.L. 251)
The tendency towards unification takes on the character
of an irrepressible, powerful drive in the diarchy, because
npower by its nature is a unifying force." (C. &.

s.

560)

.&ich

of the two powers tries to unify in itself the other diarchic
power.

But this attempt is always only partially and temporar-

ily successful.

It may give rise to cooperative action on the

part of the two powers, or result in a bitter struggle for
control.

What generally occurs, in either case, whether it is

collaboration or conflict, is a gradation of powers.

"In these

various stages, the unification often comes about in a practical fashion, now through one, now through the other of the two
diarchic centers, now in legal form, now in ethical form, now
on the political plane, now on the religious or social one."
(I.I.J. 252)

It may happen that a given diarcby collapses, through a
variety of reasons.

Another one will rise in its place, either

directly through another polarizing of forces, or indirectly
and in another form when there is such a crisis of power that
the entire power structure of a social complexus disintegrates,
dissolving into a semi-anarchic pluralistic state of social
forces.

These in their turn will develop other effective dual-

ities, creating new diarchies with their own unifying tendency.
But in whatever way the unifying tendency manifests itself,
and whatever its outcome, the diarchy is never completely sup-

pressed.

"In history. we find neither the pure suppression of

the diarchic antagonist, nor an ironic immobility in cooperation.

~
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On the contrary, what happens is that the victor undergoes a
dichotomy, or the vanquished regains strength, or a third current supervenes when the diarchy has collapsed. (I.L. 256)
Even the modern tyrannies of the right or the left fail to
achieve a definitive unification of the social powers.

Even in

the most rigorous and oppressive of such regimes there are
1nterior forces of opposition at work that produce margins of
evasion and resistance to the attempted unification of the power
structure •

.

We say that the attempt is made to cancel this polarization because actually it is impossible to do so ••••
What happens in the totalitarian State cannot be more
than a phase of reaction, which will last as long as
the outward movements that accompany it withstand internal criticism and the expenditure of the centralizing forces, and as long as the successes which excite
the popular imagination have not shown their vanity or
a cost in excess of social capacity. The passage from
the totalitarian State to normality may come either by
an evolution or in a catastrophic manner, but it can
never fail, whatever the conditions in which a modern
totalitarian State has come into being. (I.L. 189)
Whatever the nature of these forces, whether they are moral and
religious, or whether they are intellectual, they diminish the
ethical, social and political effects of such regimes, stir up
healthy reactions and keep alive a current of .opposition that
sooner or later will regain a social and political efficacy.
The Middle Ages is oftentimes presented as an example or an

historical period ot social unification, in which Western civilization was unified into the politico-ecclesiastical unity of
Christendom.

Sturzo points out that in actual fact there was

not complete unification on any level of society, whether it be
ecclesiastical, political, social, moral, or juridical unity.
(M. 101)
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Another factor which must be mentioned that is involved in
the transition of the social forces from a chaotic pluralistic

state to its dualistic polarization and diarchio crystallization is the process of mediation.

At each stage of transition

there is a mediating element functioning that actually effects
the transition.

This mediating element is one of the social

currents, which may be or become a member of the duality or
diarchy.

In the process of the diarchic crystallization of a

duality, which we described above, it is the mystical current
that is the mediator.

Once a diarchy is formed, the mediator

will usually be that current of protest or renewal arising
from within either one of the diarchic powers or outside

or

them.

It will either just stir up the two powers or cause a shift in
the balance of power and then lose its efficacy, or replace the
one which is absorbed by the other in a power struggle or
supplant one of them 9 or bring about a complete collapse of the
diarchy.

In all of these possibilities the essential fact to

keep in mind, so far as Sturzo•s theory is concerned. is that

"the mediating element cannot be considered as a third, coexisting factor that will remain such, forming a permanent triad ••••
It is always a mode ot transition from one combination of the

prevailing social forces to another." (I.L. 256-?)

I

This aspect of the mediating element in the social process
is extremely important in Sturzo•s theory on the diarchy of
Church and State.

I

As opposed to Sturzo's theory, some inter-

pret the movement of Western civilization in terms

or

focal points of power: State, Church, and People.

This inter-

three

pretation gives the impression that the Church and State are

i94.
themselves substantive principles of power, independent of the
citizens and faithful that compose them.

This, of course, runs

directly counter to Sturzo's theory in which the social forms
are the outcome and objectivation of the projection of the
individual person.

The widest dimensions of this projection

are covered by the diarchy of Church and State.

Therefore,

in accord with this basic thesis ot Sturzo's social theory,
the people cannot be considered as "a third force between State
and Church, tor we cannot conceive of either State or Church

without people, that is, of a State without subjects and a
Church without faithful.

Nor can the people act, as such,

without either resting on a social structure or creating a fresh
one." (I.L. 257)
It is in his historical and sociological research on the
relations between Church and State that Sturzo derives much of
the concrete historical and experimental data in the formulation
of his theory of diarcby.

At the same time it is in this area

that he makes the most thorough and significant application of
his theory, as the one most in keeping with the reality of the
socio-historical process.

The State and Church, ever since the

appearance of Christianity, constitute a permanent diarchy in
the socio-historical process.

For the Church is the positive

actuation of Christianity and the entry of Christianity into
the socio-historical process released within this process a
fundamental and indissoluble duality of forces.

It brought into

"the social-organic plane the dualism between the kingdom of
this world and the Kingdom of God, which is not of this world
yet is in the world; for the Church is a social organism,
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standing by itself, speaking in the name of God and as the
visible embodiment of Christianity through the ages." (T.L. 246)
Underlying the experience of Western civilization lies the
admonition: "Render unto Caesar the things that; are Caesar's
and unto God the things that are God's."

By the very fact of

its existence as a religion which is based on personal oonsoiousness and which becomes concretized as an autonomous and independent social form. the Church, Christianity limits the power
of the State and in turn has its own social power limited by
the State.

Whatever form the relations between Church and State

take on the juridico-political plane, and whether society tends
to be unified now in the Church, as in the Middle Ages, now in
the State, as in modern times, this mutual limitation of powers
persists.

For the Church-State diarchy has roots extending to

a level deeper than that or politico-legal bonds: the individual
consciousness which projects itself simultaneously into the
Church and State and is the substantive principle of both.

"It

is not a case of political and juridical relations between two
entities, nor of an interference of content between the religious and political forms of sociality, but of the formation of
an individual consciousness which expresses itself simultaneously
in both Church and State, in accordance with the ends of the two
organizations.n (I.L. 260)
Therefore, even in those states where the Church has no
juridical personality and has lost all organizational autonomy.
or where there is a complete separation between Church and
State, the diarchic power of the Church remains operative in
that State through the individual consciousness.

As long as

~
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the faithful retain a consciousness of the autonomy and power
of the Church, this consciousness effects an ethico•social
limitation on the power of the State.

Even if the Church retains

onlY her spiritual means of exerting her influence within a
given State, nevei·theless, the moral efficacy of her diarohic

power remains intact.

"And no one can doubt that such effi-

cacy has social and political effects." (C. & S. 548)
It consists in the individual diarchy which prevails,

in the persuasive power of consciences which carries
weight in the efficacy of the Christian citizen who
succeeds in bending the power of the State, or else
in opposing it in the name of Christian morality, that
is, in the name of an ethical principle that touches
collective life and which cannot be other than inward
and conducive to a State with a Christian civilization.

I

I

ii

(C. & S. 551)

The more active and effective this consciousness is, the more

efficacious is the diarchy.

Sturzo calls this type of diarchic

position of the Church "individualistu or "indirect" because the
diarchic power of the Church is expressed as a moral and religious power over its members as individuals, and not in an
authoritative and juridical form over the states. (C. & S. 54?;

T.L. 262; I.L. 26?)
There is between the diarchic powers of State and Church
a continuous and irreducible tension which is now latent, now
open, breaking out into violent conflict.

The significance of

this tension extends beyond the power structure of society,
because it reflects a fundamental tension within the individual
person, of whom the State and Church are dual projections.

The

conflict between State and Church signifies not merely a struggle between diarchic powers, but rather it more basically
Points to a permanent and irreducible opposition between two
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principles, the material and spiritual, "the imt'.lanent and the
transcendent, the naturalistic and the supernatural, with their
mutual influence and mutual strife, not formal but substantial,
taking place within our very consciousness." (C. & s.

p.P.I., Vol. I, 10?; I.L. 262)

556; cf.

These two principles reflect

tbe presence of Christianity in the socio-historical process
and, as projected into the State and Church, they generate a

permanent duality of forces in this process.
'Every duality tends towards

unificat~on

and the same law

applies to the duality released by Christianity in the dialectic of history.

But Christianity contains within itself a

unifying principle that is able to effect a unity that extends
beyond the limits of every social and political unification in
a personal and transcendental unity.
The very expression of the socio-historical process in these

1I
11.'

I.'

1:·1'

laws, rooted in and expressive of the tendency towards absolute
rationality, reveals that the social process ia not a dialectic
closed in on itself, exhausting its dynamism within itself in
a kind of cycle of blind forces without interior finality. (M.
14)

Rather, the socio-historical process reveals the urge of

individuals to transcend this very process in a personal and
transcendental unity.

But at the same time they reveal the fact

that without the introjection of a transcendental unifying
principle within these processes, not only would the !inalism
of these processes never be fulfilled, but there would be no
intrinsic meaning to the processes themselves in their very
actualization.

These laws point to the tact that the processes

of themselves do not have the means immanent to them to ever

'
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attain the ultimate fulfillment of their drive.

There would be

the "continuous immanent repetition of human activity without
resolution. 11 (T.L. 231)

But the fact is that these human pro-

cesses have been Christianized and, touched by the transforming
power of Christianity, they now contain within themselves the
power to transcend themselves and attain ultimate completion.
This transcendent element must be accounted for within
sturzo's theory of socio-personalism.

In fact, it can be said

that Sturzo's theory is an articulation of the plentitude of
personal existence, and it is this transcendent element that
makes manifest this plentitude.

CHAPI'ER IV

HISTORY: A DIALECTIC OF IMI1ANENCE-TRANSCENDENCE
Just as it is history, as the constitutive activity of
man that manifests the inner laws of man's associative nature--

laws which reveal that man in and of himself cannot effect a
totalizing and conclusive pacification of the tendencies that
give rise to the laws--so is it history and history alone that
reveals the presence of a personal, transcendent, unifying
principle within the historical process.

Therefore, not only

is Sturzo's theory of history the foundation of all his thought,
but it is also the culminating point of his thought wherein he
works out and brings together the implications o! his integral
social theory in all of its aspects.
It is in the long introduction to his major work, The Inner
Laws of Societz, that Sturzo initially describes the historicist
system that is the matrix of his social theory.

In his presen-

tation, he makes it clear that his aim is to base his theory
on an open-ended historicism that is able to account for both
transcendent and immanent factors within the historical process,
to preserve their intrinsic unity within a single process, and
yet uphold the substantive reality or each.

In this way he

sharply distinguishes his historicist system from both an immanentistic theory which a priori rejects the possibility of
any transcendent factor in history and any transcendental theory
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either undercuts the reality of the immanent factors or

subordinates them to transcendent factors, or else dismisses
the notion of historicism altogether as being immanentistic

b1 definition. 1

Sturzo's theory, which he does not hesitate

to term "historicism," is, by contrast, immanent-transcendent.
Be defines his historicism as

0

the systematic conception of

history as human process, realized by immanent forces, unified

in rationality, yet moving from a transcendental and absolute
principle towards a transcendental and absolute end." (I.L. xxx)
The first task in elucidating the full meaning of this

definition, its place and implications within Sturzo's overall
theory, and the consequences that follow from it, is to determine the meaning of history within Sturzo's system.

Sturzo

begins his own exposition with a clarification of the different
meanings that can be attached to the term "history,. by delineating its various meanings which refer to the basic idea of human
process.

These are:

1) history as the sequence o! events;
2) history as the rational systematization or remembered

events;
3) history as the recollection

or

the collective past or

a particular human group. (I.L. xxvi)
The second meaning is the basic denotation or the term from
which the first and third are derived.

Therefore, it is more

precise to use the adjective "historical'' when referring to the
first and third meanings, signifying in the first case, an

1 cr. Sturzo, "Historical Sociology," p. 332; "History and

Philosophy," p. 55.

~
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historical process, and in the third, historical consciousness.
This provides a clue as to how the three meanings are unified.

In distinguishing these denotations of the term "history 9 "

sturzo does not mislead one into thinking that the factors they

Iii'I
!,

refer to are, just because they are separable, in reality separated.

They are in fact inseparably united.

This is an extremely

iJDportant point and calls for a careful analysis because the
three meanings are in fact expressive of the dimensions of the
synthesizing process or rational consciousness and so become
concretely uni!ied "in thought, which is the rationality of
action; in action, which is the realization of thought, and in
consciousness, taken as the presence of rationality and activity
to themselves. '' (I. L. xxix)

As we have seen, this process and

its unity is absolutely fundamental to Sturzo's theory and an
analysis of his treatment of it from the perspective of history
will reveal both another.facet of it and the convergence ot his
insights into a coherent theory.
Of the three meanings of history it is in the second meanII

ing that they are ullfied.

The first, the process of events, is

l

I

~

I

the material element of history and actually becomes history
only as it undergoes a rational systematization.

The key word

in this first meaning of history as "the course of events" is
''II

"events."

I•

Sturzo is using this term with the same pregnant

111

significance that John Dewey does in Experience and Nature.
Notice also that Sturzo says "the course" and not simply "a
course" of events.

Human happenings are history not simply

because they are external occurrences but because they are
occurrences-animated-by-thought, that is, events.

History is

I

'
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not made up of a bli.nd flow of happenings but rather consists
in a clear-sighted and ordered flow of rational acts, or events
--clear-sighted and ordered to the extent that the acts are
rational; acts that are the incarnation of ideas and ideals.

"No historical fact is a purely external matter; facts have
tor their soul that element or rationality which men, acting
and reacting in the external world that surrounds them, have
put into the facts as a reflection ot that consciousness which
their actions have actualized." 2 "Every material datum of history resolves itself into a complex of thoughts, sentiments and
purposes •••• "3

For the processive and living reality of human

activity, which, once accomplished, becomes the material element
of history, to maintain the impact of its concretized rationality and not to petrify as a fossilized residue ot the past,
it ''must undergo a spiritual elaboration through the convergent
and divergent thought and feeling of a group of persons, and
penetrate not only into their memory but into their convictions
and sentiments." (I.L. xxvii-xxviii)

It is only in this trans-

formation effected through consciousness that past events, as
reconstructed by consciousness and thereby revitalized, live
on in the present.

In other words, they are historicized to

the extent that they enter into and constitute the on-going
awareness of a given historical consciousness.
2 sturzo, "The Influence of Social Facts on Ethical Conceptions," p. 110; ct. "Theory of Knowledge in Neo-Synthetism,"
p. 290.
3sturzo, "History and Philosophy," p. 60.

~
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In this way, then, the first meaning of history as "the
course of events" is intrinsically connected with the third
•eaning of history as the consciousness of the past as well as
being a derivative or the second and essential meaning.

The

third meaning that Sturzo gives for history flows from the second
as expressive not only of the recalling and reconstruction ot
events but also of their inner and continued efficacy among
determined groups in building the present and directing the
future.

The significance of this understanding of historical

consciousness will become clearer with an explication of the
fundamental meaning of history.

We can see, then, the inter-

twining connection between the three meanings, rooted in the
basic denotation, the rational systematization of remembered
events.

An

amplification and explanation or what Sturzo means

by this will reveal a further unification

or

these meanings and

draw us into the core of his historicism.
At first sight; in view of Sturzo's stress on the historicity of human reality, it would seem logical that the first
meaning of history as simply the historical process would be the
basic meaning of history for Sturzo, because the historical
process is for him that through and by which man defines his
own being.

Thus, reduced to its simplest significance, history

is nothing other than simply man's coming to be.

It is expres-

sive of the total, processive, multidimensional reality of human
existence.

As Sturzo reiterates throughout his writings,

"h:tstory is not extraneous to our 11.f'e ••• it
4 sturzo t

T.L. 232.

11

!!. our li!e. 114

Historicist Sociology' If p. 334;

er. s.P.

8 and

~
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Robert Pollock, in analyzing Sturzo's theory, remarks that
bistory is "a manifestation, always in becoming, of an interior
reality, that of man himself. 115 In pointing to "an interior
reality" Pollock indicates precisely why the historical process itself is not the primary designation ot the term "history"

tor Sturzo.

Sturzo himself states, "history is not to be con-

founded with human process, but brings its experiences into a
rational system." (I.L. xxix)

It is the interior dimension of

man's being that is the locus for his most significant and
specifying feature, rationality.

As a rational being man is

distinguished from non-rational creatures not only in terms of
his relationship with the rest of reality, but also and more
specifically in his relationship to himself.

Not only is his

surrounding reality present to him, but he himself stands in
his own presence.

The locus for man's own being stands at the

interface of this twofold directionality ot his rational consciousness, projecting outward and turning inward, in its drive
for realization and completion.

As we saw earlier in develop-

ing Sturzo's notion of the person, it is this thrust of the
individualized rationality toward the plenitude of its being in
absolute rationality that defines man's coming to be.

Also,

since this act which is man's being never exhausts the power
that generates it, it never is, but ceaselessly becomes.

It

is this incommensurability of the human spirit with itself, in
seeking itself, that is the generative principle
process.

or

history as

Since history is expressive of the coming-to-be of

5Pollock, "L'uomo nella sooieta e nella storia, '' p. 225.
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•an•s interior reality, his rational consciousness, the fact
tnat this interior reality is rational means that the full significance of the term "history" does not lie in just designat-

ing the actual becoming of individualized rationality, but also
must include the presence of rational consciousness to its own
becoming.

By his reason, man is aware of outward reality and inward consciousness, both of which are formed out ot

the accumulation of a past that has realized itself
in them. The connection between these two aspects or
being, outward reality and inward consciousness, is so
close that the more we know of reality which reveals
itself as the persistence of the past in the present,
the more we deepen our own inner being, which is, as
it were, rooted in a past liVing within us and yet
mysteriously remote. (S.P. 10)
It is the orientation of his theory around the key concept

of rationality that underlies Sturzo's insistence that it is
not the simple flow of the human process that constitutes history, but rather the
The

~ational

systematization

or

that process.

individual concrete rationality that is the constitutive

principle of man does not, in realizing itself, produce simply
a series of external facts, it produces itself.

And as spirit,

the measure of its own reality is precisely the extent to which

it is present to itself.

Therefore, in its most profound signi-

ficance, history is man's presence to himself.

In this under-

standing of history, then, the extent to which man is ignorant
of the past, to that extent is man absent from himself.

And

he will be absent from himself not only in the existential
concreteness of his present existence, but also in the ideality
of his nature.

"Actually, we should never be able to understand

our own reality if we could not relate it to the spiritual greatness which mankind has achieved in the course of history." (T.L.
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Two significant themes in Sturzo•s position are indicated
in this passage.

One is that although history ultimately re-

solves itself into the individual person as the sole substantive principle of history, the making of history is the doing
of collective consciousness.

The other theme is the contempor-

i i~
I

aneity of the three moments of the temporal process, past, present, and future in a multidimensional present.
The self-awareness that history gives rise to is not that
of the isolated individual self, but of the self in the fullness
of all its dimensions, or, in other words, of the person.

Thus,

it is not the truncated awareness characteristic of egocentricity, which is a denial of the self in its personhood, but
rather is the open-ended awareness of the social self, which is
the enrichment and enlargement of the self in its personhood.
It is this expansion of the self into solidarity with the collectivity that history in the fullness of its meaning gives us.
It must not be forgotten that this expansion o! the self into
the collectivity is not a merging of the self with the collectivity, but the further deepening and enrichment of each in the
differentiation-in-synthesis dialectic at work between them.

I

I

,1

In substance, history is consciousness of our own being
and of our own continuity--a continuity not merely individual but collective, so that we feel ourselves parts
of a whole, living elements in a life surpassing the
individual, common sharers in something that will continue when we are no more ••• We feel that the more our
knowledge widens and our feelings deepen, the greater
the enrichment of our being with what was not ours and
has become ours. Consciousness of our own being transforms itself into consciousness of human solidarity and
of spiritual co.mm.union. This forms in us a present that
may repeat itself indefinitely in our spirit, in a striving toward a continuity that will have no end. (S.P. 4-5)
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It may initially appear inconsistent for Sturzo to insist
on the individual person as the animating principle of history
and at the same time equally insist on it being a tact of col1ective consciousness.

But in view of his theory of socio-

personalism it is not.

In the intrinsic, reciprocating inter-

dependence between the individual person and society that is
constitutive of each and both together, just as the individual
begins to exist in his personhood in the transcending of himself,
so that his very individuality as a person is intrinsically
social, so it is in this
gins.

11

moment of sociality" that history be-

"For ours is not an isolated, narrowly individual life,

but an associated life, that is, a life by nature sociological.

Our individual continuity is intrinsically social." (S.P. 3)
Since the ontological structure of the individual person incorporates sociality within itself, historical reality, as the
processive realization of that structure, is itself intrinsically social. 6 Consequently, the historicization of the material elements of history, human events, is a process engaging
collective consciousness.

Sturzo's statement on this social

character of historicization deserves to be quoted in full.
The historical datum, even if expressed by a single
individual, in order to be historical must find its
repercussions in an ever-widening circle of indiv1duals and assume a collective character. The historical
datum becomes a social element, inasmuch as either
actually or as symbol or attribution it represents
that human experience and activity which once posited, continues to be experienced and reexperienced by
a group in its further process. Every happening is
in itself cap·able of being historioized, but such
historicization is the doing ot the collective consciousness. The historicization of a happening will

6
Notes

cr. Sturzo • "History and Philosophy,"
on the Problem of Education," p. 113.

pp. 55-56; "Some

,'11!
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last the longer, the deeper the repercussion of the fact
in the collective consciousness and the wider the circle
of those who feel its effects. (I.L. xxviii)

The theoretical basis for Sturzo•s position expressed in
this passage lies in his theory on the projection of rational-

itY as the constitutive activity of the person.?

The indivi-

dualized principle of rationality, which is the essential principle of man, achieves reality only by being incarnated within

the world through the mutuality of thought and action.

The

modes of this fundamental drive of rationality for expression

are variable and innumerable, but they all together make up the
process we call history.

But precisely because of the intrinsic

historicity of rationality as individualized within man, rationality as realized within the expressions or man remains immanent within these expressions only if they are incorporated
within the on-going realization of rationality. (I.L. 15)

To be historicized means to be caught up in the continuing
and processive becoming of rationality so as to become a part
of the present experience of man.

It is consciousness, and more

specifically, collective consciousness that connects the past
to the present.

It is well to recall here that collective

consciousness for Sturzo does not indicate a reified entity
substantively independent of those individual consciousnesses
that go together to make it up.

......

Rather, it is the consciousness

of each member of a given group which is reflected in the consciousness of others in a mutual process of determining and
realizing a common end. (M. 19)
?see Chapter I, pp. 61 ff.

Historical consciousness, then,
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is of its very nature collective consciousness and vice versa.
Here, in the integral realism of Sturzo's theory, we find a
dovetailing of perspectives.

Both historical and oollective

consciousness are rooted in and expressive ot the projection

ot rationality, with the first giving emphasis to the intrinsic
temporality of the projection and the second denoting its intrinsic social character.
It is significant to note that the specific element in the

trend to rationality that actually gives rise to both an historical and collective consciousness together is the emergence on
the social level of a collective finalism that unities the convergent activity of associated efforts "in a higher affirmation

of collective life."
The history, written or oral, which we know as such is
made up of events that concern not this or that family
or economic craft or trade group or class or tribe, as
groups living their own particular life, but that part
of the population, however it may be grouped or organized,
which has gained consciousness of its personality over
and above domestic and economic contingencies, in a higher
affirmation of collective life. It is the transcendent
and unifying personality that history alone reveals to
us. 'What has been already noted as collective purpose,
as spirit of achievement, as welfare to be won, is here
presented from another angle, as the transcendence of
the social nuclei through the development ot the collective consciousness. When this transcendence begins,
history begins •••• (T.L. 205)

I

l
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The importance of this lies in the implications that follow from
it in Sturzo•s historicism,

With his view of history as the

processive emergence of rationality it is natural that finality
should weigh heavily in his theory.

way

What is noteworthy is the

in which he handles this finality.

As will be further

explicated, it is an open-ended finality that leaves the directionality, possibilities and scope for the future completely

:i
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open•

In terms of the concreteness o! Sturzo's thought it

should be noted that it is more precise to speak of open-ended

finalities rather than finality in the singular, because Sturzo
does not allow for a single finality in the concrete that would

encompass all of mankind.

A single concrete finality would

give rise to a universal history of mankind, which Sturzo rejects.
"There is no true universal history; but only particular histories of different social groups.

What are called universal

histories are nothing more than collections of particular his-

tories, combined together from a given angle, which can never
unify them •••• Every history indicates the consciousness of a
group in the concrete." (I.L. 21)

Sturzo's rejection of the

universal history relates to his denial of the possibility of

a universal society, which we dealt with earlier. 8

A

single

finality would undercut the open-ended possibilities of history
and defuse the dynamism of the historical process which is
charged by the myriad diversities of these possibilities.
This view of finality and its implications gives to Sturzo's
theory a definite futuristic orientation.

It also allows tor

both the genuine emergence of completely new forms of human

expression in the present and the inexhaustibility

or

which makes for an open, never ending systematization
past.

the past

or

the

However, these features of Sturzo's theory are dependent

upon his understanding of the contemporaneity of the past,
present and future.
The contemporaneity of the temporal moments of history is

8 see Chapter II. p. 134.
ii
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iJlplicit in the description or history as the rational systematization of remembered events.

The clue to these implications

is contained in two further statements Sturzo makes about historY in discussing the convertibility of history and philosophy.
"History is the rationality of existing reality, systematized
according to the general laws of human thought and action."

or

again, history is human activity "systematizing reality in

accordance with ideas." (I.L. xxix)

These statements are signi-

ficant because they clearly indicate two important features of
history that point to the synthesis of the moments of time.
The first of these features is that the doing of history
is not an academic and theoretical enterprise, but is rather

a practical and concrete endeavor that has to do with life itself, the systematizing, ordering, or, in other words• the giving

ot shape to reality.

When Sturzo speaks of "systematizing"

reality he is not referring to the formulation of a theoretical
system about reality, but the actual "making" of reality, the
rationalizing or "historieizing" of it.

The term

11

systematiza-

tion, 11 as Sturzo uses it here, must be interpreted in light of
one

or

the basic meanings he gives to rationality: thought it-

self inasmuch as it is systematic. (I.L. xxxvii)

This is indi-

cated in the above quotations by the fact that Sturzo first
states, "history is the rationality of existing reality, ••• "
and then, a few lines later, saying it is hum.an activity "syste-

matizing reality •••• "

In other words, Sturzo's use of the term

"systematization" does not refer to any purely theoretical
Process of "system" building in the classical meaning of the
term.

Rather, he is using it in reference to the essential
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character of thought as rational, that is, as ordered.
something is to systematize it.

To know

To systematize something is

to make it rational, that is, to order or structure it by bringing it within the light, or structure, of rationality.

In this

way man "makes it his own" and it, in turn, is "hiatoricized."
"The non-human, when it is made human, is 'hietorized'; it
becomes history.

The discovery of electricity by the effort of

human science transported that natural force into the common
life of man.

Electricity entered the stream of history; that

is, it became all that man has been able to make of it.

And

thus with all discoveries." (S.P. 8)
The second aspect of history, which follows from the first

and is also indicated by these statements is that the "Archimedian" or reference point for this systematization is the concrete
present and not the past.

In the light of these quotations,

then, we see not only that the doing of history, i.e., ttthe
rational systematization," is a present activity, but also that
the subject matter of history, i.e. "remembered events," is
not the past as past, but the past as present.

For Sturzo

directly relates history to "the rationality of existing reality"
which "reveals itself as the persistence of' the past in the
present." (S.P. 10)

Sturzo exhibits the same perspective on

reality, and history, in his statement that "there is no living
reality which is not at once concreteness and process, that is,
history." (I.L. xi)

Now, the "concreteness and process" of liv-

ing reality, referred to in the second quotation carries the
same meaning as "the persistence ot the past in the present."
Viewing the moments of time in terms of their reality, it is the
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present alone that exists.

And it is the continuation of the

past into the present, i.e. "process," that gives to the present
its structure, form or content, or to use Sturzo•s term, its
"concreteness."

Every moment of the process is reality inasmuch as it
is present. The past is merely the accumulation of
human experiences which give value to the present.
The present is therefore, the existence or coexistence
of beings; the past is the process which has brought
them to existence in the concreteness of their reality. (I.L. xxv)

I

I

! I

In order for the past to enter into and constitute the concreteness of the present it must be ordered to the present.
That is, the past is history and can only be history to the
extent that it participates in the concerns, needs and issues

of the present.

To the degree, then, that the past resolves

-itself into the present, to that degree it is historioized and
continues to exist.

H'What went before resolves itself into

what comes after, the present always being enriched by the past.
Hence, the past may be said to exist after its fashion in the
present, forming one with it in a kind of simultaneity." (S.P. 6)
The presentness of the past as history is indicated by
Sturzo when he refers to the subject matter of history as Hthose

events that are known,n (I.L. xxvi) because he states elsewhere
that "the past is, and is known, in so far as it is actualized
and conceived in the present. 1• (S.P. 10)

In interpreting Sturzo,

I prefer to use the tero. "remembered'' rather than simply "known"
to more clearly indicate the acknowledged pastness of the event
and yet its connection to the present.

It brings out more ex-

Plicitly the synthesis of the past with the present in history.

J

!~

'i'I
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}. "remembered" event is one which, although having occurred in
the past, remains tied to the present, whereby it is released
from the mere facticity of its pastness to share in the life of
the present.

This connection can be maintained in any number

of ways, either directly through traditions, written or oral
records, individual or collective memory, or indirectly through
related evidence that points to a given event as having occurred.
In any case, it is the presentness of the event that is important and that constitutes its historicity, not the particular
way this presentness is maintained.
Sturzo sums up these ideas by stating that history involves
"two things in synthesis: the reality of the past in the present,
and actual, present memory of the past." (S.P. 4)

The histor-

icity of its pastness as having occurred and the reality of
that pastness in the present.

It must be emphasized that Sturzo

views these two elements "in synthesis" so that from the perspective of his integral realism the categories of object, i.e.
"the reality of the past in the present," and subject, i.e.
"the actual, present memory of the past" are not adequate to
the synthesizing unity of this situation.

The synthesizing

factor in history, or more precisely, the historicizing factor
that renders the continuity of the temporal process always
present, is the inward synthesis of consciousness.
it is consciousness that constitutes the present.
then is nothing other than consciousness itself.

In fact,
"The present
Without this

there could be no present and no history, only the materiality
of crude facts that in themselves are neither consciousness nor
history." (S.P. 9)

I:
!
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It is here, :from the point of view of the present as consciousness, that the theoretical basis and full force of the
contemporaneity of the past, present and future come out.
have already seen that time is the rhythm

or

We

the inner movement

of consciousness, as "the presence of' rationality and activity
to themselves," toward realization and ooncretization.9

Within

the inward synthesis of consciousness, the moments that mark
this rhythm are not separate and autonomous, but intrinsically
imply each other in a specific order.

It is precisely in the

contemporaneity of these moments that consciousness generates
its own presence to itself, which constitutes its reality as
spirit.

"Insofar as men live simultaneously these three moments

of their existence, in 'Unceasing process, insofar have they
consciousness of their own reality." (I.L. xxvi)

It is the

living synthesis of the present, as consciousness, that the bond
between these moments is forged.

"Only the present exists,

that in which the consciousness of each may feel the throb of
the life accumulated through the ages and may divine the throb
that will continue in the future.

There is nothing else, as

living consciousness, than the temporal present." (T.L. 224)

The actual movement of rationality toward realization constitutes the historical present that distinguishes the human
process from the process of nature on the one hand, and from the
eternal "now" of infinite consciousness on the other hand.

The

process of nature is simply a uniform sequence of natural occurrences made up of a series of neutral "now•s."

9see Chapter I, pp. 100-101.

Although each
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neutral "now'' may be distinguished from 1 ts "before" and "after,"
each is qualitatively indifferent to its "before" and "after."
It opens out to neither one in its presentness. (I.L. xxvi)
'?he eternal "now" of infinite consciousness is one of pure actue.li ty, a total and simultaneous pres.ent, embracing within itself
the absolute immediacy of its complete presence to itself. (S.P.
6)

The historical present arising out of the successive and

always partial realization of rational consciousness is multidimensional, taking up within itself both its past as its constitutive and sustaining element and the future as its inherent
drive tor further realization.

We must examine more carefully

the synthesis of these moments within consciousness in the constitutive activity

or

the person.

History, in Sturzo•s view, is the actual becoming ot the
constitutive principle of the human person, his rational consciousness.

It is the concrete, processive occurrence of the

projection of rationality in the mutuality of thought and action.
As the immanent principle of history, rationality is not in any
way extraneous to the historical process, but is the process
itself in both the multiplicity of forms it gives rise to and
the full range of its movement.

Since the reality of rational

consciousness as spirit and subject is commensurate with its
presence to itself, it is precisely in rendering present to itself its own becoming that it attains the fulness of its reality.
Thus, the reality of rationality will be commensurate-with the
totality of its becoming in the synthesis of its past and present. and future too, because, as we have already seen, the
1

self-generative dynamism of rationality tor realization, in its

1

.

!.1·
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opening out onto the infinite, is never commensurate with the
concrete forms in which it expresses and, in expressing, realizes itself.

Its present actuality, then, contains within

itself its future as the efficacious beginning of further
realization.
And the future world? And the after life? For human
thought and activity these two constitute a present,
The significance of the future for a man depends on
just how far he feels the effective reality of that
future within himself, that is, on how far he believes
and feels his existence to be projected into the tuture •••• The future therefore finds realization in the
present as effective beginning. Otherwise it would
not exist for man; it exists only in so far as it is
transformed into thought and activity, that is, in so
far as it becomes for us a present. Only then can we
achieve it. The man without faith in himself, the
man who does not think, has no future; fo~ the future
is in ourselves. (S.P. 10-11; cf. also T.L. 215, I.L.
xxv)

What the multidimensional present of human consciousness
is expressive of is the dialectical tension between the negative

and positive moments of the process of rationality.lo

This

tension is ontologically grounded in the finitude of rational
consciousness and it is this finitude that gives rise to the
factors in the becoming of rationality that makes the past a
necessary, integral dimension of its present.

These factors

are the processive, transitive and material features of human
activity through which rationality is realized.

The negative

aspect of these factors is related to the tact that rationality
is entirely immanent to its own becoming; and these features of
human activity are disruptive of that immanence, because each
cuts across that immediacy ot presence through which that

10see Chapter I. pp. 9?-100.

~
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iJnI11anence is preserved.
Since rationality can realize itself only through a succession of acts, a continuity must be maintained in such a way
that its accumulated achievement in which it is expressed will
be resolved into, thereby constituting and enriching, what comes

after.

Due to the fact that rationality is incarnated within

a body to form a single personal principle, it can therefore
realize itself only in dialectic with material reality, within
which it is concretized.

Given the transitive character of the

activity that is necessary to transform material reality into
the embodiment of rationality and the material character of this
objectification, the immanence of rationality is precariously
relational and transitory.

The material features of embodied

rationality can maintain their existence independently ot the
activity that produced them.
dimension.

But not its spiritual, or rational,

If these products of human activity are to remain

expressive of the spirit that produced them, their lifeline to
that spirit must remain intact.

In other words, concretized

rationality must be continually reexperienced so as to maintain
its continuous existence and development.

The orientation of rationality in maintaining this contact
with its becoming is not towards the past as given, but the
present.
To attain this spiritual continuity we ourselves need
to be initiated into a sure grasp of the present in
which we live and in which the whole of the historical
past is reconcentrated and exists as its fruit ••• , so
that we can ask of the present the title-deeds of its
reality, the meaning or its existence, and bid it unveil
to us its mysterious face. The answer, if it is entire
cannot but illuminate the whole of history •••• (T.L. 229)
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Jiistorical consciousness, then, is not so much directed toward
the systematizing of the past, as it is toward the synthesizing

of the present with the past and future.
The act of penetrating into the past by which the encrustations of age are scraped off the achievements of rationality
to restore and renew the light of rationality within them is
not one of simple recall or reproduction,

It is a constructive

aet, bringing about a deeper and more complex realization of
rationality.

There are two reasons for this: first, because

the original impulse of rationality is not immediately given in
its objectification; and second, because the reference point of
this recovery of the past is the present, namely, the reality
that forms the present actualization ot rationality.

Therefore,

although the form of rationality already objectified may appear
fixed and static, the light

or

rationality refracted from the

present rather than the past will reveal another facet of its
content.

This will at the same time deepen the present content

of rationality as the well-springs of its own vitality are tapped.
Suoh contact with the past is not a repetition or a
copying; it is a rebirth, a creation of the spirit
reintegrating what others produced under different
circumstances--a rebirth which at a given historical
moment responds to the need of the collective consciousness. (T.L. 208)
This passage points to the problem of what makes the past
present.

To state the problem more fullyi

In the process of

reconstructing the past, through which man makes his own being
present to himself, historical consciousness clearly does not
integrate into the present every event and tact o! the past.
On the part of past events and facts, what is there that some
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are historicized, that is, live on in the present, while others
tall into oblivion, either temporarily or possibly permanently?

on

the part of historical consciousness, what criterion is at

work to distinguish between them?
tion here is not

The problem under considera-

!!.2:!! a past event or tact is historioized--this

occurs through collective consciousness--but whz one and not
another.
not?

What makes one fact historically relevant and another

Clearly, for Sturzo, whatever enters into the matrix of

the concrete living present, or consciousness, is historicized.
"Inasmuch as it is historicized, it is telt in the historical
consciousness of the time." (I.L. xxviii)

But just as clearly,

there is for him no effective practical criterion operative at
the level of reflective consciousness to determine in any given
moment exactly what

or

the past is truly historicized, or crea-

tively synthesized with the present, and what remains a residue
of the past and possibly an obstacle to the possibilities of the
present.

\./hat facts are not directly or explicitly operative

within consciousness, whether individual or collective, at a
given stage in history, does not exclude the possibility ot
their having "practical effects in the formation of the concrete
and processive reality, for in human consciousness everything
has its repercussions as language, custom, tradition, institutions, religion, art and so on, in continual becoming." (I.L.
xxviii)

The basis for Sturzo's position here is the intrinsic

socialization of consciousness in its origins and the on-going
dialectic between consciousness and every torm of its objectifications whereby from these latter, the products of consciousness,
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there is in turn a feedback into the continual structuralization

or
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consciousness.

Or as Sturzo puts it, they "often form

strata in the consciousness

or

1\

associated members." (I.L. 4)
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In other words, these "strata" are located within the prereflective level ot consciousness, which in turn arises out of and is
grounded in the infrastructures of a given collective consciousness.
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Sturzo therefore draws the following conclusion:

It is difficult to take a true inventory of what lives
and what dies, so closely is all that forms the present
knit with a long historical continuity. If we go back
and back into the furthest-known centuries, we find indelible traces of the reality living and throbbing today.
It is our way of understanding the past of our briet
personal experience that we think the greater part of
it is dead. We forget much. or think we have forgotten,
because much of our past is no longer actual to our
memory. And yet that past is so transformed into our
present, so actual and so intimately belonging to us,
that it cannot be distinguished from what we are today.
(S.P. 2-3)
What historical consciousness does become aware of in its reconstruction of the past will depend on its practical needs, interests, and emotional and cognitive orientations of the present.

(I.L. 4; S.P. 3)
The other side

or

this question of the rebirth of the past

in the present is that status of what is not in accord with the
present state and needs of consciousness.

This issue revolves

around the fact that the crystallizations of rationality, once
formed through human activity. acquire a reality of their own
distinct from the original impulse of rationality that gave
shape to them.

They thus tend to persist within the flow of

history whether they remain expressive of rationality in its
historically advanced forms or not.

In view of this fact,

there are two possible theoretical paradigmatic situations

I '
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cover the relationship

collective consciousness.

or

these persisting residues to a

There is, first of all, the situation

in wbich a collective consciousness in no sense remains in vital

contact with these residues and so either implicitly, on the
operative level, or explicitly, on the reflective level,
acknowledges that they are no longer consonant with its present
1mpulse and form of rationality.

Then there is the situation

in which, of the differing currents of thought within any
given collective consciousness, some are directed toward maintaining or reasserting these persisting residues, even though,
or more accurately, because the present direction of collective
consciousness is moving ttaway from 0 or, from the perspective
of other currents, "beyond" the values of rationality contained
in these residues.

This is a general situation within any

active, complex collective consciousness and is another aspect

of Sturzo's theory of the polarization of social forces into a
duality of organizational and mystical ourrents. 11

In regard

to this matter of historical residues, it can often be a polarizing issue between the two

cur~ents,

generating a tension that

will vary in intensity according to the value assigned to the
residue and the organized vigor of the two currents.
In both instances it must not be thought that the residues
themselves, in whatever form they are, are inert and passively
slip into oblivion.

No, even when detached from the lifeline

of rationality, they remain active as conditioning factors,
determining the course and mode of the further realization of

11 see Chapter III, PP• 179-185.

~
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rationality.

As with all conditioning factors of human acti-

vity, the historical conditioning ot these residues can function
as either impulse or check to either tac111tate or hinder,
spur-on or retard the continuing process of rationality.

In

either case, by reason of his fundamental view that the historical process is the becoming of rationality and therefore intrin-

sically tree, Sturzo emphasizes that the conditioning is never
These residues fall within the setting of all
conditioning, which is necessary for all human activity. 12 They
deterministic.

do not lessen the autonomy of man, who, as the individualized

principle of rationality, is the principle of history and always
remains a self-determining force.
Historians often call such antecedents causes. but they
are not true causes at all. There are no determinist
causes or our action outside ourselves; we are the cause
of our own activity. Every physical or moral reality
in existence and the mode of our apprehension of it, conditions our activity, helping or hindering it •• ,.Man
alone, therefore, with his mind and will, is the true
author of the historical process. (S.P. 8-9)13
This whole discussion of those forms of the past that are
revitalized in the present, as opposed to the residue which is
not, points to the ambiguous and complex character of the pastpresent relationship.

If at a given moment in history a higher

form of rationality is attained, in this enlightened state ot
collective consciousness aspects of the past which were formerly
held to be rational will now manifest themselves as the pseudorational.

Also, since the realization of rationality is often

partial and marked by deficiencies, even those historical forms
12 see Chapter I, pp. 65-68.

13To see what a recurring theme this is in Sturzo'a writings,

ct. also I.L. xix, 89-90, 220; C. & P. 18; T.L. 198-99; M. 63.
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that embody a genuine spark or rationality will in many instances have to be purified of these blemishes, or, more simply,
"updated•• in their historicization.

It is thus neither possi-

ble nor desirable to resolve the entire past into the present.
Not only if there has been a genuine growth of rationality,
but also to nourish it, the extirpation or the unauthentic
expressions of rationality, or aspects thereof, is as equally
important in the reconstruction or the past as the reintegration of its authentic expressions.

Since both kinds o! expres-

sions have followed together from the drive of rationality to
realize itself, the task of exorcising part ot its own becoming
is very seldom easily accomplished by collective consciousness
and is one calling for an effective and highly critical acumen
at work within it.

Thus, Sturzo's position on the relationship

of the present, or consciousness, to the past is neither revolutionary, insofar as this is not sufficiently discriminating
in its eradication of the past, nor progressive, since the movement or history is never linear, but reflectively critical.
Before concluding our treatment or the relationship between
the past and present in Sturzo's theory of history, it is important to point out another aspect of it that follows from what
,,

has already been explicated about it.

This is the unconditional

openness ot the past which makes the systematization of it
open-ended.

Many contemporary thinkers are insistent on the

unconditional openness of the future, being careful in the
development of their theories to preserve this openness and
categorically rejecting anything that may endanger it.

Sturzo's

!

theory allows !or the same view of the future, but he views the
past in the same way.
This is a corollary of the contemporaneity of the historical moments, and for several reasons.

In the first place, it

follows from the fact that in their contemporaneity the past,
present and future remain irreducible historical moments.
have seen

tha·~

We

their contemporaneity consists in the tact that

it is actual and processive consciousness that constitutes the

present, so that the inner synthesis

or

its actuality, the pre-

sent, takes up the past and future as the irreducible, positive
dimensions of that actuality.

Since the past and future are

irreducible dimensions for Sturzo, this means that in positing
their contemporaneity he does not mean they are absorbed into
the present.

Although they do exist only in the present. they

retain their own integrity which is in no sense restricted to
or exhausted in their actuality within the present.

Therefore,

when Sturzo states that ''past and future do not exist in themselves, but in the present," (I.L. xxv) he does not mean they
exist .......
as the present.

They exist as the past and as the future •

It is precisely this "real" or specifying dit!erentiation

or

the

past and future within the present actuality ot consciousness
that distinguishes the consciousness of finite temporal being
from that of infinite being.

The absorption of the past and

future into the present constitutes the

0

total and simultaneous

present, pure actuality" of intinite consciousness. {S.P. 6)
In regard to the relationship

or

the past to the present,

a similar situation holds as that between social facts and values
and the individual person.

In the latter instance we have seen

,,,,,
',,,
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that Sturzo explains the intrinsic dialecticity between society

and the person in terms of "a continuous succession of resolutions," setting up a reciprocating vital process in which the
reality of each is constituted together. 14 It should be observed that Sturzo uses the same term, "resolve," in describing
the actuality of the past in the present.

"~e

past resolves

itself into the present. and becomes present to us through that
of which we are conscious." (T.L. 215)

"What went betore

resolves itself into what comes after, the present always being
enriched by the past." (S.P. 6)

In using this term he is indi-

cating that the past, though actualized in the present, is not
dissolved into the present--just as society is not dissolved
into individual eonsciousness--but retains its specifying quality as the past.

And just as there are always remainders in

the process of sociological resolution, so in the historicization ot the past only a portion of the past is revitalized in
any given present, "and this never accurately and never completely, so that critical revision is continuous and necessary."

(I.L. xxvii)

As already indicated, this reconstruction varies

according to the present needs, interests and orientations of
consciousness.

Since these are always undergoing modification

and revision, so, too, does the interpretation and systematization of the past.

"Thus, history is always being made and re-

made, its material is always being elaborated and refashioned,
and it is always being tested by existing reality and its final1sm, ever reborn in the various phases ot human process." (I.L.
14see Chapter I, pp. 104-106.

XJCViii-xxix) 1 5
Another aspect of the contemporaneity of the historical
moments that makes for an open-ended and on-going reconstruction or the past is that the unconditional openness of history
in one direction, the future, opens it up in the other direction,
the past.

For within the synthesizing matrix of the present the

past is reciprocally linked to the future.

They are "recipro-

cally linked 11 in that the past is known and actualized in the
present from a position of openness to the future, the specific
directionality of which is in turn determined by the past.

A

knowledge of the past, then, can open up new possibilities for
the future.

Sturzo does not allow for a radical discontinuity

between past and future, such as would characterize a revolutionary stance toward the past, because both arise out ot and

are expressive of the tendency of rationality toward absolute
rationality.

It is precisely through the continuity estab-

lished within the synthesis of consciousness that the thlnlst
into the future is generated out of the achievements

or

the past

in the one movement toward absolute rationality.
It is also by reason ot the fact that the historical moments
are expressive of the becoming of rationality that the tuture
is the focal point of history, and the ultimate locus of its
meaning.

It is the frame of reference from which we understand

and evaluate the past and present.

Since it is a rational

process, it is only in the light of its overall finality that
the meaning of its particular events is made manifest.

Its

1 5ar. also "History and Philosophy," p. 48; I.L. xxvii.
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iater development unveils the hitherto unperceived connections
o£ the earlier events and thereby uncovers their meaning.

The

pull of this finality as felt within consciousness is what
constitutes the future.

"The human present, however, is not

something static and definitive; it is, on the contrary, dynamic.

It projects itself into the future, which presses on to

become present and lose itself in the past.

The dynamism

towards the future in human process translates itself into
£inalism ••• " (I.L. xxv; cf. also

s.P.

10-11; T.L. 215)

It is

the ever-receding temporal horizon of rationality's drive tor
completion that comprehends the entire span of its realizations
and provides the backdrop that reflects their meaning.

It is

"ever receding" because it stretches out to contours of absolute rationality, which is never attained within the confines
of the historical process.

If it were, this would transform

"the dynamism of human process into a rationalistic staticism
which, being against nature, is fundamentally irrational."
(I.L. 16)

This means that the meaning of the past is in turn
never closed off • 1 6

A.

16F.dward
T1ryakian has recently expressed a similar position: "The historian's fundamental endeavor is to make visible anew that present which once was visible but which tends
to become invisible once it is engulfed in historical time.
The historian, thus, may be properly called the discoverer of
the past. The act of historical discovery is one or meaningful perception •••• For the past to be exhausted as an object
would necessarily imply that the future is exhausted, that is,
that historical time would no longer have any possibilities of
becoming. The ultimate meaning of historical events, therefore,
can only be transhistorical, that is, it can only be perceived
after all historical possibilities have been actualized and
that can only be after there is no more history." "Socio-historical Phenomena: The Seen, the Unseen, the Foreseeable,"
mimeographed paper, prepared for a meeting of the American
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It is here in the linking of the past to the future through
the present that the range of Sturzo•s historicist system is
encompassed.
Therefore, when we wish to make a thorough study of the
elements of human activity, no matter trom what standpoint, while starting from the present. that is, from
the reality that forms our personal experience. we seek
in the past the laws of formation and development, and
try to fix for the future the ideal, deontological element. the 'should-be', that corresponds to human purposes. On this conception of human process and or its
substantial comprehensiVity is based what we call the
historicist system. (I.L. :xxvi)
The futuristic stance of Sturzo's historicism is explicitly
brought out in his treatment of the historical sense within a
given people.

He states that ''if history is the consciousness

of collective and processive existence, and this consciousness
seeks a unification in rationality and in religion, then to
have the historical sense is to reflect on this consciousness,
to bring it out, to make use of it in all its bearings and all
its complexity.n (T.L. 220)

The historical sense, then, is an
!'

active, and practically oriented, reflection on the historical

!

,,:i
!1

consciousness of a people.

It is important to note that within

this description ot the historical sense. as practically oriented,
Sturzo includes the teleological orientation

or

historical con-

sciousness, its seeking "a unification in rationality and in
religion. 0

Now, since the historical sense is the reflective

and practical working out of the historical consciousness of a
people, obviously a people without a history will be without a
historical sense.

.

Significantly, Sturzo allows for this possi-

Historical Association, Dec. 1966. pp. 8-9. Quote trom Henry
s. Kariel's Open S~stems: Arenas tor Political Action (Itasca,
Ill.: F. E. Peacoe PUb., Inc., I<JG9), P• 123.
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bility.

His statement on this is worth quoting in full as it

sums up the themes we have been discussing.

It (the historical sense) is not found in a people that
has no history, but if a people has no history it is
not because it has not had important events in its past,
but because it has not felt the fundamental unity between
the present and the past, and has not arrived at creating
a course for the future. Thus we find the historical
sense more highly developed in prophetic Hebraism, which
lived by the thought and expectation of the Messias,
than among other people ot the time. We find it in
Rome at the height of her grandeur, and therefore conscious of the roads traversed and of her mission in the
world. In both peoples the past was linked to the
future, and the historical sense reflected the motives
of expectation and or action. (T.L. 220)
The perspective of history, then, is not one of looking
back over one's shoulder nor even simply of peering beyond the
immediate horizon, but in its fullest sense is one of actively
moving towards and giving shape to that horizon.

Within this

framework of histor,' the historical sense ceases to mean adherence to the past and becomes a liberating power; it means not
conformity but transformation, not the old but the new, not
custom but progress.

Through an historical sense we do not

merely preserve our world, we create a new one.

It is not a

mere accumulation of knowledge whereby we are enabled to meet
with a situation; it is a power whereby we can anticipate the
istuation and transform it.

The basic posture of man in his-

tory, then, is one of "creative expectation," engendering
action in the present to fashion his tuture. 1 7
Another passage that brings out the futuristic slant of
Sturzo's position is one in·which he is considering what it is

~

1 ?see Harvey Cox's "Forward" to Ernst Block's Man on His
(New York: Herder, 19?0)• P• 10.
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in the flow of events that constitutes them as history.

It is

not simply their significance within the affairs of men, such
i1

as the succession of rulers.

We have already seen that an event

is historioized inasmuch as "it is felt in the historical consciousness of the time." (I.L. xxviii)

Although, as has been

indicated, Sturzo holds we cannot on the reflective level determine what is "felt"--that is, operative--in a given historical

consciousness, nevertheless, the question remains as to what
sturzo means by the term "felt."

In other words, in what manner

are events operative when they are historicized.

Sturzo answers:

The changes that have been mentioned will become history when they come to reveal fresh aspects of lite,
to create new spiritual exigencies, to arouse the
feelings of social groups and stir them to action,
to feed revolution, first in the mind, then in events.
Why are the historieized elements effective in this way?

Because

"there is no history without the manifestation of a truth to be
actuated, and without the impulse of a love to be communicated •••• "
{'l'.L. 22?)

The wording here,

11

0! a truth to be actuated ••• o!

a love to be communicated," clearly indicates the practical,
futuristic thrust of history.
We have indicated that Sturzo is at pains to preserve the
open possibilities of the future.

Since he does emphasize the

finalism ot history and positively designates the goal, we must
carefully determine how and for what reasons he works this out.

It is of the utmost importance to correctly understand Sturzo's
position on the form and nature of the tinalism of history be-

cause it is here that the final rectifying principle of the
drive toward absolute rationality, which defines the person in
:I~

.1
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biS most intimate character, is made manifest.

Since history is a rational process, its movement must be
teleological.

The future will then resolve itself into the

,telos or aim of the human activity making up this process.
(S.P. 11)

Yet, for Sturzo the very notion of finalism is an

open concept because for him it "implies tree initiative and
co-ordination to a further reality." 18
Tb.ere are two fundamental reasons which are intrinsic to
sturzo's whole theory that require the tuture to be unconditionally open in its possibilities tor determination.

The first is

the dynamism of the human process arising out of the tinitude

of man•s nature and its drive for completion.

If the future were

not open, this would imply that the human process, and man
within it, is able to realize itself fully.

With the completion

of its being there would then be no exigency for further realization.

Tb.is would result in an antivital stasis. which is

contradictory to the inherent dynamism of the human process,
and of all reality.

"In every concrete reality there is always

something wanting; and by this want it is incessantly impelled
,II

,,
''

to fresh realisations. 111 9
The second and most important reason is that man is the
sole substantive and efficient principle
the coming-to-be of his own nature.

or

history. which is

And since this nature in

its most intimate and fundamental character is an individualizedc
#
18 sturzo, "Maurice Blondel's La Pensee:
the Philosophy of
'L'elan spiritual,'" p. 346.

19 Ibid.,

-

p. 347.
:'
i
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principle of rationality seeking realization, man, although
limited by the physical, moral and socio-historical condition1ng factors of his existence, is an autonomous, selt-determin1Ilg creator of his own life.

Man could not act were he not physically conditioned;
such is his nature •••• But geographic and physical con-

ditions will reveal themselves as such when man makes
them an element in his life, when he transmutes them
from something purely material into a spiritual factor,
an object of knowledge and action, thus creating his
human environment out of the very conditions offered
him by the physical world. But man's creative act-and we may call it creative by analogy, in so tar as
he makes his lif e--is nothing other than a continuous
activity of his mind and will. It is this only that
produces the process that we call history. (S.P. ?; ct.
also P• 9)
Since this autonomous self-determining activity, or freedom, is
ontologically rooted in and expressive of rationality, it is not
characterized by chaotic, arbitrary and total indeterminancy of
expression, but rather is patterned according to the laws and
limits of the rationality of which it is expressive.

And when

Sturzo, in his statement of the historicism at the basis of his
theory, describes history as the human process "realized by
immanent forces," the immanent forces he is ret'erring to are
the inner laws of man's nature, individualized rationality.
One commentator on Sturzo's thought has already pointed this
out.

"Thus those immanent forces that propel the march of

humankind are to be identified only within the deep and intimate laws of spiritual being which can have only a moral, not
a physical character, consonant with the spirituality and
rationality of the subject." 20 Thus to say that the future is
Ii

20Antonio Messin(eo, "Tb.e soc1)al noetrine ot Luigi Sturzo.,"
Social Research, 34 Summer, l 96? , 307 •

11!
1

1
,:

1

1

:c
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completely undetermined in its possibilities does not mean it

I

can be realized in any possible way and still be expressive ot
the becoming of rationality.

What it does mean is that there

are no determining factors extrinsic to the subject and efficient principle of history, man himself.

Ir man is to be true

to himself in the realization of himself, the pattern of his
life must conform to the inner laws of his nature.

And it is

only in this sense, that is, normatively, that these inner laws

are the determining--determining in the sense of regulatory-factors in the shaping of his future.

For as operative from

within a rational subject, their enactment remains dependent
on the freedom of that subject.

The complete autonomy of man

in the realization of himself is manifested in the tact that

be can operate, and therefore shape his future, even against
the laws

or

his own being. (I.L. xxxii)

It is the autonomy of ·man and the subsequent originality
of individual experience as the basis of history that underlies
Sturzo•s rejection of every deterministic view of history.

In

summation he states: "The fundamental error of determinism lay
in seeking the unifying force of the historical process outside

the makers of history, that is, outside men themselves, and in
envisaging nature as a purely material force." (S.P. ?)

The

logical consequence of every deterministic view, whether materialistic or spiritualistic, is the placing of the locus of
reality iL a principle outside of man and of which man and his
world are but the mere phenomena.

i

d
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In both cases, we could no longer speak of human process
as the experience of free and reasonable individuals,
~ut of a succession of either material or spiritual phenomena which would present none of the originality of a
human personal cast, and none of the value of experience
as we conceive of it for ouraelves and through history.
{I.L. xxi)
This result would be the same i.f--we accepted the idea
of immanent Spirit or universal M'i.nd as the sole conscious
reality, of which individual men were but the phenomena;
it would be the end of the personal individuality of
each, which is what constitutes the originality of human
life and experience. (I.L. xxii)
.
At the same time, the logical consequence of the autonomy
of man and the originality of his experience is the openness of
the future.

For since the immanent forces by which history is

realized are

self~determining

forces, genuine self-determinancy

is possible only when the future is not fixed a priori.

freedom is intrinsic to the nature

or

Since

rationality, the attain-

ment of rationality can only be through the expression of treedom in activity.

The very possibility of free decision and its

enactment includes within it openness for the future.

With

freedom at its core, then, the movement towards rationality
cannot be a movement towards some more or less clearly discernible goal which is fixed prior to the movement itself.
Sturzo does point to a definite unifying principle of history, rationality, both as immanent in human rationality and
as transcendent in the Absolute f'iind.

This two-told unifying

finalism of history must be viewed in the light of the very
nature

or

history, which is man in search

or

himself.

Thus,

the goal of history is the very nature of the subject of history
considered as an exigency to seek realization and fulfillment.
And since Sturzo views man as an open-ended or "unfinished"
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creature, he does not assign a predetermined form or facticity
to the unifying principle of rationality as immanent, inasmuch
as this is the specifying element in manis nature.

The specific

concrete content or facticity ot rationality must be determined
through each person's own experience and personal activity.

"It

1s always a case of a unification in process, never final, but
always a tendency, a dynamism." (I.L. xx111)

The reason for

this, which is the theoretical basis for man's open-ended
nature, is that the thrust of the rational principle of man's
nature for completion extends to unification in absolute rationality.

Although Sturzo does hypostasize absolute rationality

into the Christian notion of God, this still does not close off
the possibilities of the future because here too the relationship between man and the transcendent unifying principle of absolute rationality is intrinsic to and grounded in the ontological exigencies of man's own nature.

We must now carefully

elaborate Sturzo's position on this relationship.
In the definition of his historicism Sturzo states that
history moves nrrom a transcendent and absolute principle
towards a transcendental and absolute end."

He states elsewhere

that history, "whatever history it be ••• carries us to the fundamental problem of living and journeying humanity in relation to
its unifying finalism." (T.L. 214)

As we have traced the main

I

Ii

lines of Sturzo's theory, we have frequently referred to man's
orientation towards absolute rationality.

It is within his

theory of history that Sturzo draws out the full implications
of this, both in respect to the orientation itself and the form

i

;
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of absolute rationality as it has presented itself in history.
Th·..is, we must now examine the full scope of the relationship

sturzo finds betwP.en a transcendent and absolute principle and

man as it arises within history.
The question of the absolute arises from the pressure of
man's search for himself in the present historical moment, be-

cause it is a question that has its ground in the very structure
o! man's being, his sociality and its consequent projection,
which extends "towards the absolute which commands present
reality ... (I.L. 66)

It is precisely from within the actuality

of its own experience, the present, that the human spirit
grasps the root of its own actuality, its tendency towards an

absolute in the torm of absolute rationality.

"But the present,

that of our living experience, is not at all an •ourselves,• it

is not our knowledge of it, but it is a totality that absorbs

us and transcends us in a striving towards the infinite." ('1'.L.
215)

'l'he key concept in Sturzo's historicism that brings to the
fore the full range

or

implications in the concrete relationship

that he finds between the question

or

the absolute and the ques-

tion of man as it arises in history is the notion of
dence.

~ranscen

For in the concrete eraplo;yment of this concept by Sturzo

it is expressive both of the tendency within man toward the absolute and the absolute itself.

In the most generic meaning

Sturzo assigns to the term, transcendence means "the processive
passage to another term that elicits it" or "the overstepping

ot the limits of one stage into another." (I.L. 308-9)

I

I
'I
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it is the tendency of rationality for absolute rationality

that constitutes the nature of the person, the person 1s transcendent in the

interiorit~r

of his own nature.

In view of the

generic meaning of the term, this transcendence as inherent in
the nature of the person may still be interpreted as a wholly
immanent process, that is to say, as a continual passage from
one stage of realization to another in an on-going overcoming
of limits, but all within the immanent order of man's own becoming.
However, as Sturzo applies this term to the concrete becoming of the person in history, several specifically different,
but interrelated meanings become manifest which rule out the

wholly immanent interpretation.

The term "transcendence,. refers

to the dynamic openness-towards-absolute rationality, which
ontologically constitutes rational consciousness, the actual
process of "going beyond" oneself, or more accurately, one's
given state of actuality generated by this dynamic openness,
and the goal of this process.

"Men, taken as an historical

whole and in their process, feel, more or less intuitively,
that the urge to a transcendence in a rational ideal, an ideal
of goodt will not be arrested until a goal is

eached that com-

prehends everything and transcends everything." (I.L.

312)

We must bring into clearer focus the features of this goal
because here in his historicism within the dynamics of the notion
of transcendence, Sturzo moves from an abstract metaphysical
f'inalism to a concrete historical finalism.

In the concrete of

history, the absolute rationality towards which the person tends
reveals itself as a personal absolute, "a God with whom it
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(society) can enter into communion through knowledge and love.''
(I.L. 313)

The total context of Sturzo's theory of socio-per-

sonalism provides the theoretical foundation for a personal
absolute.

We have already mentioned one feature of Sturzo's

theory, the social grounding and context of self-awareness,
that points to a personal absolute. 21 But even more basic than
this, since this transcendent principle enters into the ontological structure of the person both as its underived source and
ground and its ultimate unifying finalism, it, too, must be
personal.

For in both aspects it is an imnanent constituent of

the person as such and consequently must itself be personal.
This could be demonstrated in terms of several fundamental features of the person.

The most basic one within the framework

of Sturzo•s theory is that of consciousness.
A conscious being such as man cannot be resolved into
or unified with anything but another conscious being,
so that ultimately either we think of a personal God
or of a universal consciousness, whether this be the
logos of the Platonisf:., the potential intellect of
the Iverroists, the Mind of the Idealists, or other
similar hypotheses. Yet which is the more contradictory,
an infinite personality or an impersonal consciousness?
If personality is consciousness of self, impersonality
is incompatible with the concept of consciousness. A
personality that has consciousness of its infinite contains nothing contradictory. (S.P. 62)
To avoid any misinterpretation of Sturzo's position on
personal absolute, or God, it must be made unequivocally clear
there is a basic and essential difference in his use of the
term ''transcendence'' as applied to the constitutive process of
the person and the finalizing principle of this process. God.
21 see Chapter II, pp. 136-13?.

1
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'l'he difference in his use comes down to one between absolute
ontological transcendence and relative processive transcendence.
The former refers to the absolute ontological transcendence of
God's activity and the latter refers to the various processes
of transcendence that flow from and are constitutive of the
ontological structure of the person.

Thus, in view of the abso-

lute transcendence of God's activity, the concepts that are used
to designate the reality that is one with that activity, such
as conscious and personal, are applied only in an analogous
sense.

What the human person is through a dynamic tendency and

partial attainment, God is as complete and perfect actuality.
In Sturzo's own words:
A personal God is in no wise an anthropomorphic conception, but a superhuman one, beyond the bounds ot
our comprehension. We can only lay hold of the negative elements of this infinite existence and express
them in a positive mode so as to affirm their reality.
We do not reduce the personality or God to a human
mode, but transfer to God a predication of conscious
man, inasmuch as we wish to deny that God is either
an impersonal universal consciousness, or a non-consciousness. We mean to affirm that God is the real,
absolute, infinite, super-existence; of a thought and
a will always in act, entirely; pure and without inward
or outward limits. (S.P. 63; or. p. 61)
The reasoning behind Sturzo•s diversified use of the term
"transcendence" must be clearly understood.

It does not signify

a careless or indifferent use ot a culturally freighted term
that is itself highly ambivalent in its historical significations.

Rather, the diversified meanings he attaches to the

term have a signal function within his thought: they convey the
full significance of the ontological tension that constitutes
the person.

As Sturzo himself states, "We use the word,
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transcendence, which inspires so much mistrust among experimentalists and positivists, not assuredly from a wish to bring confusion into our terminology, but because we find no other word
that renders the meaning we seek to convey.'• (I.L. 309)
A preliminary fact that should be kept in mind in consider-

ing Sturzo'a diversified use

or

the term is that this occurs

within a relational, processive perspective.

Thus, transcendence

must be interpreted not substantively, but relationally.

The

underlying concept that unifies the divergent use of the term.
is that of relation.

It is within the one world of relation

that transcendence takes place.

Transcendence is a single term

covering a variety of relational activities, all of which, trom
the perspective of man, involve "the processive passage to another term that elicits it."

It is from the view of His rela-

tional activity with man in history that God is said to be transcendent.

And since the relational activity of God is at one

with His being, from the level of man's perspective, God!!
transcendent in His being.
being.

In contrast, man is a transcending

Also, whereas in the transcendent activity ot man there

is a reciprocating interdependence between that activity and
its term, God's transcendence is such that His activ1ty touches
man's life but man's activity cannot of itself alone touch His.

In other words, God's activity within history is beyond all that
is possible to man through his own power.
One of the reasons Sturzo uses the same term for two tundamentally different significations is to point up that man in
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realizing himself must go beyond himself in an upwardly--with
no spatial connotations, of course, but ontologically "upwards"
towards a higher grade of being--directed finalism that opens
out onto the infinite horizon of absolute transcendent being,
which, being the goal of a relative transcendent movement, continually remains unattainable.

In this way, Sturzo clearly

preserves the essential otherness of God which differentiates
His being from everything in the world and within history, and
yet at the same time points to a genuine transcendenae that
takes place within history, or more exactly, IS history as constitutive of man in the plenitude of his being.
In the single designation of a relative and absolute reality
Sturzo is able to emphasize the intrinsic constituting--tor the
relative reality--relationship between the two and, at the same
time, the inherent and fundamental tension in the ontological
structure of the relative that this relationship generates.

This

tension marks the incommensurability between the positivity of
this structure and its ideality.

Since this incommensurability

cannot be surmounted by man himself, in order tor there to be
an actual movement towards the ideality

or

his own being, there

must be a power present capable of spanning the magnetic field
between the poles of man's being.

Only then is it possible for

the movement towards the absolute to be initiated and sustained.
Thus, the very designation of the movement of man's being toward
realization as transcendent points to the presence of the transcendent principle within man's nature that generates the transcendent movement of his self-realization.

r
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Another reason why Sturzo applies the term "transcendence"
to the various phases of man's becoming is that it underscores
the efficacious reality of the immanent order of man's own nature,
and attributes full value to its prooessive character by calling
attention to the fact that there is a genuine emergence of
higher levels of being within that immanent order.

Robert Pol-

lock, in his usual trenchant manner, has commented on this
aspect of Sturzo•s thought:
Limitation is intrinsic to the idea of creature; nevertheless, within the immanent order there is always the
stimulus to overcome it, by passing continually from
one limit to another. But each new position attained
is not simply a manifestation of that which pre-exists
in germ; it is not only the moment of an intrinsic
dialectic, or merely the phase of a process of 'seltrealization'; it is a real transcendence, manifesting
the relation which exists between the immanent level
of development and the transcendental Being. 22
We have said that God is both the ontological ground and
ultimate unifying principle of the ontological structure ot the
person, so that we must conclude that He is both immanent and
transcendent to the becoming of man.

lle is immanent in His ac-

tivity, or at least in one dimension of it, and transcendent in
the modality of that activity.

This immanence of God within

history must be more fully elaborated.
That God is the ontological ground of the person can be

seen in the inexhaustible dynamism of the person's constitutive
principle, rationality, for completion, which is expressive of
"a movement of interior necessity towards the absolute." (S.P.

39)

That God ontologically grounds this inner dynamism follows
22Pollook, "L'uomo nella societ~ e nella storia,n pp.

241-42.
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f'rom the tact that the person cannot of himself alone originate
or sustain the thrust of this dynamism towards the absolute.
The person cannot of himself alone even initiate the actual

movement of his being toward tultillment because there is an
ontological inoommensurability between the constitutive principle of his being and its own inner exigency for completion.

This incommensurability is experienced on the conscious level
as an ever present disquiet, which points to an insatiable void

between the positivity of its present actualization and the
fullness ot its ideality towards which it tends.

In the face

of this void and the intrinsic limitations or his own being,
man experiences a profound disquiet and dissatisfaction with

himself rising up from the depths of his own being, taking on
and manifesting itself in a variety of forms. 2 3
2 3In view or the complexity of this phenomenon and the
great variety of interpretations which have been given to it,
the reference to it obviously does not mean to imply that it
necessarily, in and of itself, verifies the argumentation here.
Marx's interpretation of this experience of disquietude, to

name one prominent example, stands in direct opposition to the
one given here, namely, that there is a fundamental anxiety
arising !rom the ontological structure of man and as such inescapable, which may be termed "the appeal of transcendence.n
Also, as Gabriel Marcel warns, if "the need for transcendence
presents itself above all ••• as a kind of dissatisfaction," not
every kind of dissatisfaction "implies an aspiration towards
transcendence." or. The ~ste;yof' Being, Vol. I: Reflection
and ~ste;y; trans. by G.
aser (Chicago: Hen17 Regnery Co.,
19$!~ p. 42.
Therefore, granted that the interpretation here
demands, and merits, more attention and oaretul analysis than
the scope of this essay allows, nevertheless, it clearly does
remain a viable position with a vast body of literature supportive of it, the essence of which Henri de Lubac epitomizes when
he states, "It would be a very poor observer who thought that
it was just an anomaly, a passing disease, a sort ot excrescence which could be removed altogether one day, a phantom of
the mind which could be diss~pated , a strange voice which could
be reduced to silence. It would be most unrealistic to imagine
that physical or social health or the progress of science were
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The power of a finite being is proportionate only to a
finite term. {T.L. 30; S.P. 41)

Therefore, the activity of a

finite being can explicitly be directed only toward a finite
term.

If there is an actual movement of man toward the ideal-

i ty of his nature, this would be indicative or the operative

presence ot a transcendent principle, which is not subject to
the limits ot finitude, within the depths ot man's own being.
For Sturzo, the actual movement of history testifies to this
presence.

It has been the effort of his thought to document

this movement.

"After studying the unification in rationality

in all the stages, and in all the guises of sociality and in
its process and resolution, we cannot but reach a transcendence
towards an absolute end." (I.L. 313)

It is precisely the

grounding ot man's nature by God that makes the immanent realization of that nature an inherently transcendent movement.
Just as man alone cannot be the initiator of the movement
toward the fulfillment of his nature in the absolute, so . .ither
is he of him.self alone able to maintain it in a sustained devel-

opment of bis being.

This tact, too, has its root in man's own

being in the principle of materiality with its movement contravening that of rationality.

The dynamism of rationality toward

completion in absolute rationality is the immanent source ot the

, I'

transcending movement towards God in man.

, I

I

But as we have al-

11

,;1

I'

ready seen. the specifically human rationality is not pure
the cure. That would be to misconceive all that is most human
in the human being and which 'makes him more than man.• 11 de
Lubac, The Discoverz of God (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons,
1960)~ p. 116 LTrans. or: Sur les chemins de Dieu (Paris; Aubier,
1956)..J.

,,
1,1,

'Ii,

,,

'
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rationality; it is limited by the principle of materiality,
whose natural movement is towards an individualistic self-contained egoism.

Consequently, the movement ot rationality

towards completion, which is a natural and spontaneous converging projection of the self outward in unifying association
with others--a projection extending to what Sturzo calls a
"communicative union" with God--contains within itself a counteracting movement. 24
The concrete individual rational consciousness, then, is
a consciousness in tension between the polarizing forces of its

constitutive principles.

Since this polarization arises from

its own immanent constituents, it is complete and unavoidable.

Inasmuch as the two principles together constitute the seamless
reality of theego, the movement toward the ideality ot man's
nature does not involve a denial or rejection of the pull of
materiality, which is an impossibility, but does call tor a

conscious redirection and spir1tual1z1ng of it by ordering it
towards a higher collaboration with and integration in the movement of the rational principle, so that there is achieved

11

the

obedience of the lower faculties, their docility, their adaptability, their decisive subjection to spiritual impulses." (T.L.
41)

It, too, must be caught up in the movement of rationality

for completion

if

this movement is to be maintained.

Otherwise,

its equally compelling pull within the individual consciousness
will cut across the path of this movement, short-circuiting its
24

see Chapter III, pp.

15?-158.
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thrust and deflecting its flow into a regressive slide towards
a constricting egocentricity.

It is this equally compelling

pull ot materiality that is the root ot man's incapacity for a
sustained movement toward absolute rationality.

There are no

resources wholly immanent to the person that would provide him
with the means for permanently reordering its natural movement
toward coordinating with and reintoreing the movement of rationality.

The principle of materiality obviously does not provide

the means for subverting its own natural movement; and the tact
that individualized rationality is itself limited by this principle means that it cannot completely dominate the force of its
own intrinsic limiting principle.

Thus, if man is to be actu-

ally successful in realizing the exigencies of his own nature
tor completion, the fulfilment of the conditions that make this
possible is not immanent to that nature.

There must be a prin-

ciple of reconciliation between the principles ot his being if

•
1

the demands of their contravening movements are to serve as a
stimulus for a transcending development and not be lost in a
sterile inner struggle.

This principle of reconciliation will

have to be both immanent and transcendent at once.

It will be

immanent in that its conciliating activity will be indissolubly
woven into the fabric of man's becoming and it will be transcendent in that it itself, as its conciliating activity testifies,
will be beyond the limitations of that becoming.
Here, ot course, within the context ot this specific discussion on the conditions necessary for sustained development
on the part of man, the logic of Sturzo's position only points

i

I!
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to the inherent need for such an immanent-transcendent principle
but not its actual presence.

This must rest on an appeal to

facts that would verify that the sustained development has or
does take place.

In this particular issue of sustained develop-

ment there is no direct empirical way or substantiating its
actuality.

:I

·~

Nevertheless, in drawing from the evidence culled

from other features of man's becoming that do indicate the actual presence of this transcendent principle within man's becoming, we can at least affirm that the conditions for its possibility are actually present and that in terms of these conditions the transcendent principle is operatively present as a
principle of reconciliation between the contravening movements
of man's own being.
The tendency towards unification is a law of life.
We seek it all the more in that, formed of sense and
spirit, we have within us two laws that are otten in
conflict, disturbing even natural activities. A principle that pacifies the finite with the infinite is
in itself vital and unifying; it is the new order,
penetrating the spirit and reverberating through the
whole of human activity. (T.L. 41)
There is another aspect of God's immanence in history that
must be considered.

This is as the ulterior unifying principle

of man's becoming.

Viewing God from the aspect o! man's final-

1,

ism also provides another approach for demonstrating that the
absolute towards which man tends is in tact a personal absolute.
At first sight it may not seem correct to speak of God's immanence in history in terms of man's unification with Him.

It

would seem that precisely as the ultimate goal of ma.n's finalistic striving God transcends history.

In the definition of

",,,
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bis historicism Sturzo says that history moves "from a transcendental and absolute principle towards a transcendental and absolute end."

Thus, the primordial source and ultimate end of the

human process "are not historical, but extra-historical." (I.L.

xxx: and xxxiv)

Sturzo also appears to rule out any immanence

to this unlf'ication when he compares it with the unification in
rationality.

"In our personal experience, the udtioation in

rationality is inward and immanent; the same could not be said
of the unifying relationship between the contingent and the
absolute.'' (I.L. xxxi)

And again, "this unification in ration-

ality, which is immanent in us, would lead us to an exasperating
rational anthropocentrism (pseudo-humanism) if it were not tor
the unification that makes us transcend it in the absolute, the
unification or the human in the divine." (I.L. xxiv)

Thus, it

would seem that whereas the unification in rationality is immanent, the urU'ication in the absolute is transcendent.

Yet,

,,

"'

Sturzo goes on to sa:y that in the unifying relationship between
man and God, "we find an initial immanence that suffices.tor unification without falling into immanentism." (I.L. xxxi)
In view of the absolute ontological transcendence of God,

a question more pressing than that of the immanence of any unification between man and God would seem to be how any such unification is in any way possible, given the ontological incommensurability between the two.

Even if one admits to the possibil-

ity of a unifying relationship between man and God, at least as
a hypothesis, in view of their ontological incommensurability
there is the added difficulty of how it could be effected without

'',1
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the total absorption of the finite, the individual person and
the human process as a whole, into the infinite reality of God.
Actually, all three difficulties stemming from the question
of God as the finalistic principle of man•s becoming and of the
historical process as a whole are closely intertwined because
the solution to them lies within the context of Sturzo's theory
of the person.

In explaining this theory we arrived at the

basic definition of the person as "the tendency towards absolute rationality in time. 112 5

We can now more accurately and

concretely designate the objective

or

the tendency that consti-

tutes the person as a personal absolute, or God.

And we have

seen that since the person cannot initiate this tendency, God
is operatively immanent with the ontological structure of the
person as its source and ground.

This is the "initial immanence"

Sturzo referred to which "suffices for unification without falling into immanentism. 11 (I.L. xxxi)

The other aspect ot this

divine activity within man's becoming is that now under consideration as the ultimate unifying principle of that becoming.
Actually, in distinguishing between God as the creative ground
or the person and as the finalistic term, we are assuming two
different perspectives on the single operative presence of one
and the same principle.

From the perspective of man this lat-

ter divine activity relates to his finalistic striving, of which

1

God is the unifying principle.
It is important to clarify here that we are not considering

God as an extrinsic final cause, but as the unifying principle
25see Chapter I, p. 101.
I
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of a finalism that is not external to the person but rather is
11

I

the very nature of the subject considered as a tendency or

exigency to seek fulfillment and perfection." (I.L •. xv)

~

1'\

1

As the

unifying principle of this tinaliam God is an inner constitutive
dimension of the person.

Before we experience the tullness of

1

1

the unification within us as reality, we experience the force
of its pull as the finalistic demand of our nature.

This is

the sense in which God is immanent as the finalistic term.

'?he

extent that we respond to this pull by striving to actualize
the finalistic drive of our nature is the extent to which the
unifying presence of God is actually historioized.

Emphasis

must be given to the fact that the individual person must ot
himself respond to this pull.

It is not an extrinsic, determin-

ing force, but is intrinsic as the finalistic demand ot a
rational nature.

As such, it operates not merely in accord

with, but from within the instrumentality of human freedom.
We mentioned above that it is within the total context of
his theory of the person that Sturzo theoretically works out the
problem of the unifying relationship between man and God.

To

properly comprehend the full force of his position it is well
to recall that the basic metaphysical categories in his theory
are relation and process.

The person in his ontological struc-

ture is relational and processual.

It is this that brings out

the full force of both the immanence and transcendence ot the
unifying relationship between man and God.

Robert Pollock has

also suggested these implications for the processive character
of human reality.

'I

i
I
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Once there is given to contingency its full value of
process and it is studied integrally, it is impossible
to abstract it from its concrete relation with transcendental Being. This affirmation is also valid for
those who, while affirming transcendence, do not appreciate the concrete and vital character of the relation
which ties the finite with the infinite. To those we
say this happens because they, by considering contingency too abstractly and statically, make the distinction between Absolute Being and the contingent so rigid
as to end in separation. We should not minimize contingency by stopping there in its processual character;
and if we conceive it adequately we should see that it
is not otherwise intelligible than in terms of the
dialectic ot immanence-transcendence.26
·
What we have here in the human-divine relationship is the
grounding and vertical component of the basic differentiationin-aynthesis dialectic that constitutes the field of the personal.

This is the primordial relationship that grounds and

subsumes under its scope the total range of all horizontal relationships in the personal field. (T.L. 9?) 2? This is so because
it is the relationship that most intimately and constitutively
I

establishes the basic ontological structure o! sociality.

As

1

I:
, I

26Pollock, "L'uomo nella societ~ e nella storia, 0 pp. 240-41.
2?Aga1n, the spatial imagery of the terms "vertical" and
0
hor1zontdf" is not to be interpreted literally, but f'iguratively
to denote, in the first instance, a relationship between different levels or being, and in the second instance, relationships on the same level of being. The imagery is not entirely
precise because even in the establishing of "horizontal" relationships is an "upward" movement ontologically for the persons
concerned in the increase of the depth and extension ot their
personbood. Nevertheless, relatively speaking, the imagery does
connote the qualitative difference between the two kinds of relationships. As with all concepts applied to God, the vertical difference-in-synthesis dialectical relationship is only analogous
to that operative between human persons. In its vertical dimension it takes on a different character in that it does not work
itself out in a reciprocating interdependent dialectic. The
ontological deteroination and dependence is only on the side of
the human person.

'i

'I
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a result, the constitutive activity of the person is directed
in principle towards God.

The determination and individuality

of the person, then, is by definition established in direct
proportion to the movement or his being towards the transcendent being of God.

The apex or that determination and indivi-

duality is reached in union with God.

Thus, it is by reason

of the fundamental ontological structure of the person that the
reality of the person is not submerged into the higher reality
of God but rather is accentuated and further differentiated
according to the closeness of the union with the divine reality.
This is the precise point in Sturzo's theory that forms the
basis tor his opposition to any immanentistic theory of history.
Such theories, by seeking all spiritual values and meaning in
the historical realization of human activity as a strictly
immanent process, depersonalize the process and consequently
the values and meaning that are realized in it. 28
Sturzo terms the kind of union attained between man and
God a "communicative union" (T.L. 98), which consists in a contact of presence between persons.

This is in tact the only

kind of union that is constitutive of the person because in it
alone is there a contact of spirit to spirit of which the incommunicable reality of the person consists.

The only way in

which the vital and synthesizing center of the person can be
touched, and thereby further deepened, is in and through a "communicative union," namely, one that is effected through the mode
28 sturzo, "History and Philosophy," p.

53.

!

i

254

o! being proper to the person as such. presence.

Only in this

mode ot being is there the two-way kinetic transparency

or

being--directed inwards and outwards--that proVides that immediacy of being in which spirit is able to touch spirit.
It is by reason of the conditions necessary tor this union
that the contact between man and God in the historical realiza-

tion of man's being is a contact of freedom.

The very nature

of presence as expressing and revealing the inner dimension of

the person. which is the locus of his reality, demand that it
arise from within the person through the autonomy of his own
being.

Although the operative presence of God is necessary to

initiate and sustain the constitutive activity of the person.
the power of this presence only talces effect through the autonomous activity of the person. 2 9 As Robert Pollock has pointed
out, it is necessary for us to consider the relation between
man and God "more concretely as a real eooperation."30

This

cooperation, as constitutive of the person, or lack thereof,
marks the rhythm of history.
The contact between man and God is a contact of freedom.
Without freedom there would be neither the quest for
truth nor the union through love, there would not be
lite. A deterministic. compelling force exercised upon
us would not be a contact of spirit between us and the
29If we emphasize the role of freedom trom the side of the
human person in effecting this union. it obViously follows that
equal stress must be given to the play of divine freedom, so
that whatever in this process flows from the divine dispensation, whether in the order of nature or the theological doctrine
of grace. clearly does so through divine freedom, allowing for
whatever theological distinctions must be made in each order.
30Pollock, uL'uomo nella societa e nella storia, 0 p. 241.
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Godhead •••• On the same principle, history is our free
activity, it is human realization, though it is the
result of the initiative and intervention of God. It
represents the alternatives of aeeeptanoe or rejection
of the divine which come to us and which dwell within
us. (T.L. 232)
This passage indicates the way in which the contact ot
freedom between man and God is historically effected, and the
communicative union established insofar as it depends on man's

own endeavor, namely, through "the quest tor truth" and "the
union through love."

The full sentence reads, "Without freedom

there would be neither the quest for truth nor the union through
love, there would not be lite."
to is that of personal selfhood.

The "lite" Sturzo is referring
Only through knowledge and love

is this life realized and in being realized moves towards God.
Since the communicative union between man and God is a contact
of presence, it is clear, from our previous analysis of presenoe,31 that it can be achieved only through the reciprocally
interdependent activities of knowing and loving.

Since both

knowledge and love are the principle and condition of the other,

Sturzo explains our relationship to, movement towards and union
with God in terms of both, giving emphasis to one or the other
depending on the formality of the perspective.

!l'hat Sturzo would explain the historical working out of our
relationship to God under the formality of knowledge and tX'Uth
is clear from his position on the participatory and creative
nature of knowledge with its theoretical basis in his central,
and integral, concept of rationality.

In the synthetic process

I
lj

31 see Chapter I, PP• 51-53·
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o! its realization the intentionality of knowledge embraces the
finalism of the will.

Consequently, knowing encompasses the

personal field as completely as loving.

We have already seen

that within the personal field this works itself out as a reciprocal dialecticity of knowledge and love.

How much more this

holds true when the relationship is with God, who is the truegood I

"Knowledge is a principle of love; the knowledge ot the

true good, insofar as it is real and tull knowledge, is undoubtedly love.

To know God is equivalent to establishing a rela-

tionship with Him, inasmuch as we recognize Him as our Creator,
our first principle and our last end." (T.L. 86)
The concrete and particular truths that we actualize in
the realization of rationality participate in Truth itselt who
is God, so that the movement of rationality towards the true-that is, towards its own realization--is at the same time a
movement towards, and participation in, Truth itself.

For Sturzo

this implicitly expresses itself in every act ot knowledge as
an intuitional awareness of an all-embracing totality that transcends the duality of subject and object.32 It is also manifest
in every act

or

knowledge in that in the actual process ot mas-

tering a given truth, which as known is only relative, we grasp
it under the formality of absoluteness--this despite the tact
that we are not in a position to coordinate it, as a relative
truth, to absolute truth. (S.P. 45-6)
Sturzo calls this "the mystical" dimension of the striv1ngs

32 see Chapter II, pp. 136-3?.
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~

of our spiritual life because "it is a drawing near to and al-

I I
'11

most a partaking of the absolute, which, through the values of
1,1

truth and goodness, comes into communication with us."

Even

when there is a falsification of values, this contact with the

r

,1

~,I

absolute cannot be evaded because the concrete and particular
values are still sought under the formality of truth and goodness.

In addition, by reason of God being the creative ontolo-

I

I

gical ground of all reality, ''there shines out from the various
forms of the contingent an unseizable element, which is the
imprint of the absolute, the mark ot the creative force, the
value of the thought o! the Spirit, the supreme reality which
is God."

Sturzo therefore concludes, "It is impossible to live

our relative, contingent life, and to live it as knowledgeable
beings and not as brutes, without feeling the reality of the
Absolute as present." (S.P. 46)
In accounting for the communicative union between man and
God, Sturzo gives emphasis to love.
for this.

There are several reasons

The most significant one is to emphasize that the

absolute towards which we tend is, and has to be, a personal
absolute with whom there is a genuine communion, or touching of
spirit to spirit.

In other words, it highlights the "communica-

tive" aspect of the union because communion can occur only
between autonomous centers of presence, namely, persons.

Commu-

nion involves a reciprocal dialecticity with love in that each
is the principle and term of the other.

Out of this reciprocal

dialecticity a communicative union is established.

Correlative

to these constitutive activities of the person, then, "in the

1,

258

spiritual and historical life of man, God cannot be other than
unfolding truth, compelling, winning love." (T.L. 225)

This
1

clearly removes man's relationship to God from the abstract

\i'

and metaphysical realm in which the relationship is reduced to

I

I

a metaphysical dependency and God to an abstract metaphysical
principle, and sets it in the concrete process of history in
which the becoming of personal selthood is realized through an
existential relationship to a living, personal absolute.
Those philosophers who conceive ot a strictly rational
God, as prime mover, as creator or rather as architect
of the universe, reduce the relationship ot man with
God to a metaphysical dependency. This relationship
is stripped or any cleaVing will, ot ~ sense ot love;
there is no communion in it. (T.L. 86)

The true absolute is God. I! he were merely a physical
or metaphysical principle, the logical primary, the
unmoving first mover, we should have no communion with
him that could induce us to love, no love that could
arrive at communicative union. (T.L. 98)
Giving emphasis to love also calls attention to the intimacy of
the union by indicating that the union attained by man with God

unites, and in uniting further deepens, the innermost depths
man's being to the ineffable center or God's being.

or

As Teilhard

has so incisively expressed, "Love alone is capable of uniting
living beingsin such a way as to complete and fulfil them for
it alone takes them and joins them by what is deepest in themselves. 033
When we began our treatment· or God's immanence in terms of
man's tinalism, we mentioned that this aspect ot His relationship
33Teilha.rd de Chardin, The Phenomenon ot Man (New York:
Harper & Row, 1961), p. 265.
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to man demonstrates that the absolute rationality towards which
the person tends is in tact a personal absolute.

In view of

what we have already said, we can summarize the main lines of
the argumentation.

Finalism is the nature of the subject con-

sidered as a tendency towards fulfillment.

But the fulfillment

of the person can be achieved only through a communicative
union with a personal absolute.

It must be a communicative

union because only this is constitutive

or

the person.

It

must be with an absolute by reason of the unconditional nature
of love through whieh a communicative union is attained.

"Love

by its very nature seeks to become absolute, and for that very
reason it seeks God, is transformed in God, has peace in God
alone.

'When God is lacking we seek the absolute love in our-

selves or in something extraneous to complete ourselves.
any such attempt must fail." (T.L.

But

9?) It must be with a Eer-

sonal absolute because a communicative union can only be established with another person.
In view ot the absolutely transcendent character ot God's

being, the human-divine union remains "something towards which
we tend, and the experience we may have of it is not
intuitive." (I.L. xxiii)

direc~

and

Since the being of God transcends

history, the full actualization ot man's union with Him will
also transcend history as its transcendent end.

With the ac-

tive presence of this transcendent principle as an inner constitutive dimension of the person, history, whether viewed as the

concrete becoming of the individual person or in its totalit7
as embracing all of mankind, can not be conceived as a wholly

I

1
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immanent dialectic which is able to find realization within the
contours of its own process.

It is this ontological relation-

ship to God as an inner constitutive dimension of his being
that makes the person, and history, open-ended realities.
Nevertheless, to say that the unification with God is
"something towards which we tend" and is actually achieved in
its fullness only in some sense "beyond" history, whatever
light this may shed on the nature of man and history, it does
not add any clarification to its nature and place rithin history.

It this unification with God does pertain to history,

and Sturzo very definitely holds that it does. the di!tioulty
still remains of determining further in what sense and how it
is effected within history since it is with the transcendent
reality of' God.

Although of its very nature this unification

can be achieved "in its fullness" only "beyond" history, Sturzo
still maintains that it must at the same time be hiatoricized,
or to use his words, "inserted into human process."

Thia is

necessary in order that the unification will "f'1nd fulfilment
with its cognitional value in each man." (I.L. xxiv)

What

Sturzo means by this is suggested in another passage where he
discusses those who "have had only a glimmer of' the divine
idea in the world."

"Indeed it is a spiritual necessity to

f'ind a historical center that will give an orientation towards
truth.

A subjective idea is not enough. the voice of' conscience

is not enough; we need in addition something that has f'ound
realization in life--that has been embodied, 'incarnated,' as

some say in the widest sense of the word." (T.L. 226)

The same
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"spiritual necessity" applies to the tundamental movement towards
unification with God in order for there to be nn orientation of
consciousness in regard to it that would become an explicit and
permanent value of lite.
To understand the significance ot this passage in this context it is important to keep in mind that the unification with

God and the orientation towards truth are not secondary or
accidental features of the person, but together are constitutive
of the person as such.

Rationality, the constitutive principle

ot the person, is consubstantial with truth.

It is constituted

in its tendency towards absolute truth and exists only through
it.

Therefore, as grounding the reality of the person, the

absolute can not be merely the ideal projection of the prooessi ve reality ot the person, but, as reflected in the depths ot
that personal reality, must itself be personal.

The constitu-

tive activity that rises out of these depths is, then, in its
initiating movement and most basic character a personal and
freely constituted response to the magnetic pull ot that personal
absolute.

In Sturzo•s own words, it is a case of "a freedom

that seeks and of a truth-and-love that attracts." (t.L.

2~5)

From an analysis of the factors involved, we see that this determining tendency towards absolute rationality manifests itself
as a relationship with a personal absolute, and the actualization of this determining relationship takes the form of a communicative union.
From the nature of the person as a conscious being whose
spirituality and subjectivity ontologically consist

in the
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immediacy of presence, it follows that the communicative union
with God, as an immanent determinant of this presence, cannot
lie beyond the present reality of this consciousness, but must

make itself felt in his present experience of himself. (ct. S.P.
'l'h.is does not mean that the communicative union, as an

60-1)

existential fact of the person•s concrete nature becomes a

Never-

direct and explicit experience through introspection.

theless, as coextensive with our spiritual actiVity we are
indirectly and implicitly conscious of it, before any objective
grasp of it, simply in being conscious of ourselves.34 But,
although this union is implicitly posited in the act

or

aelf-

knowledge, for it to "find fulfilment with ita cognitional value
for each man," it must become the explicit objective

or

the

reflectively conscious strivings of man's spiritual lite.

Only

then is it able to take firm root and blossom forth from the
subterranean levels of man's being into the clear light of consciousness where its transformative power can take tull et.tact
on that consciousness.
The reason for this lies in the fact that this union is a
contact

or

presence and presence involves the total

d~m9nsions

341 am indebted to the insights of Karl Rahner in his explanation, as a theologian, o.t the supernatural a pr1~ri of our
spiritual being. In the course of his exposit!one states,
"Man lives consciously even when he does not 'know• it and does
not believe it, i.e. cannot make it an individual object or
his knowledge merely by introspection. This is the inexpressible but existing ground or the dynamic power of all spiritual and moral life in the actual sphere or spiritual existence
founded by God, i.e. supernaturally elevated, a 'merely a-priori'
existing ground, but still existing, something ot which we are
conscious of in being conscious of ourselves, not as an object,
but nevertheless existing.n Karl Rabner, Nature and Grace (London:
Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 31.
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of the person.

A contact

or

presence is not something that can

be fully achieved on only one level of personal activity through
implicit consciousness.

We have seen that the personal activity

of the human person jn establishing that contact of presence is
a response to the presence of a personal absolute--a presence
that has a stimulus and protundity to it alone.

Thie is the

exact locus of the difficulty since the presence here in question is that of the transcendent person.hood ot God.
How can there be a contact of presence with this transcendent reality on the experiential conscious level of man?

The

conditions for this can be determined with some accuracy because
a model for it is provided in every contact ot presence between
two persons, which is itself a process of transcendence.

Any-

contact ot presence between two subjects can occur only to the
extent that they manifest their inwardness to one another in
their actions towards and communication with each other.

Our

knowledge of other persons always involves and is dependent
upon the self-manifestation of their subjectivity since it lies
hidden beyond what is directly available to our experience of
them.

A contact of presence, then, is always a transcendent

process, occurring beyond the limitations of our direct experience through the self-manifestations of the persons involved.
such interpersonal communion provides the model for determining what is required for a diVine-human communion to take
place within the conscious experience of man, at least as an
hypothesis.
vity

Just as· the transcendent reality of the subjecti-

of a person can be known only through the self-communication
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of that subjectivity, so also does this hold true for a knowledge

of the transcendent reality of God.

In both instances, within

the paradigmatic situation of interpersonal communion, the category that is correlative to transcendence is that or self-manifestation, or revelation.

Therefore, on whatever level there

is effected a contact of presence with God, it is primarily and

essentially dependent on God's self-manifestation.
We have already seen this self-manifestation reflected
through the various forms of His immanent activity which bears
witness to "a presence in a certain fashion self-revealing."

(S.P. 53; cf. also P• 46)

But the contact of presence resulting

from this manner of revelation clearly does not attain· that
level of unification Sturzo maintains is necessary for it "to
find fulfilment with its cognitional value in each man."

The

exact words of Sturzo are: "But, since this unification, though
essential in the idea of creatureliness. in order to find fulfilment with its cognitional value in each man, must in some
way be inserted into human process, it will be well first of
all to make it clear what human process means." (I.L. xxiv)

The

significant word in Sturzo's statement is "inserted" and it is
clear from the context that what he wants to accent with this
term is that the level of unification referred to is transcendent not merely to the human process, but even to the total
intrinsic intelligible structure of the human process.

Since

it is a unification that occurs within the human process and
yet transcends the intelligible structure of that process, it

will consequently be a unification in which God acts towards
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and communicates with man in a special manner that cannot be
derived from a rational analysis of the human process.

And it

will be more revelatory ot God's presence than is possible to
the receptive dimensions of rational consciousness.

Therefore,

in order tor the human person to enter into a new and higher
communicative union with God, this contact of presence will have
to take place through an added dimension in the subjective structure

or

rational consciousness through which he is able to be

aware ot the mysterious reality of God more directly and fully.
The awareness which makes possible this higher and yet more
fundamental contact of presence--more fundamental because only
~

it can fill the depths of the human spirit--can only occur
through an illumination of faith in which God is the principal
agent.
i

conditions necessary tor it, the inescapable question we are
now confronted with is whether it is something that bas "found
realization in lif'e--that has been embodied, 'incarnated•"?
This raises the question of "the historical problem of Jesus,
of His influence, of the realization of His word through the
centuries," because it is the Christian claim that in the person
of Christ the unification of the human in the divine has in fact
found "a historical center" tor the fullness of its realization.
It is a phenomenon that rests entirely on the historical fact
of the Incarnation of Jesus Obrist.
'?he historical fact of Jesus, His preaching, His miracles, cannot be separated from His affirmation that He
is the Son of God, that He and the Father 'are one.•

I
I

Given the need tor a higher unification with God and the

I'
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'fhey must either be acoepted together or denied together.
But to deny them is not to solve the historical problem
of Jesus, of His influence, of the realization of His
word through the centuries. It would have the unforeseen
yet logical result: that of depriVing history of any intrinsic meaning, reducing it to an interplay of facts
without outcome, to a continuous immanent repetition or
human activity without resolution. (T.L. 231)
This is what Sturzo maintains will be the consequence of denying the Christian claim because the communication of God to man
through Jesus Christ is integrally connected with every historical manifestation of God.

But through this communication in

which the divine has become a part of history in a special way,
it has been revealed that mankind does exist on another level
of participation in and unification with divine reality within
history--a level that has traditionally been termed ttsupernatural".
Sturzo also uses the traditional natural-supernatural terminology in bringing his immanent-transcendent theory of history
to completion.

But it must be definitely established that he

is not developing his theory within the framework of a dualistic,
bifurcated view of reality, the natural and the supernatural,
which ia common to the traditional use of the terms.

For Sturzo,

the two-world view of the natural-supernatural dualism flows from
the fallacy of abstractionism.
others, brought up to consider the two domains from
the point of view of abstract speculation and not in
concrete reality, end by unreflectingly transforming
the distinction between natural and supernatural into
a kind of intellectual separatism. The non-existence
of pure nature, the close interweaving of nature with
the supernatural, through a mysterious and absorbing
fact, is not made the basis of a thoroughgoing scrutiny of reality. (T.L. 46)
Therefore, the natural-supernatural terminology that Sturzo

l

employs does not signify a metaphysical dualism of two worlds,
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but rather two dimensions of a single reality which in its
fundamental character can only be adequately described as •historical.'

This historical reality has two dimensions and both

are necessary for the historicity of man and the ivorld.

Neither

dimension is secondary to or reducible to the other. but rather
both together constitute the single reality of the historical
process.

Or conversely, the historical process. is the very

reality in which the divine and human come together.

One of

the fundamental points tor Sturzo in articulating his historicism was to clearly establish the intrinsic unity ot these two

dimensions of the historical process.

For in doing this he

was directly engaging the prevailing im.manentistic theories ot
history, and more importantly, was showing the theoretical
inadequacies and, consequently, the practical dangers of secularism in all its forms.
Nevertheless, the acceptance of the supernatural fact as
an integral dimension
problems.

or

the human process raises some serious

For example, to mention one, it poses a serious

methodological problem tor every investigation of human reality
in its socio-historical process, that is, as it is concretely
and existentially, that aias to be scientific.

If this super-

natural factor does pervade the whole of this reality as an
integral dimension of it, then, as transcendent and acknowledged only through the vision of a faith that is itself transcendent, how can it be accounted for scientifically?
Sturzo insists that

11

Yet,

to dwell as many do on rational and natural

motives, either through speculative abstractionism or in accordance simply with methodological criteria (with the praiseworthy

268

aim of not confusing the two planes, the natural and the supernatural), renders them inapt to see the synthetic values of
reality and to fight the original separatism that is at the
bottom ot the modern crisis." (C. & S. 559)
presents to the t11inker

0

Just as history

the historicization ot the divine as

a constant datum," so also "society in the concrete historicizes

such problems, too, with all their various consequences, be they
in the scientific, cultural, ethical or religious f'ielda .. ";5
Thus, despite the manifold problems the presence of the divine
within the structure of concrete reality presents to one who is
trying to account for all the dimensions of it, if the insertion of the divine into the human process is a historical and
social phenomenon, he cannot ignore it nor undervalue its influence.

Both factors, the human and divine, must be considered

in any analysis of the "concrete real," if they are present,
or else one will fall guilty of "abstractionism."
In order to be able to understand and analyze society
in the concrete, the sociologist cannot ignore the insertion, or, better, the historicization ot the divine
in lite. While admitting that this fact, of exceptional
as well as perennial importance inthe history of humanity, has been and may be interpreted in diverse and even
Qpposite ways, yet if those who treat of society in the
concrete in its morphological complex and in its becoming
omit or undervalue the religious factor in its historic
worth, they fail in the task they have set themselves
and distort human reality.36

Consequently, in the development of his integral, historicist sociology, Sturzo was inexorably drawn into the problem of
the historicization of the divine, and more specifically, in

35sturzo, "Historicist Sociology," p. 336.

-

36Ibid., P• 335.
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its Christian form.3?

To say that Sturzo was "inexorably"

drawn into dealing with this problem is to indicate that he is
not guilty of the charge that he started from a ready-made
thesis and sought "to introduce an extraneous dogmatic element
into sociology, thus talsif'ying a science grounded on experiment

and induction." (T.L. 12)

It was only his attempt to develop

a truly experimental, four-dimensional science of society in

the total complexity of its concrete existence and historical
development that brought him to the problem of the Christian
presence in history.
Although I wished to establish the natural data of society and keep to historical experience, I could not but
bring into light what history itself teaches us about
Christianity in its special characteristics, not to be
confounded with those of any other religion. In doing
this I started from no dogmatic preconception, but from
historical elements, elements which I interpreted from a
strictly sociological viewpoint, as every author has
the right to do. My theory of historioiat sociologJt
obliged me to study the thesis of supernaturalism in
history, given that this is accepted and professed by
the Christian peoples, whose number, geographical extent and continuity in time surpass those ot any other
human experience historically known. (T.L. 13)
As the intricacies of Sturzo•e theory become unravelled, it is
clear that the movement of his thought is from a consideration
of the socio-historical process in its natural dimension to its
supernatural dimension.

The pivotal concept in this movement,

as we have seen, is the concept of transcendence, and the various meanings and degrees Sturzo assigns to it indicates the
shifts of perspective in his theory.

It is only in his last

3?This, of course, is not to deny the non-Christian forms

L

ot an awareness of the divine in history.

I 11,:
I
!
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major work, The True Life: Socioloftt of the SuRernatural, that
Sturzo undertakes a thorough exposition of the problem of
transcendence in its Christian meaning of the supernatural.
Since it ia the supernatural that integrates and transcends
nature, a sociological study or the supernatural presupposes
an analysis of the natural. (T.L. l?-18; I.L. xxiv)
It is evident, then, that the inclusion or the religiousChristian understanding of transcendence within Sturzo's analysis

or

the socio-historical process cannot be construed as an

a priori or dogmatic factor in his theory, nor can his theory
be viewed, and dismissed, simply as an apology tor Christianity
by setting up in sociological idiom as

the classical "homo religiosus.n

!h,! anthropological model,

In the first place, both of

these views are contrary to hie historicist methodology and the
cognitive orientation of his thought.

In View ot both it should

be apparent that, for Sturzo, there can be no such theoretical

-

construct as the anthropological model.

In his integral, his-

toricist approach be is simply attempting to determine, through
a deepening of sociological-historical research, human reality
as it is so that the indeterminancy of the human process may
be directed toward a broader, deeper and richer future.

Any kind of Christian apology stands as much in opposition
to Sturzo's thought as an a priori rejection of transcendence

or the supernatural by a reductive naturalistic position.

In

regard to this, Sturzo says, "I feel bound to point out that
the historicization of the religious fact cannot be examined by
the sociologist as a unilateral or particularist vision ot
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society, nor in a polemical position allied with those who deny
the supernatural or those who assert a natural religiosity. 11 38

As A. R. Caponigri has pointed out, Sturzo had no sympathy for
e!forte to reconstruct history from the point of view of Christianity.

All that the recognition of the presence of a divine,

transcendent factor within history does mean for him is the
need to formulate tta theory of history wide enough and dynamic
enough to embrace in a complex unity this duality of presence
without the undue subordination of one element to the other."39
Since Sturzo's theory of history is an essential component
of his comprehensive sociological theory, it ia important in
understanding both to determine his perspective on the science
of sociology and how it can incorporate transcendent !actors

within its study of the socio-historical process.

Sturzo him-

-

self provides this information 1n the "Introduction" to The

True Life in order to establish the methodological and formal
distinction between his theory of society, termed by him "integral sociology," which remains open to every detail

or

reality,

and others, which, by contrast, are either abstractionist, analytical, morphological, or particularist.

For our purposes here

it is enough to emphasize that in Sturzo's understanding of
sociology it is a study of society in the concrete, in its
historical development, and directed toward discovering "the

inner laws that are bound up with its very nature." (T.L. 3)
38sturzo, "Historicist Sociology,'' p. 336.
I,

39A. R. Caponigri, "Introduction" to Sturzo's Church and
State, P• xii.
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By contrast, for other sociologists, especially those influenced
by positivism, sociology is a study of society in the abstract,
in its fixed morphology, and directed toward the gathering of
external tacts.

Methodologically, Sturzo's view of sociology

differs from other views in his emphasis on bringing the results of analysis into synthesis so that society is approached
and understood in its liVing, concrete complexity.

Consequently,

if a transcendent factor is at work within the human process,
it must be accounted for within a study of society "in the
concrete.n

Otherwise, it is "either simply analytical (presup-

posing'the synthesis' with the supernatural), or is falsified
by the omission of essential data on the social reality." (T.L.

14)

or

Another distortion that follows from an a priori rejection
the supernatural is the reduction of religion, as a social

fact, to either a closed naturalism or to a political moralism,
which is preservative of the status and privileges of the
ruling classes.

All

or

these errors "spring from considering

sociology an experimental science of external facts, and eliminating both philosophy, as a metaphysical construction, and
history, as the inner process of society." (T.L. 5)
But for Sturzo, developing his historicist social theory
in accord with his historical method, the empirical data of
history, "not the outer history of the material facts but their
inner reason, their logical connection, the metaphysic to which
they give birth," does in fact point to the intervention of
special divine action within the temporal process.

The fac-

tual elements that reflect a human-divine synthesis at work
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within the temporal process revolves around the transformation
effected through Christianity in the history ot man.
The sociologist cannot deny the transformation effected
by Christianity, whether he regards it from the historical point of viewt or compares Christian societies with
non-Christian, or truly Christian societies with those
which are Christian in name only or which have degenerated in faith and morals. All the naturalistic explanations cannot suffice to elucidate the reason tor such
a transformation." (T.L. 5; 12)
Two difficulties immediately present themselves.

Has

Sturzo confused those factors of reality that can be acknowledged only with the vision of faith with those that can be
subjected to a strictly rational, scientific explanation?

It

he has not done this, how can the transcendent character of the
socio-historical process be present to the sociologist as such,
that is, as a scientist?

The emphasis which Sturzo gives to

the transcendence of the supernatural dimension of history makes
it clear that he has not attempted to reduce what can be acknowledged only through faith to rational analysis.

As transcen-

dent the divine activity in history manifests very little or
its transcendental character in any single event.

And as trans-

cendent it can never be reached or recognized by adding the
empirical data of the historical process. (T.L. 228)

The his-

torical process can never directly reveal divine activity within

it, but to the extent that it is immanent within the process,
the process does function as a refracting medium of this divine
action.

What Sturzo does maintain is that no reductive, natur-

alistic approach to history can provide the context of meaning
for interpreting, and thereby making intelligible, the histori-

L
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cal process which includes the transformation wrought

by Chris-

tianity.
In regard to the second difficulty, namely, how a sociologist as such can handle transcendent facts within his discipline, Sturzo affirms:
The supernatural is not made a separate section ot
social life, something juxtaposed to the natural, which
individuals may accept or reject at will. In studying
society in its complex wholeness, in the concrete, it
is found to exist within the atmosphere or the supernatural, and to act and react to it according to the
sociological laws which are at its natural basis. (T.L.
18)

Since the individual forms the constitutive principle of society
in all its forms, all that touches the spirit of man, whether
naturally or supernaturally, will manifest itself in society.
''In the concrete" there is no such thing as a "purely natural"
life.

There is only a dual-dimensional, natural-supernatural,

life in which the latter dimension raises the former to itself,
"coordinates its values and ends, and synthesizes it in its own
form. tt {T.L. 26)

Thus, the sociologist who views sociology as

'I
i

"the science of the concrete" and wishes to investigate social
phenomena as they are "in the concreteu cannot view the results
of his research as "purely natural" facts.

To do so is to

reduce the results of his research to "a mental or methodological abstraction." (T.L. l)
The natural and supernatural are so intertwined in all
social 11.fe that in the concrete of history it is hard
to discern where one is at work without the intervention of the other. The tacts themselves, in their complexity, show the imprint of a higher value as soon as
we discern the motives of faith and love that have
shaped them." (T.L. 12)
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Consequently, in his work, The True Life, Sturzo examines the
nature, value. and influence ot the supernatural dimension ot
the human process on society as it exists concretel7.

The

notion of a close interweaving of the natural with the super-

natural, with one influencing the other and vice versa, forms
the basis of this work.
Within the scope of this essay, a central question remains

to be answered in view ot the acknowledgement of the special
divine dispensation made manifest through the Incarnation ot
Christ.

If this essay accurately portrays the logical movement

of Sturzo•e thought, what effect does the acknowledgement of
this new dispensation, which admittedly can be grasped in its
true and full historical value only through faith, have on the
rational presentation of his theory.

In other words, what

readjustments, if any, must be made in that theory in view ot
the fuller picture proVided by the light of faith?

Sturzo him-

self provides the answer to this question within the context of
his discussion of the movement towards, and attainment

or,

truth by those peoples who were outside Israel in pre-Ohristian
times.
When at last these peoples (and similarly each individual) arrive at a knowledge of the substantial truth,
the Word ot God in His Incarnation, then all their
past conquests (of truth) are lit by a new lite, the
glimmerings ot truth grow bright, everything is reoriented and coordinated, and their histo%'7 reveals itself
as a hesitant journey in the dark towards this term,
a secret symbol which is now unveiled •••• (T.L. 239J
Conclusion

In arriving at and acknowledging the historicization of

L
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God's own divine nature in the person of

Cb~ist,

Sturzo'a theory

of soeio-personalism and this essay have come full circle.

We

began our treatment of Sturzo by stating that the individual
person was the central concern of both his socio-political
theory and activity--o! his theory to uncover the nature of
the person and the conditions necessary tor its realization,
and of his activity to create the economic and socio-political
conditions that are commensurate to that nature, preserving its
innate dignity and enhancing the possibilities for its completion.

Since the person, for Sturzo, is ultimately and essen-

tially constituted in his primordial relationship to and movement towards God, and since Christianity, as the historical
prolongation-participation in the divine person ot Obrist, has
fully revealed and brought about the fullness of this relationship, the insight into the nature of the person is basically and
essentially a Christian insight.

And due to the nature ot both

the person and Christianity, it is an insight that is only
mediated through history.

1'hus, it is also history that testi-

fies that "the fundamental error is to conceive ot Humanism and
Christianity as separate. to keep their values distinct and often
to oppose them, and finally to eliminate one ot the two from
the redeeming synthesis." (C. & s. 560)

With his theory ot

history, consequently, Sturzo's socio-personalisa is brought to
completion, and reveals itself to be in its most fundamental
character a Christian-humanism.
I
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